


The Past Meets the Present: Picking the Eyes Out of The Country

No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable.

Adam Smith¹

Many observers have claimed that the “master narrative” of South African history “is the violence of conquest, the violence of the frontier wars, the violence of apartheid and of the struggle against apartheid, the criminal violence of gangs and the ritualised violence of the faction fights”². But the current patterns of violence in South Africa need to be understood against the background of local struggles against private and government attempts to contain and manage the aspirations and expectations of the African majority.³ Today the lack of redress in these areas accounts for much of the black indifference to the outcomes of a new, more democratic post 1994 political dispensation. Getting to the root of political violence in South Africa thus requires a healthy dose of skepticism about the apparent certainties of the master narrative. As James Scott suggests, economic and political conjuncture often creates desires and aspirations among otherwise marginal protagonists that the state cannot easily cater for, or even anticipate.⁴

Power and violence have played an integral role in shaping the lives and expectations of South Africa’s population for more than three centuries. Now, however, its population is struggling to make popular elections and the drafting of new laws and constitutions the only legitimate means of political contest. But as the recent murder of Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging leader, Eugene Terre’Blanche, the 2003 actions and trials of Boeremag assassins and saboteurs and the sharp spike in *plaasmoorde* or murders of white farmers in North-West Province between 1997 and 2003 suggest, violent forms of contest can, on occasion, assume renewed vigour and thus reprise earlier periods of state terror and mass civil disobedience.⁵ In fact, many people remain confused about whether South Africa’s respective eras of segregation and apartheid were coincidental misfortunes or deliberate instances of social engineering. This confusion turns largely on a general misunderstanding of how official and unofficial forms of collective violence weighed in to shore up the previous social order.⁶



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...it [the law] is just like a river in full flood...you've got nothing in your hand with which to stem them.⁷

Kas Maine circa 1984

Few, if any, of the black witnesses from Rustenburg and Marico for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) suffered from this kind of confusion. In mid 1997, L.S., or Lizo Makganye, testified at one of the TRC's public hearings in the town of Zeerust on 6 May 1997. He came as an unassuming peasant farmer who took the purpose of the proceedings at face value. He had come from his nearby village to talk about how he and his fellow Bahurutshe had resisted incorporation into the apartheid regime's fictional nation-state, Bophuthatswana, even though the Commissioners wanted him to talk about how his son and other young people from his village had been arrested and tortured in 1993. At one point, the conversation between the elder Makganye and the Commissioners took a turn that was reminiscent of William Faulkner's claim that "the past is never really the past":

CHAIRPERSON: You said earlier on...that there was a struggle of the people of Braaklagte against incorporation but that was around 1989...but this happened in 1993. What was happening in 1993 that made the police come back in such large numbers, back into the community and take such action against the people?

MAKGANYE: *They did so because we did not want to be incorporated in Boputhatswana.*

CHAIRPERSON: But incorporation had taken place already. We're talking about 1993, we're not talking about 1989. Incorporation had taken place already.

MAKGANYE: *Do you say we were incorporated in Boputhatswana?*

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MAKGANYE: *Do you say we were incorporated in Boputhatswana in 1993? We didn't agree. When they, immediately they said we were incorporated, we did not agree. We continued with our struggle, because we knew that there was nothing called Boputhatswana; it's part of South Africa.*

When Makganye had completed this portion of his testimony, the Commissioner mildly admonished him by saying: "We just wanted to hear about what you have written in your statement, but now you are telling us about the land"⁸. Of course, Makganye was at pains to see how one could separate the two so

neatly, for why else and at whose behest had the soldiers come? Unlike the TRC's commissioners, Mr Makganye understood that South Africa would never be secure as long as it ignored the aspirations of a significant portion of its people, or worse, identified them as potential enemies of the state.

Equally contradictory public conversations had taken place at the outset of South Africa's protracted transformation into a high modernist interventionist state.⁹ On the afternoon of 20 April 1914, less than hundred miles from where L.S. Makganye had testified in 1997 and less than a year after the infamous Natives Land Act had been promulgated by the Union Government, a prominent Afrikaner farmer from the Hex River Ward of Rustenburg, C.J. du Plessis, declared to a district court:

The natives in the Hex River Ward I think should be treated just the same as other natives, but they have got ground, in that Ward, and it is very difficult for me to state what should be done with them ... In the long run they will have to be shifted. They must realise that they cannot go on as they are at present. If Hex River were left as it is, where a white man or Kaffir could buy where he liked, it would result in war.¹⁰

War did come but not as du Plessis imagined. In mid October 1914, over twelve thousand men like du Plessis and their families participated in or gave passive support to a rural rebellion against South Africa's entry into the First World War on the British side and the realisation that the 1913 Natives' Land Act would not give white farmers complete control over the lives and expectations of their African tenants and labourers. A pogrom against the persons and property of many Africans and nonwhites in the Hex River, Zwartuggens, and Dinokana wards of Rustenburg and Marico ensued.¹¹ Government forces and rebels alike participated in the spoils and carnage.

