South Africa, Democracy and the Changing Patterns of Global Power

Raphael de Kadt is Professor of Political Science at St Augustine College of South Africa. He is a former Head of the School of Politics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, with which institution he still has an honorary association. He has also been, for twenty years, Editor-in-Chief of "Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory"

The principal questions that inform this article are: are we living through a major shift in global political power relations that is of 'world-historical' significance? If so, what are the distinctive features of this transition, and what challenges does it pose to those in a country such as South Africa?

The triumph of liberal democracy?

My point of departure is Francis Fukuyama's famous claim that the collapse of the state-socialist systems in Eastern Europe heralded 'the end of history'[1]. Of course, in neither his original article nor in the subsequent book, did Fukuyama mean that history as a sequence of events had ended. Rather, the end of the Cold War marked the end of a period in which the principal conflict that defined global politics was between two fundamentally different and incompatible economic systems, and between the broad ideological constructs through which they were represented and defended. It marked the end of the 'bipolar' order that had evolved once the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the USA (and its allies) had fallen apart.

The key outcome of the collapse of the 'state-socialist' system in Eastern Europe was that political power came to be predominantly vested in the liberal democratic states of the north-Atlantic world and a few geographically distant allies such as Japan and Australia. It seemed that there were no challenger systems left, in terms of principles of political and economic organisation, to these now dominant capitalist liberal democracies. They were hegemonic – economically, technologically, politically, militarily and ideologically. And, it seemed, their patterns of political, social and economic life were destined to steadily envelop the globe as countries became wealthier and adopted the political forms of the west. It seemed as though the promises and predictions encapsulated in 'modernisation theory' had been broadly – if with qualifications – redeemed.

The praise singers for 'western style' liberal democracies were and are not , for the most part, simple 'ideologues' and wishful-thinking protagonists of the 'western system of power'. There was – and continues to be – a growing body of empirical literature that underwrites, with various qualifications, their main claims. The world values survey undertaken by Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators at the University of Michigan, for instance, has strongly intimated that there is a broad global convergence of values as societies modernise and post-modernise. This convergence is also seen to have political implications: economic growth leads to cultural and societal shifts which, in turn, impact on political dispensations[2].

Economic growth and democracy have long been argued, in modernisation theory and other literature, to be linked. The classical account of this link was offered by Seymour Martin Lipset[3]. Once economies reach a certain level of development, regression to pre-democratic

or 'authoritarian' regimes appears less likely[4]. Yet another line of enquiry has suggested that many of the features of democratic dispensations are, *ceteris paribus*, conducive to better long-term economic progress. This optimistic view of western liberal democracy's prospects came close to being encoded in a mantra in Michael Mandelbaum's *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century*[5].

The salience of Mandelbaum's title lies in the three principal elements and their interconnection: peace, free markets and democracy. The state-socialist systems imploded, at least in considerable measure, because they did not have a 'market system'[6]. They were economies based on the institutionalisation of shortages, poor articulation and feedback between economic actors and governments, and few incentives for entrepreneurship. *Dirigisme* and central planning had failed to secure economies that could compete with the capitalist systems of the West. The drivers of economic growth – technological and scientific innovation – were largely concentrated in the capitalist West and, especially, the United States of America[7].

While not without empirical warrant (the rich capitalist democracies were, after all, not only richer but also generally better off in human development terms than their state-socialist competitors) there was an element of triumphalism in the pronouncement that liberal capitalist democracy embodied the culmination of human progress[8]. This triumphalism was underwritten by the long economic boom that characterised the last years of the 20th Century and the first eight years of the 21st. It was also reinforced by evidence that a 'third wave' of democratisation was sweeping across the world and that (democracy held the key to solving many of the most urgent challenges confronting both the 'world as a whole' and specific parts of it. Free market capitalism had generated, through competition and rewards to innovation, hitherto unimaginable wealth. Democracy, too – even in poorer economies – had seemingly contained and limited the impact of famine and natural disasters[9]. Finally, as if in empirical vindication of Kant's anticipation in *Perpetual Peace*, 'republican liberalism', when sufficiently widespread and consolidated, had spared its bearers from war between one another[10].