Despite looting by both the rebels and government forces, the machinery of African expropriation continued to move much too slowly for most white farmers.¹² After 1924, Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog sought to calm the fears of these farmers by increasing the number of days that an African labour tenant was obliged to work on his landlord's farm from 90 to 180.

He also appointed one of the principal leaders of the 1914 Rebellion, General J.C.G. Kemp, as Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Justice. But the pace of African land dispossession outside the designated reserves did not accelerate. Nor was there any appreciable decline in the number of Africans having direct access to productive land.¹³

White farmers felt particularly aggrieved about African landowners in their midst.¹⁴ As long as white farmers, African share and labour tenants, and smallholders made use of the same technology—namely the wagon, draft animals and the plow—force and coercion remained the most palpable means of subordinating the rural black population.¹⁵ However marginal some African holdings might have been, neighbouring white farmers claimed that African landowners and share tenants had “picked the eyes out of the country”, right up to President J.B. Vorster’s christening of the fraudulent “Bantustans” in December 1977.¹⁶

The Past Meets the Present

Between the Great Slump of the latter part of the nineteenth century and the Great Depression of the 1930s, because of the lag between the production of gold and commodities, access to hard cash became a chronic source of potential impoverishment for farmers, workers and indeed, for poorer countries.¹⁷ Once the commercial exploitation of the Witwatersrand’s gold reef commenced, especially acute periods of economic downturn in the South African countryside and the devastation of war, periodically turned thousands of small and middling white farmers into paupers. Between the 1922 recession and the 1926 collapse of global agricultural prices, more than a third of the white population of the Western Transvaal experienced such a fate.¹⁸

Up to the 1930s, after the worst effects of the previous depressions had subsided, industrial entrepreneurs viewed these developments more confidently. They imagined them to be a means of disciplining wages and “correcting” the relationship between the real economy and its financial structure.¹⁹ But South Africa’s white farmers did not share the confidence of the investment groups that controlled the country’s mineral wealth and the new industrial entrepreneurs that import substitution and the dramatic economic conjuncture of the First World War had spawned.²⁰ Many white farmers believed they saw real enemies in the midst of their economic difficulties – Jewish cattle auctioneers and general dealers, Indian store owners and traders and accumulating African

smallholders and labour tenants. In their estimate, after Louis Botha’s death in August 1919, Jan Smuts’ government had directly handed the country over to the former two and, by 1920, was rapidly making provisions to accommodate Africans in what they perceived as a triumvirate of misrule.²¹ The increasing numbers of impoverished rural Afrikaners throughout the 1920s “irrevocably politicised the ‘poor white question’”, while constraining the state’s ability to depict white poverty as a consequence of moral or personal failings.²²

Middling and poor Afrikaner farmers continued to press for a solution that would result in a *boerestand* or economic safety net. They saw themselves as white republicans with a small “r”. Their ideal republic would have been composed of independent, self-employed communities of white people who worked with their hands. A white farmer from Lichtenburg, G. A. van der Walt, expressed their sentiments shortly after the election of 1920: “The government unwisely allowed the banks to issue more paper money than there was gold to back it, and the banks pushed this paper money into the country with all their power... Speculators—the gentlemen—ruined Afrikaner farmers, while Smuts did nothing”²³. Another put it more bluntly: “Our products are their property before we even sow... and you and I are their servants, who must be sure that it goes in the bag for them.” Falling prices compelled all farmers to maximise production while holding down costs. These situations were made doubly tragic by the frequent flight of adolescent children from the households of white farmers and African labour tenants alike, because of the fury of their fathers over highly leveraged crop yields, indebtedness and fluctuating agricultural prices.²⁴

There was fear, victimisation, entitlement of students, a new type of selfhood, anger at the malaise,...

Meanwhile, just as some white farmers believed themselves to be acquiring the upper hand by expropriating the cattle and movable property of their African labour tenants, under the nebulous stipulations of the Land Act, banks and general dealers ceased to think of cattle as collateral and a means of settling debts.²⁵ By 1924, once auctioneers acquired a surfeit of cattle, distinctions between breeding cattle and workaday draft oxen became virtually meaningless. Yet the relative worthlessness of cattle did not

prevent creditors from seizing them as surety against outstanding debt. Many local officials thought the spreading financial ruin in the countryside presaged a breakdown of law and order, while many resident white farmers genuinely believed that they were the victims of a cabal of *die meneere* of local Nationalist propaganda (the ubiquitous Jewish cattle auctioneers and general dealers, Indian storeowners and African *bysaaiers* or labour tenants of wealthier farmers). The slogan of *Red Ons Self* or “Save Ourselves” became a cry of defiance against Smuts, the “Kaffir King”, and his alleged paymasters in the mining industry.²⁶ Tielman Roos, the chief firebrand of the Nationalist opposition in the Transvaal, who also dabbled in attempting to bring Afrikaner workers into the Nationalist fold, put it this way on the eve of the white miners’ general strike and rebellion of January-March 1922: “Simply ensure that the Boer on the *platteland* makes friends with the Boer in the towns, and everything will come right”²⁷.

The desire for an economic cushion against hard times often expressed itself violently, and the rhetoric of *oorstroming* (swamping) or *swart gevaar* (black peril) could be mobilised. Various iterations of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party attempted to harness this potential for moral panics and mass hysteria for their own purposes.²⁸ Not only did the fear of being overwhelmed by the African majority animate the public discussion around strengthening the confiscatory features of the Land Act, but it also sought to insure and deepen the disparity between black and white wages and working conditions in South Africa’s cities and towns, even as Hertzog’s Nationalist-Labour Pact administration attempted to cap the number of impoverished rural whites migrating to the cities and towns. The labour legislation of Hertzog’s Pact Government – the Wage Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, and the Civilised Labour Act – strongly underscored these aspirations.²⁹

The Recent Past

...South Africa, as far as we aboriginals are concerned, is a country perpetually in the throes of martial law, from which there is no escape.

D D T Jabavu circa 1934³⁰

Today South Africa is a moderately industrialised country of 48 million people. It is also a member of the G20 group of industrial nations.³¹ Its great paradox is that perhaps only about 12 to 15 million of its 48 million people live as if it is an industrial country.

Seven million of the 12 to 15 million have only begun to experience a middle class standard of living in the last generation — shortly before the country’s first truly democratic election in April 1994. The social costs of achieving this status have placed a crushing burden on South Africa’s remaining 30 odd million people.

After the Sharpeville Massacre, the South African state was crafted around four major policy objectives: tighter racial exclusion (at least until 1985); anti-black urbanisation (with the recommendations of the 1952 Tomlinson Commissions and the 1923 and 1925 Native Urban Areas Acts as points of departure); “Bantu education”; and finally “separate development”, which combined with the periodic expulsions of hundreds of thousands of people from the cities and towns, just as hundreds of thousands more were finding their way to the cities in defiance of the pass laws. The latter two policies — “Bantu education” and “separate development” — were therefore highly abstract given South Africa’s expanded industrial production. Moreover, they were virtually impossible to enforce in any coherent fashion. However, many of apartheid’s architects, who had hoped for a German and Axis victory during the Second World War, represented some of the last remnants of the kind of authoritarianism that threatened the entire globe after the Great Depression.³²

Apartheid’s legacy gave a particularly perverse twist to the failure to invest sufficient resources in human capital and public education. For example, between 1994 and 1999, during apartheid’s protracted demise under the first and second African National Congress (ANC) governments, South Africa paid off a large portion of its debt. Ironically the governments of PW Botha and FW De Klerk had amassed the largest portion of this debt, after a state of emergency was declared in 1985, and after South Africa had initiated a massive war of destabilisation against Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Zambia under the rubric of “total strategy”.³³ In fact, the latter war began shortly after the 16 June 1976 Soweto or Children’s Uprising. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives throughout the region and over 124 of South Africa’s 129 cities and towns were administered directly by the South African Defence Force (SADF) from the end of 1985 to 1990.³⁴

Meanwhile, in 1993, unemployment was 30 to 40 percent for blacks (42 percent for rural blacks, 35 percent for urban blacks, 44 percent for black males

and 34 percent for black females). By 2005, however, the weighted average for black unemployment had grown to 41 percent. These tragic circumstances have led to a “generational crisis” of daunting dimensions.³⁵

Participants in the “youth revolt” of 16 June 1976 are now middle-aged. This has a number of implications. For example, Orlando East High School in Soweto – “The Rock” as it used be called by many of its students – having been closed for several years for lack of students, has recently reopened with less than 200 scholars enrolled. Yet this was the secondary school that produced the largest number of black doctors and engineers under apartheid.³⁶ Were there comparable schools elsewhere in South Africa? If so, what do enrollments look like now? Would it be worth locating students who attended such schools to see if their views of what happened have changed substantially?