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It is, however, important to analyse these terms more closely. 'Democracy' is a 'contested concept'[11]. There have been many interpretations and definitions, ranging from C.B. Macpherson's broad, inclusive and somewhat ostensive account in *The Real World of Democracy* to Schumpeter's canonical definition of democracy as a method in *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*[12]. The key distinction is between 'thick' theories of democracy – that enunciate the substantive virtues of democracy as educative and as valuing and improving the quality of citizenship and enhancing the well-being of citizens (the 'classical' theories) – and those that see democracy as a political decision-making instrument, a device to facilitate some kind of optimal collective choice process.

This latter view of democracy as process and procedure has perhaps become predominant as ever greater emphasis has been placed on generating empirical studies of political systems across the world. 'Thick' conceptions of democracy – deriving either from a nostalgic disposition to re-ignite the normative impulses that informed classical Athenian democracy or deriving from later thinkers such as J.S. Mill – have been eclipsed by more modest views of the scope and prospects of democracy[13]. One of the consequences of this

move towards the deployment and further development of descriptive or empirical theory in political science has been a recognition that the spread of north-Atlantic style liberal democracy has been less compelling, and more complex and varied in its manifestations, than stylized interpretations of Fukuyama's vision may have promised. Rather, what has emerged is that the political forms that have been embraced are often hybrid, ranging across varieties of 'competitive authoritarianism' to variations on the theme of 'western style' parliamentary or liberal democracy[14]. Some recent evidence suggests that the march of democracy has been, if not completely halted, certainly slowed down (and even forced into temporary retreat in some countries). The latest Freedom House index suggests a possible recent 'retrenchment' of democracy – a fact adverted to in recent writings by Larry Diamond[15].

This has implications for international relations if the 'liberal republican' view of global politics and state behaviour is warranted. On this view, the nature of states' political regimes has implications for whether they are likely to go to war with one another. In particular, liberal democracies – it is argued – have a very low propensity to wage war against one another. A world of 'liberal republics' would, ideally, be a world of perpetual peace.

The facts are encouraging: since the end of the Cold War, there has been a long-term secular decline in the number of wars. In particular, there has been a notable decline in the number of wars between states (only four of any significance) and these – except in one instance (the invasion of Iraq by the 'coalition of the willing') – have not involved any 'developed' economies.

The facts are encouraging: since the end of the Cold War, there has been a long-term secular decline in the number of wars. In particular, there has been a notable decline in the number of wars between states (only four of any significance) and these – except in one instance (the invasion of Iraq by the 'coalition of the willing') – have not involved any 'developed' economies. Particularly notable is the complete absence of war between liberal democracies. Wars that have been fought have largely been civil wars and these, for the most part, have been in 'failed states' and relatively poorer regions of the world.

The Twentieth Century brought, in terms of political and economic systems, a number of key 'challengers' onto the world stage. Loosely following the wide-ranging and suggestive account provided by Philip Bobbitt in *The Shield of Achilles*, these were Fascist-type systems, communism or state-socialism, and 'western' parliamentary constitutionalism or 'liberal democracy'[16]. The conclusion of the Second World War saw the decisive defeat of Fascist-type systems (despite minor, residual manifestations in Portugal and Spain) and the emergence of Soviet-style state-socialism and western-style liberal democratic capitalism as the remaining contenders. 1989 marked the beginning of the cataclysmic implosion of the state-socialist systems in the Soviet sphere of influence and heralded the triumph of the 'western' system. It was this moment that heralded a world-historical shift that the idea of the 'end of history' captured.

If a global power transition is under way, and the newly emergent powers do not adopt political forms proximate to liberal democracy, the conflicts of the future may well be less 'pacific' than those that characterized the relations between the countries of the north-Atlantic world.

The nature of power transitions

The approach in this paper draws in part, and with significant qualification, on 'power transition theory'. This was first articulated by A.F.K. Organski in the 1950s and further developed by, among others, Organski, Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke. It posited

an alternative to 'traditional' balance of power approaches to international relations, and asserted that, on the basis of historical evidence, wars between states were less likely to occur when there existed a clearly hegemonic or 'dominant' state that stood at the apex of a pyramid, with subordinate 'great powers', mostly satisfied with this arrangement of power, beneath it. Beneath the 'great powers' were 'regional' and 'lesser' powers. Such systems, where the basic rules of association are defined by the dominant power and are accepted by the 'great powers', are stable. As discontented 'great powers' begin to challenge the dominant power the system becomes less stable[17]. In terms of power transition theory the stability of the Cold War era would be attributable not so much to the 'mutual balance of terror' or 'mutual deterrence' but to the effective dominance of the USA – dominance attested to by the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. The post Cold War era, in turn, has been characterised by the continued dominance of the United States of America and by the broad acceptance of the incumbent global 'rule-system'.