Any discussion of the South African “generational crisis” should also take account of the dramatic increase in HIV/AIDS cases between 1990 and 1994. This increase may have been due to the undercounting of the black population by the previous apartheid governments. The opportunistic nature of the disease would also lend itself to the increase.³⁷ The gutting of South Africa’s textile industry and metals trades and the subsequent loss of nearly 200,000 jobs between 1999 and 2003, and the periodic spot labour shortages in various kinds of mining operations have accentuated the implications of the AIDS crisis and added to the globalising conundrum” and “disabling social actions”.³⁸ But one has to go back to the beginning of the twentieth century to grasp how these apparently South African dilemmas have been aggravated and underscored by the global shift in power and wealth that threatens to short-circuit industrial production in the North Atlantic countries and in South Africa.

From the end of the nineteenth century to the American stock market crash of October 1987, gold and oil were the two great cornerstones of the modern capitalist economy.³⁹ Presently, information distributed electronically and broken down into units smaller than milliseconds has become the third cornerstone of the global economic system — one which combines the mystical and productive capacity of the previous two into one entity by way of micro processing.⁴⁰ The advent of this third cornerstone underscored the shift

of the centre of the financial structure of the global economy from the North Atlantic countries, including the United States, to the countries of the North Pacific Asian rim, particularly China, after the October 1987 stock market crash.

The destruction of the old industrial pattern of work centered on the notion of the job and its replacement by techniques associated with micro processing and genetic engineering has produced a formidable means of challenging continued Western dominance of the global economy.⁴¹ For example, China, with approximately 240 million engineers out of its billion and a quarter people – very nearly more engineers than there are people in the United States – as taken up this challenge in dramatic fashion. How does South Africa fit into this scheme of events, processes and outcomes?

What does this “historic debt” amount to?

Essentially it is the result of the unrequited effort of multiple generations of underpaid and underemployed workers going back to the outset of South Africa’s industrial transformation in 1868.⁴³

Against the background of the “generational crisis” and the popular demand for an enlarged and speedier delivery of public services, South Africa’s big multinational corporations and financial houses have experienced fairly high growth rates since 1994. However, these high growth rates have been generated largely by the profits South African companies have made on foreign investments and on the purchase of foreign industrial companies – South African Brewery’s purchase of the Miller Brewing Company in the United States, for example. To their credit, the last two governments compelled private enterprises to pay their taxes at a higher rate and with more regularity than they did under the Afrikaner Nationalist governments, even though it remains to be seen whether private South African companies will at some point pay the “historic debt” that they owe to the society rather than to any specific group.⁴² What does this “historic debt” amount to? Essentially it is the result of the unrequited effort of multiple generations of underpaid and underemployed workers going back to the outset of South Africa’s industrial transformation in 1868.⁴³

The state cannot presently compel any private South African company to pay such a debt. Their line of argument would certainly be that virtually none of them existed at the inception of South Africa's industrial revolution. Yet any attempt to grow the public sector by increasing the income tax on higher real wages would have to be underwritten initially by greater contributions from private enterprises to public education and the fostering of fast track adult education and apprenticeship programmes in basic industry.⁴⁴ The pain of increasing real wages might be offset by distributing increases in such a way that the initial reduction in profit rates would not disproportionately affect labour intensive industries such as construction more than those industries where the cost of hiring labour with certain skills is constantly being weighed against the purchase of labour saving technology.⁴⁵ Moreover, lifetime earnings would increase with a greater investment in human capital and there would be a net gain in terms of creating an expanded pool of labor that was better educated and endowed with portable skills.⁴⁶ Anything short of the latter approach leaves the prospect of improving and expanding public education and targeting specifically troublesome areas such as the first few years of primary education and secondary education at a decided disadvantage. Hence any major improvements in health, public education, public transportation and mass communications must now be effected by cracking down on corruption within the government bureaucracy rather, than by putting a larger number of people to work at a living wage.⁴⁷

Tom Hertz's study on education, which he conducted with a team of researchers at the behest of the Mandela government's Labour Commission, bears out some of these conclusions. Hertz's study did not concur with the outcomes that the key ministers in the first Mbeki government were fishing for. As a result, the government let the study die a quiet death, even though it was funded with a grant of several million dollars from the MacArthur Foundation. The crux of Hertz's argument is that contributions that most black families can make to a child's education are marginal at best, and that unless some nationally standardised outreach program (preferably housed in the National Research Foundation and subsidised by public and private contributions) is put in place and aimed at the primary and secondary schools, rates of attrition among black students will get worse before they get better in the netherworld beyond the Model C schools.⁴⁸

Corporate managers and public officials therefore must now pay particular and meticulous attention to the present as well as the future. They must have a precise sense of just how many people are going without much needed public services in Tongaat and Mogwase as well as in Cape Town's Claremont and Johannesburg's Houghton or run the risk of being engulfed by problems that even the most farseeing manager could not have imagined, much less foreseen.⁴⁹

How much of South Africa's past is embedded in its present? How has its past impeded or advanced its future? The new South Africa is still in the making. Between 1993 and 1997, South Africa's rural black population went from 44 to 51 percent. This amounted to a net increase of the rural black population of more than seven percent in less than five years. The percentage of economically vulnerable black people living in the rural areas has risen faster than the net increase of rural population— to the point that more than 70 percent of this group can now be found in the rural areas. Meanwhile, South Africa's rural white population has shrunk dramatically since 1970, without a concomitant reduction in the amount of private property owned by whites.⁵⁰ Nevertheless white droplets of rural misery

like Bapsfontein have also increased sharply since 2003.⁵¹

The blasted lives jammed into makeshift rural settlements lining the N1 and N4 highways, from Pelandaba, just below the Hartbeestpoort Dam to Ledig, and now in white informal settlements near towns such as Bapsfontein, bear powerful witness to these tragic circumstances. As long as the present South African government continues to describe such people as “gainfully employed,” even though they are buffeted between fitful bouts of employment on farms, mines, textile sweatshops, an increasing number of game and theme parks, and peddling trinkets in the “informal sector,” it will find its economic policies hobbled by those who continue to dispute the official version of the past and the present.

Increasing the portable skills of young people in city and countryside and focusing on the outcomes of education rather than how much money is spent for them should become top priorities for South Africa

if it wishes to avoid the dystopian portents of a generation ago. As a result, the metrics of any new economic policy must now become the extent to which it assists in creating sustainable livelihoods for the greatest number of real people – from small plot farmers who are being urged to increase productivity by making better use of fallow land, to auto workers in Port Elizabeth and East London. And all this has to be done without triggering dramatic inflationary spirals.⁵² As Trevor Manuel said several years ago, “We remain under pressure on the macro side” – that is to say, South Africa is in a race to fill and expand its vast industrial capacity with indigenous resources.⁵³ If government spending to enhance the infrastructure for the World Cup, for example, results in better run cities over the long run and in eradicating circumstances that compel a significant portion of the urban workforce to wake up at two in the morning to get to work by eight, then the current and past inequities might begin to recede into the deep recesses of the public memory. If not, immediate success will translate into long term failure.