Power transition theory is able to account both for the outbreak of the Second World War and for the 'long peace' that followed its conclusion. It suggests that as long as 'great powers' in the hierarchical scheme are satisfied with the rule structure, they will not be inclined to start wars. The evidence adduced by proponents of power transition theory suggests that it is the dissatisfied 'great power' challengers to the dominant state that are the aggressors.

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Nation-states, globalisation and a world of regions

The 17th Century witnessed the birth, in still somewhat embryonic form, of the modern nation-state system. The signal event that defined the modern template of international relations was the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the basic character of the modern, secular, state was – as Martin van Creveld has put it – 'invented' by Thomas Hobbes. The nation-state's purpose, aside from the provision of order as a public good, was to wage war[18].

The question of whether the nation state, as the principal unit of political life, is becoming obsolete has been a recurrent refrain since the advent of modern globalisation, and the growing evidence of the 'retreat' of the state. This began with the fiscal crisis of the state in the 1970s and continued in the Reagan-Thatcher era in which the state, at least with respect to regulation and the provision of social welfare, was pared back[19]. Van Creveld has argued that the nation-state – that is, the state as we know it – is, in consequence, in 'decline'. Many of the reasons for the claimed demise of the state relate to its perceived 'transience' – a political form 'sandwiched' between the great 'religious sodalities' of the medieval world and the so-called 'new economy' characterised by the global presence and power of transnational and multi-national corporations. The general line of argument is that 'form' and 'function' have become disconnected. As Daniel Bell famously observed, the nation-state may be too big to deal with the small problems and too small to deal with the big problems. These 'big problems' have become associated principally with environmental challenges and the complex tasks associated with the governing of the global commons.

The original purpose of the early nation-state system was to provide a collective security solution to the turbulence that the European religious wars had brought with them. The fortunes of this systemic solution were mixed: the Napoleonic wars tested the arrangement, but the Congress of Vienna put in place a structure that – though punctuated by relatively minor wars such as those of German and Italian unification – provided Europe with almost a century of peace. This 'peace' ended with the outbreak of the First World War and the modern nation-state became, in the rich world, a 'martial' entity that was the mobilisiational pivot for waging the most destructive wars in history.

The victorious powers at the end of the Second World War put in place a global financial architecture and collective security structure that would, ideally, bring the age of 'total war' to an end. These arrangements, designed to remedy the failures of the League of Nations and the ills associated with the 'Twenty Year Crisis' were, respectively, the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations Organisation[20].

Equally important was the recognition of the destructive potential of nationalism, particularly in Europe. This disenchantment with aggressive nationalism played out in Europe as a long process of 'functionalist' integration, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community and culminating with the formation and spread of the European Union. This process was informed both by the desire to transcend intra-continental international conflicts and by the great power struggle between the Soviet system and the capitalist west from the late 1940s until 1980. The result was the construction of Europe as a major regional economic power bloc.

The Security Council of the United Nations could not operate when the two most potent 'veto-players' – the USA and USSR – were custodians of two competing and incompatible economic, political and ideological orders. Collective security was provided – to the extent that it was – by the move towards regional integration in the case of Europe and, more broadly, the 'western system of power'.

The Cold War dictated that the attempt to find a global solution to the collective security dilemma was doomed. The Security Council of the United Nations could not operate when the two most potent 'veto-players' – the USA and USSR – were custodians of two competing and incompatible economic, political and ideological orders. Collective security was provided – to the extent that it was – by the move towards regional integration in the case of Europe and, more broadly, the 'western system of power'.[21] NATO and the EEC (later EU) were the instruments of this. A similar, ultimately less successful, attempt at consolidating regional power in the Soviet geopolitical sphere occurred under the aegis of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. At another level, collective security, in those theaters not affected by 'proxy wars', was underwritten by the mutual balance of terror that assured the stability of an essentially bipolar system – or by the de facto hegemony of the USA.