NOTES

- 1 As quoted in Tony Judt's *Ill Fares the Land*, in *New York Review of Books*, April 29, 2009, volume LVII, Number 7, 18
- 2 See Andre Du Toit, *Understanding South African Political Violence: A New Problematic?*, UNRISD (United Nations Institute for Research and Development), Discussion Paper 43, April 1993, 6-10.
- 3 See Aninka Claassen, Umhlabla: Rural Land Struggles in the Transvaal in the 1980s (Johannesburg, South Africa: Transvaal Rural Action Committee, 1989); see also André Du Toit, *Understanding South African Political Violence: A New Problematic?*, UNRISD (United Nations Institute for Research and Development), Discussion Paper 43, April 1993, 6-10.
- 4 See James Scott, *Seeing Like A State* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1998), 5-8.
- 5 See David Smith, *Tension simmers as Terr'Blanche is laid to rest*, Mail and Guardian, April 10 2010 (<http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-04-10-tension-simmers-as-terrebl...>); Stephanie Nieuwoudt, *The brandy and coke approach*, Mail and Guardian, April 9 2010 (<http://www.mg.co.za/printformat/single/2010-04-09-the-brandy-and...>); Sebastien Berger, *SouthAfrica: Police Use Barbed Wire to Separate Whites and Blacks*, 06 April 2010 (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindia...>); Report of the Special Committee of Inquiry on Farm Attacks (henceforth: SAPS Report, 2003), *The Nature of Farm Attacks (Chapter 1)*, 1-12.
- 6 For example, in a recent interview, David de Gavea, a 24-year old unemployed Afrikaner said of the apartheid era, “*The main thing that was wrong about apartheid was its name. We should have called it ‘diversity’*”: see Richard Lapper, *A People Set Apart*, Financial Times, April 10/April 11 2010, 6.
- 7 Quoted in Martin Chanock, *The Making of South African Legal Culture* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 42.
- 8 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (henceforth TRC), Case JB 0716, L. S. Makganye (www.doj.gov.za/trc/index.html).
- 9 See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like A State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 5-8; see also David Yudelman, *The Emergence of Modern South Africa: State, Capital, and the Incorporation of Organized Labour* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1983).
- 10 See U. G. 23 '18 (1918) Report of the Native Lands Commission, Western Transvaal (Cape Town: Cape Times, Government Printers, 1918), *Testimony of C. J. du Plessis*.
- 11 See South African National Archives/ Rebellion Losses Commission (henceforth SANA/RLC), Pretoria, South Africa, SAB JUS S270 (vol. 51), *Statement of Essop Haji* (16/6/15) and *Statement of Abdul Hamid Ameer* (16/6/15); see also SAB, JUS S270, *Sworn Statements of the Mundel Brothers* (Wolf Hermann and Jessel Sam) of farm Tweerivier no. 823 (Rustenburg, Hex River Ward).
- 12 SANA/RLC, SAB JUS S270, 13th January 1916, Sub-Native Commissioner, Rustenburg (Hemsworth), to Rebellion Losses Commission, Pretoria [J. Mahuma, translator].
- 13 See Marian Lacey, Working for Boroko (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981), 194-246; see also U. G. 23-18 Report of the Natives Lands Committee, Western Transvaal, (Cape Town: Cape Times Ltd., Government Printers, 1918), 7-57 (testimonies of G. J. van Tonder, Louis Stephanus Steyn, D. Theron, Heinrich Wilhelm Jensen, Frederik Hendrik Conrad Tonsing); see also *Evidence of Frederik Christoffel Eloff, Inspector of Lands for Rustenburg, Bierkraal 545*.
- 14 See Ernest Thomas Stubbs Papers A954 (Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa), Box 1, folder 4.
- 15 Tim Keegan, *The Origins of Agrarian Capitalism in South Africa: A Reply*, *Journal of South African Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 4, October 1989, 680-681.
- 16 T. G. 11-1908 Report of the Transvaal Indigency Commission 1906-08 (Pretoria: Government Printing and Stationery Office, 1908), *Testimony of Johannes Hendrik Hattingh*, 321-322; see also Yolandi Groenewald, *State changes its tune*, Mail and Guardian, Tuesday, August 12, 2003 (<http://www.mg.co.za/Content/13.asp?ao=18888>).
- 17 Joseph Schumpeter, *A History of Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 405 and 1075-1079; Elmar Altvater, *Eléments pour une critique méthodologique des theories bourgeoises de la conjuncture*, *Critiques De L'Économie Politique*, avril-septembre 1973, 57-58.
- 18 At the beginning of November 1928, A. Grant, Secretary for the Public Service Commission, sent Lieutenant Colonel J. G. B. Clayton to Rustenburg and Marico because of the alarming number of bankruptcies among white farmers in the two districts. Clayton concluded bankruptcies were bound to increase because at least a third of the white farmers in these two districts were already “over their heads with debt” because they had paid too much for farms they had purchased: see South African National Archives (henceforth SANA) SAB SDK, vol. 103, file 4/13/13-4/13/15, 10-11 December 1928, *Lands: Inspection Report Rustenburg and Marico*.
- 19 W. Arthur Lewis, *Growth and Fluctuation* (Boston: Aldine Publishers, 1965), 28; Pierre Vilar, *A History of Gold and Money* (London and New York: Verso Books, 1976), 330-336; Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, *Lord Milner and the South African State*, *History Workshop*, No. 8, Autumn (1979), 56-60.
- 20 See Thomas Lamont Papers (Baker Business Library, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts: henceforth TLP), file 23 (2) *Correspondence: Thomas Lamont to Jan Smuts, 29th June 1937*; see also Rusell Ally, *Gold and Empire* (Johannesburg, University of Witwatersrand Press, 1994), 12-28.
- 21 Afrikaner farmers were not alone in displaying occasional outbursts of virulent anti-Semitism. John Gaspar Gubbins, a venture capitalist and “progressive” farmer, wrote regularly to his sister Bertha Tuffnell, claiming that he was being gouged by the general dealers Mosenthal and Sons, and that “Jew middlemen

- and auctioneers" were making excessive profits from the sale of meat: see John Gaspar Gubbins Papers A1134 (Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa). Correspondence: 12.V.1914 to 6.XI.1918, Gubbins to Tuffnell, Otshoop.
- 22 Timothy Paul Clynick, *Afrikaner Political Mobilization in the Western Transvaal: Popular Consciousness and the State* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University at Kingston, Canada, 1996), 16-24.
 - 23 Timothy Paul Clynick, *Afrikaner Political Mobilization in the Western Transvaal: Popular Consciousness and the State, 1920-1930* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University at Kingston, Canada, 1996), 92-93.
 - 24 SANA, SAB SDK vol. 103, file 4/13/13-4/13/15, Lands: Inspection Report Rustenburg and Marico; see also Charles van Onselen's magisterial *The Seed is Mine* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), especially the chapters entitled *Consolidation and Struggle*.
 - 25 Solomon T. Plaatje, *Native Life in South Africa* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Ravan Press, 1982), 79-81; see also.
 - 26 Timothy Paul Clynick, *Afrikaner Political Mobilization in the Western Transvaal: Popular Consciousness and the State, 1920-1930*, 100-101 and 108-109; see also.
 - 27 Roos's speech was entitled *Boerestand en Arbeiderstand*: see Timothy Paul Clynick, *Afrikaner Political Mobilization in the Western Transvaal: Popular Consciousness and the State, 1920-1930* (), 104-105.
 - 28 See Helen Bradford, *Mass Movements and the Petty Bourgeoisie: The Social Origins of ICU Leadership, 1924-1929*, *Journal of African History*, Volume 25, no.3 (Oct., 1988); see also Helen Bradford, *Lynch Law and Labourers in Umvoti, 1927-1928*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 11, no. 1 (Oct., 1984), 128-149; Martin J. Murray, *The Natives Are Always Stealing: White Vigilantes and the 'Reign of Terror' in the Orange Free State, 1918-1924*, *Journal of African History*, Vol. 30, no. 1 (1989), 107-123.
 - 29 See Marian Lacey, *Working for Boroko* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Ravan Press, 1982).
 - 30 Quoted in Martin Chanock, *The Making of South African Legal Culture* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 42.
 - 31 Anon, *Africa's great black hope: A survey of South Africa*, *The Economist*, February 24th 2001, 2-16.
 - 32 See Michael Mann, *Fascism* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); see also Patrick Furlong, *The Crown and The Swastika* (Manchester, New Hampshire: Wesleyan University Press, 1992).
 - 33 See Lionel Barber and Alec Russell, *Transcript of Interview with Trevor Manuel*, *Financial Times*, April 10 2007 (<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b87e6d40-e765-11db-8098-000b5df>), 1; see also Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, *Total Strategy in South Africa: An analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 11,2, (April 1985), 183-211; Brian Wood, *Preventing the Vacuum: Determinants of Namibian Settlement*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 17, 4 (December 1991), 742-746.
 - 34 General Magnus Malan put it succinctly—and bluntly, "The territory of the Republic of South Africa became an operational area for the South African Defense Force.": see *Statement of General Magnus Malan to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, 7th April 1997, www.doj.gov.za/trc/pr/1997/p970430a.htm.
 - 35 I do not have a detailed rural/urban breakdown for 2005, but certainly those figures are available in any number of government or Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) reports. I suspect that subsequent parliamentary discussions around Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and various ABET programs that arose in its wake might contain such numbers: see John Higginson, *Making Short Work of Traditions: State Terror and Collective Violence in South Africa*, *Journal of the Historical Society*, III:3-4, Summer/Fall 2003, 319-320.
 - 36 Personal communication with Michael Ndi Mcethe and Ishmael Moroka. According to the Gauteng Department of Education, 27 schools are not operating in Soweto. 25 are primary schools and two are secondary. Ed.
 - 37 E Heston, Barbara Anderson and N. Phindiwe Tsebe, *Sex Ratios in South African Census Data, 1970-1996*, PSC Research Report, no. 01-476, March 2001, 4-7; see also Amadou Noubissi and Tukufo Zuberi, *Household Structure and Aging in South Africa: A Research Note*, African Census Project (ACAP), University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia Pennsylvania, 2-4; Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: Norton, 2005), 9-10 and 245.
 - 38 Ari Sitas, *Voices That Reason: Theoretical Parables* (Pretoria, South Africa: UNISA Press, 2004), 64-68; see also Franco Barchiesi, *Social Citizenship, the Decline of Waged Labour and Changing Worker Strategies*, in Tom Bramble and Franco Barchiesi (eds.), *Rethinking the Labour Movement in the New South Africa* (Aldershot, England and Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), 116-120.