In the post Cold War context global collective security remains a challenge. Further, the issues are no longer properly confined to those of peace and war. They extend, in the 21st Century, to environmental matters such as climate change, and include issues such as food security and the governance of the global commons. Addressing collective security problems is easier, *ceteris paribus*, when there is normative or ideological consensus. While the ideological conflict that characterised the Cold War era may no longer be salient, the necessary normative consensus around matters of environmental management and the diverse needs of countries and regions at very different levels of economic development and facing diverse developmental challenges has not been met.

Europe: The 'new-old' continent[22]

Much emphasis is presently placed on the 'rise of the east'. This began with the emergence of Japan and the so-called 'Asian tiger' economies which shed the tattered mantle of backward, 'third world', status and became alternative models of capitalist development, even suggesting concepts such as the 'developmental state'[23]. However, in addition to the extraordinary ability of the United States of America to 'reinvent itself', sight should not be lost of Europe in the post-World War II period.

Views of Europe's achievements, prospects and challenges differ and sometimes diverge quite sharply. Some of this divergence has been occasioned by specific circumstances

–from Europe's failure, at the time of the Balkans' crisis, to deploy a regional collective security capability, through to the strain placed on the European Union by the recent Greek sovereign debt crisis and the controversial ways in which immigration and ethnic integration are handled.

However, the key fact about Europe is that as a new regional 'sodality' it has come to constitute a major, multi-dimensional, and formidable presence in world affairs. Europe's advocates point to its essentially normative and institutional advantages – as well as to the sheer magnitude of its market and its considerable success in having lain to rest the ghost of its genocidal past[24]. They advert, especially, to its remarkable achievements in health care, public transport provision and the provision of social security and that, in having developed these 'social democratic' arrangements, it has accomplished an institutional balance between freedom and equality that is unmatched by, for instance, the United States of America. For Mark Leonard and for Stephen Hill, Europe's appeal is based on its normatively compelling institutional accomplishments which, for Hill, should be appropriately embraced by the USA. For Leonard, more generally, Europe's appeal is both normative and economic. Countries in reasonable cultural and geographical proximity to Europe are, and will continue to be, drawn into its large and comforting embrace. Europe, in Leonard's provocative prediction, will 'rule the twenty first century'. But entry into Europe's domain comes at a price: conformity to the advanced regimes of human rights protection and non-martial behaviour.

Europe's' critics advert to its structural weakness and policy failures. In particular they are exercised by the challenge to future wealth creation by an ageing population, an over-generous social welfare dispensation, an economic culture that does not sufficiently reward risk-taking and a University and knowledge production system that is relatively inimical to innovation[25]. Other commentators point to the deep variance in Europe's political systems, that the elision of countries into a political and cultural 'sodality' is illusory or at least fragile and that the disconnection between the achievements of monetary union on the one hand and fiscal sovereignty on the other is deeply problematic to the maintenance of an effective Union[26].

While the jury may be out on Europe's future, it is important to emphasise what has been achieved. Europe has evolved from a war-torn continent with fire-bombed cities, through a bitter and difficult division between the Soviet-dominated east and Anglo-American influenced west, to a continental domain with a parliament and a 'quasi-federalist' bureaucratic and executive centre. In so evolving from the early achievements of the European Coal and Steel Community via the Treaty of Rome and the EEC, Maastricht, Nice and Lisbon it has effectively drawn in countries that had earlier fallen under the Soviet aegis. In this, Europe has become an authentically post-Westphalian regional bloc.

The rise of China and India has signaled the emergence of potential 'great powers' that might – if dissatisfied – challenge the hegemony of the United States of America. This, to some extent, invites one to recall the post- War rise of Japan – the then 'emerging superstate' as Herman Kahn described it – and the rise of the Asian 'tiger economies'.

The European Union has borne testimony to the virtues and feasibility of international integration along functionalist lines of the kind espoused by David Mitrany[27]. It is a regional arrangement in which sovereignty has been shared, disseminated and redefined in such a way as to suggest the possible early dawn of a post-national world, defined by a progressive value system and high normative standards for participation. It may well be that the welfare state system in Europe is a global normative benchmark that remains, in both political and ethical terms, unsurpassed[28].

China, India and the 'Rise of the "Rest"[29]

The rise of China and India has signaled the emergence of potential 'great powers' that might – if dissatisfied – challenge the hegemony of the United States of America. This, to some extent, invites one to recall the post- War rise of Japan – the then 'emerging superstate' as Herman Kahn described it – and the rise of the Asian 'tiger economies'[30]. One feature of the rise of these economies has been the invitation to revisit the role of the state in capitalist economic development. This has been captured by the concept of the 'developmental state'. Politically, Japan – on account of conquest and American suzerainty – 'converged' with the North Atlantic postwar system. By virtue of the effective normative concord between the north-Atlantic network of advanced economies and Japan, Japan was never likely to emerge as a 'great power' challenger to the United States of America. China's rise, by contrast, signals a decisive 'power transition' moment – as might India's.

Whether one agrees with Martin Jacques' prognosis that China will reconfigure the world in its own cultural image and thus end the material and normative hegemony of the West, or is persuaded by Will Hutton's more cautious estimates of China's prospects, there is little doubt that the sheer magnitude of China's economy and its rate of economic growth ensure that it will be a major player in the global system in any foreseeable future[31].

The implications of this are as yet unclear. Will China – notwithstanding Jacques' projection – pass thorough a societal and cultural transformation that will render it both organisationally and normatively more convergent with the north-Atlantic systems (which, if Sergio Fabbrini is correct are themselves converging in political character), or will its societal and political systems evolve along distinctive paths that diverge in significant ways from those of Europe and north America[32]? It is too early to discern clear patterns, and difficult to read too many political and societal consequences from the fact of economic growth.

It is an open question whether China will move towards a 'polyarchical' political system as it continues to urbanise, industrialise and – more generally – to modernise. If it does democratise, however, it seems unlikely that it will regress politically.

However, one may at least hazard some guesses. One is that, should China continue to grow at or near its recent historic rate, and should it become a truly wealthy society (in the league of wealth associated with the USA or the countries of the European Union) then distributional conflicts – and the modalities of such conflicts – that have been evident elsewhere will likely occur. A recent edition of the *Economist* magazine has pointed to the significance of China's emerging working class[33]. 'Class struggles' might well become an increasingly salient feature of China's economic success, with implications for its global competitiveness. Its ability to undercut labour costs in other parts of the global economy may then be constrained, curtailing the expansionary role that China's cheap labour market has had on the global economy.

Yet another prospect is that, as China becomes ever wealthier, its ability to sustain a modern democratic-style of government will improve. It is an open question whether China will move towards a 'polyarchical' political system as it continues to urbanise, industrialise and – more generally – to modernise. If it does democratise, however, it seems unlikely that it will regress politically.

Should China democratise it will become more like Europe and the USA in a number of key ways. Such convergence would mean that, even though the Chinese economy would continue to have many distinctive features, the weight of Chinese power in global terms would likely be felt as more rather than less benign[34]. In other words, the 'power transition' that it betokens would not be conducive to military confrontations with other developed economies. The general pattern that broadly similar liberal democratic regimes do not go to war against one another would likely hold. Loosely deploying Michael Mann's four-fold characterisation of the sources of social power, it could be claimed that as societies become more economically developed, so the salience of military power declines relative to economic (and perhaps also ideological and political) power[35]. The key point, however, is that the latent magnitude of military power is a function of economic power.

What is indisputable is that China has already become, and will continue to develop as, a major player as the global system evolves. Equally, its massive economic capacity will likely translate into significantly greater military potential. Those societies that have

transactions with China will need to 'get to know' and to understand China. That will place specific demands on elites. In very general terms, the fortunes of countries and, not least significantly, the fortunes of democracies, depend in substantial measure on the capabilities and qualities of elites. The skill with which the leaderships of counties that are engaged in trade, diplomatic and political relations with China manage their interactions with the emerging superpower will be critical. The United States of America's foreign policy establishment has clearly identified the task of understanding China as a priority. This is clear from the emphasis placed on analysing China by the Council for Foreign Affairs in its journal *Foreign Affairs*, to the comprehensive and thorough studies collated by the Petersen Institute under the aegis of Fred Bergsten[36].

That China is aware of its rapidly growing presence on the global stage is registered in the fact that the Chinese elites are themselves thinking hard about their role on the international stage, and about how to effectively engage with the West. China is itself, to this effect, spawning think tanks at an astonishing rate[37].