 - 39 See Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power* (New York: Free Press, 1990); see also Pierre Vilar, *A History of Gold and Money* (New York and London, 1991), 330-340; A. V. Anikin, *The Yellow Devil: Gold and Capitalism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), 74-80.
 - 40 Jeremy Rifkin, *The Biotech Century* (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1999), 175-183.
 - 41 Jeremy Rifkin, *The Biotech Century* (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1999), 180-185; see also Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1988), 45-67; William Bridges, *The End of the Job*, *Fortune*, September 19, 1994, 62-74.
 - 42 Lionel Barber and Alec Russell, *Transcript of Interview with Trevor Manuel*, *Financial Times*, April 10 2007, 1-2 (<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b87e6d40-e765-11db-8098-000b5df>); see also John Iliffe, *The South African economy, 1652-1997*, *Economic History Review*, LII, 1 (1999), 98-99.
 - 43 See David Yudelman, *The Emergence of Modern South Africa* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984); see also Charles van Onselen, *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand* volumes one and two (London: Longman, 1982); Rob Turrell, *City of Diamonds: Capital and Labour on the Kimberley Diamond Fields, 1870-1890* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
 - 44 Lionel Barber and Alec Russell, *Transcript of Interview with Trevor Manuel*, *Financial Times*, April 10 2007, 1 (<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b87e6d40-e765-11db-8098-000b5df>).
 - 45 Samuel Bowles, *Choice of Technology, Sectoral Priorities and Employment: The Challenge of Job Creation in the South African Economy*, unpublished report for the South African Labour Market Commission, December 1, 1995, 2-4; see also Francesco Scacciati's microeconomic study of textile mills in Biella, Italy *The New Economy: Why We Should be Concerned about the Future of Work* (New York, 2001), 1-2 and 12-14.
 - 46 Tom Hertz, *An Educational Poverty Trap: Models and Estimates for South Africa*, unpublished paper for the James G. Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's Research Network on the Effects of Inequality on Economic Performance, 11/5/00, 15-16.
 - 47 See Tony Hawkins and Alec Russell, *Manuel rejects rethink on SA economy*, *Financial Times*, May 30 2008; Alan Beattie, *Tony Hawkins and Alec Russell, Manuel rejects rethink on the economy*, *Financial Times*, May 31, 2008; Alec Russell and Tony Hawkins, *Transcript: Trevor Manuel interview*, *Financial Times*, May 30 2008 (<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f3cd9f8-2e72-11dd-ab55-000077b...>).
 - 48 See Bekisizwe Ndimande, *Cows and Goats No Longer Count As Inheritances: The Politics of School "Choice" in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 2005), 12-18.
 - 49 James Heintz, *Political unrest, distributive conflict, and investment: the case of South Africa*, PERI workshop on Investment in Africa, October 2000 (also read at South African Trade and Industry Policy Secretariat conference, Forum 2000, September 16-18, Gauteng, South Africa), 3-5 and 12-14.
 - 50 See Pierre Hugo, *Frontier Farmers in South Africa*, *African Affairs*, vol. 87, no. 349 (Oct., 1988), 537-552; Merle Lipton, *South Africa: two agricultures?* and Francis Wilson, *Reflections on farm labour in South Africa* in Francis Wilson, Alide Rooy, Delia Hendrie (eds.) *Farm Labour in South Africa* (Cape Town, South Africa: David Philip, 1977, 72-86 and 195-201; see also Kalie Pauw, *Quantifying the economic divide in South African agriculture: An income-side analysis*, Working Paper 2005:3, PROVIDE (The Provincial Decision-making Enabling Project) PROJECT, Elsenburg, South Africa, September 2005, 3-9, 20 and 27-28 (see particularly Figures 2, 5 and Tables 11 and 12). Approximately 10% of agricultural land has been transferred from White to Black ownership since 1994. Ed.
 - 51 See Richard Lapper, *A People Set Apart*, *Financial Times*, April 10/ April 11 2010, 6.
 - 52 See Zhao Ziyang's, *Prisoner of the State* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009) for an account of how an analogous set of charges were met in China between 1982 and 2000; see He Chinglian's *China's Listing Social Structure*, *New Left Review* 5, September-October 2000, and *A Volcanic Stability*, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 14, Number 1, January 2003, for a critique of these policies and what she calls the *marketisation of power*.
 - 53 As late as 2007, South African Coal and Oil (SASOL) was recruiting pipe welders from Thailand to work on its new facilities: see endnote 45.