Whether China emerges as a global actor of unparalleled scope and power or whether its prospects are more curtailed is a moot point and not material to the larger case that I am making. The crucial point is that China is party to the broad shift in power from the north Atlantic world, where it has historically been centered from at least the 17th Century, to Asia. Whether this impels the world in the direction of yet another multi-polar dispensation, with a distinctive 21st century 'balance of power' collective security arrangement, has yet to be established. Whether, too, it means that a great power will emerge to challenge, and perhaps displace, the USA or the 'western system', is unclear.

Clashes of 'civilizations' and the resurgence of the sacral

An alternative and influential 'grand narrative' to that offered by Fukuyama was suggested by Samuel Huntington[38]. The 'return of the sacral' as a force in world politics – especially represented by certain stripes of radical Islam such as that associated with Al Qaeda, militant Hinduism and some varieties of 'Christian fundamentalism' – have given some credence to Huntington's vision of a 'clash of civilizations'. Despite the appeal of this as a 'phenomenological' account, the available evidence would suggest a convergence rather than divergence in terms of value systems as societies

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modernise and post-modernise. There appears to be a general shift away from values oriented towards 'survival' to values oriented toward 'self-realisation'. This is not to say that the patterns of convergence that have been identified are 'one-dimensional' and that there are no cultural variances. Indeed, the evidence suggests that as societies converge in normative and institutional terms they do so in a manner that reflects the impact of distinctive cultural histories and dispositions. However, it is my view that the functional features of societies as political and economic systems shape the predominant patterns of behavior. That is, it is the 'axial' institutions – economic and political systems – that have the most significant impact. I argue that, for all that phenomena such as al Qaeda style militant Islam will add turbulence to the global political system, they are structurally insignificant. Far more important is the shift of economic power towards Asia, and the global entrenchment of capitalism.

South Africa's challenge

South Africa does not feature as a potential global power on the scale of China. It is, however, the dominant economy in sub-Saharan Africa and arguably belongs to the dynamic, increasingly significant, category of middle-income countries that Parag Khanna has termed the (new) 'Second World'[39]. The shifts adverted to in global economic power impact significantly on South Africa. It is clear from available data that the new economic giants of Asia will continue to play an ever increasing role in South Africa's economy. While new major inter-state or inter-alliance wars seem unlikely in the foreseeable future, many development challenges – especially in the so-called 'countries of the south' – have yet to be met. To hold its own in a context of rapidly changing economic and political forces, South Africa's elite will need to acidulously address certain issues.

First, to ensure that economic growth is not compromised by political factors, they will need to ensure that the

country remains politically stable and that it protects and maintains its democratic and constitutionally enshrined institutions.

Second, it will need to invest ever more insistently in the development of high quality human capital in all the key arenas of economic life, ensuring the 'universalisation of competence'. Third, conjoined with broad improvements in school and tertiary education, the relevant institutional frameworks will need to encourage and support scientific and technological innovation. To the extent that a global power transition from west to east is occurring, it is being accompanied by a shift in leadership in science and technology innovation away from the USA to Asia[40]. This will require a willingness to support an environment friendly to entrepreneurship, private sector initiatives and to free and open trade. South Africa confronts a serious challenge to its global economic competitiveness on account of its historical education and distributional legacies, and the attendant challenge of reconciling the demands of economic growth on the one hand and the reduction in poverty and inequality on the other.

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Fourth, a key responsibility of the political elite will be to ensure that the state not only improves its performance and delivery capabilities, but that it is rapidly and efficiently responsive to challenges that emerge from both the domestic and global 'operating environments'. A government with good feedback mechanisms and quick, effective, responses to evident policy failures will be crucial to the country's future prosperity. To this end, provided that it does not lead to political instability and to the kind of perceived risk associated with high levels of uncertainty, greater political competition – in whatever forms it takes – may be necessary to keep government accountable. This might, as a larger 'framework' matter, invite the country to revisit the electoral system better to improve the quality of governance.

Finally, and not least important, the country will be well served by an elite that holds steadfastly to the normative principles of the constitutional order that was so effectively crafted in the 1990s while, at the same time, acquiring a deep knowledge of the richly diverse global cultural, political and economic environment in which it operates.

This means that it must not lose faith in its hard-won democratic dispensation. Nor should sight be lost of the importance of regional blocs other than Asia or Latin America, such as the north-Atlantic system. And sight should not be lost of the significant role that South Africa itself will play in facilitating the functional integration of the larger southern African nexus into a wealth generating and peace underwriting entity.

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