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

NATIONALISM & POPULISM

DAVIS | DIKENI | DOMINY | FRIEDMAN | KOK | SHAIN | SIMKINS
WERBELOFF | **REVIEWS** | DAVIS | SHAIN

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CONTENTS

BOOK REVIEWS

Nationalism and Populism



Francis Antonie is the Director of the Helen Suzman Foundation. He is a graduate of Wits, Leicester and Exeter Universities. He was awarded the Helen Suzman Chevening Fellowship by the UK foreign Office in 1994. From 1996 to 2006 he was senior economist at Standard Bank; thereafter he was director of the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at Wits University. He is the founding managing director of Strauss & Co.

In the (Western) triumphalistic aftermath of the collapse of Communism – most readily associated with the appearance of Francis Fukuyama's important "End of History" – the future seemed if not quite pre-determined, then at least more certain. A combination of economic growth, fostered by unleashing market forces and greater democratisation of states and societies, would ensure greater peace and stability not only in individual societies, but also to the international order.

There were criticisms levelled at this view from both the left and the right. Needless to say Fukuyama distanced himself from this parody of his thoughts. But a more troubling account by Huntington - concluding the clash of civilisations - was largely bypassed, if not ignored, as it did not fit in with the hopes of the globalists, some of whom sought to extend democracy even by war.

The financial crisis of 2007/2008 no doubt brought home the reality of the tenuous underpinnings of globalisation. People began to count the costs of this process and elites, especially, were asked to account for themselves.

Accompanying these developments the state once again became central to social and political developments. The emergence of Donald Trump, Brexit, the political shifts in India, Turkey, Russia, the flood of immigrants and refugees into (Western) Europe all herald, if not an end to the globalist ideal, then, at least, a serious reversal. It is within this context that we see a re-emergence of nationalistic ideals which centre, on the state as the principal agent of political life.

In their alarm, some commentators have suggested that "we are going backwards". But it is unclear how far backwards we are going (favourites are the 1930s or 1914). It is too early, as yet, to write the obituaries of either the nation state or of globalisation. But undoubtedly the emergence of - in Benedict Anderson's famous characterisation of the nation - the "imagined community" requires that we reconsider what nationalism means in today's world with its great income disparities, breakneck technological innovations and its moral malaise.

How then does nationalism seek to address these issues? Or is it a consequence of them? And what are we to make of the emergence of populism, the unruly offspring of nationalism? This edition of Focus seeks to address some of these issues.

Milton Shain considers the historic rise of nationalist politics globally through the lense of history, with the parallels to nationalist and nativist movements of the past offering a stark warning for our modern day politics. The development of these movements and their migration across, is so often accompanied by

hateful narratives. With this in mind Shain looks at South African politics and the growing trend of divisive and inflammatory political rhetoric that is of deep concern for those with an eye for the lessons of the past.

Rafael Friedman explores one of the unspoken bogeymen of the global trend towards the enactment of populist economic policies, automation. While far too complex a topic to make for an easy target at a campaign rally or on the world's most volatile twitter account, the effects of automation and advances in artificial intelligence have a profound effect on the underlying insecurities that help foster nationalist sentiments. This has seen the global trading system become a prime target, too, in a proxy battle around those who have benefitted from the gains of globalisation and those who have not. Friedman explores the propensity for division in South African society that this creates and the vulnerability we face as technological advances fundamentally alter traditional job creating industries.

Leslie Dikeni offers crucial insights into the development of nationalist and populist theory over the last century. Multiple schools of thought have emerged in this period in relation to both, and their development has been profoundly shaped by the impact of the prevailing political ideologies of the time. Dikeni analyses the underlying theoretical trends that have informed the development of these concepts in South Africa while also looking at their potential impact on South African society today.

Harking back to Ernest Gellner's assertion that it is "nationalism that engenders nations and not the other way around" this piece explores our often superficial connections to our countries, by interrogating South African patriotism, and searches for the substance behind emotional connections to physical elements and theoretical lofty ideals.

Cecelia Kok and **Jason Werbeloff** posit a different take on patriotism by looking at the fundamental myths that commonly underpin individuals' professed love for their country. While many common tropes around why people are committed to their national identity seem uncontroversial, this piece analyses the underyling assumptions that they foster and the notion that any of these, often arbitrary, factors should inspire us to hold a particular reverence for our home state. Kok and Werbeloff look at this in the context of the rhetoric used to mobilise nationalist sentiments and urge citizens to rally around a particular national identity. Harking back to Ernest Gellner's assertion that it is "nationalism that engenders nations and not the other way around" this piece explores our often superficial connections to our countries, by interrogating South African patriotism, and searches for the substance behind emotional connections to physical elements and theoretical lofty ideals.

Graham Dominy looks at the controversies around the University of Cape Town's art collection and the diverse nature of freedom of expression. As student protests have intensified the University's extensive art collection has seen itself become the centre of controversy about institutional culture. The controversy has seen student protesters burn pieces of art deemed colonial remnants or demeaning of black people, while a University task team has

recommended that 75 works of art be removed from display. This has driven world renowned South African photographer, David Goldblatt, to relocate his photographic collection to Yale University. Dominy explores the Freedom of Expression issues at stake as well as what this controversy means for our national attitude towards engagement and dialogue.

Charles Simkins considers the current crisis of African nationalism. With an undoubtedly ailing ANC increasingly focussed more on its own internal battles than on its role in any national project, South Africa's traditional centre of African Nationalism is not holding. Simkins explores the reasons behind this and looks to the future for what will emerge out of it. In doing this, the prospect of a lurch towards ill conceived economic populism is considered with an analysis of the scale of the damage this could potentially inflict on South African society and its economy.

We conclude with two compelling book reviews; Martin Plaut's *Promise and Despair. The First Struggle for a Non-Racial South Africa*, reviewed by **Professor Milton Shain** and Justice Dikgang Moseneke's *My Own Liberator* by **Justice Dennis Davis**.

Francis Antonie
Director of the Helen Suzman Foundation

Racial and Populist Nationalism in South Africa: the Global Nexus



Milton Shain is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Historical Studies and a former director of the Isaac and Jessie Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies at the University of Cape Town. He has written and edited several books on South African Jewish history, South African politics, and the history of antisemitism. His latest book, *A Perfect Storm. Antisemitism in South Africa, 1930-1948, published in 2015 by Jonathan Ball, won the Recht Malan Prize (Media 24) for English and Afrikaans Non-Fiction for 2016.*

With division, often on ethnic, national or racial grounds, often at the centre of nationalist and populist movements their global influence demands careful analysis. Professor Milton Shain looks at the way in which these currents migrate with ease across national borders and the impact this has on South African political discourse and life. Professor Shain looks at the historical impact of these trends on the South African political landscape before offering warnings given current trends in our present day politics.

Introduction

Political commentators often frame events with past occurrences in mind. In epidemiological fashion, taking their cues from earlier trends, they identify patterns and reflect on mutations. For example, the Arab spring was compared to the 1848 revolutions in Europe - a turning point when, in the memorable phrase of GM Trevelyan, 'modern history failed to turn'. Similarly the Bavarian Soviet Republic of 1919 was linked to its St Petersburg predecessor, and the domino-like collapses of Communist regimes in Europe in 1989 were inextricably connected. Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history' is - at least in part - a paean to such framing. More recently Brexit and 'Trumpism' have been lumped together as harbingers of populist radical nationalism fuelled by inequality, alienation, resentment, and the hatred of elites.[1] It is this that propels the hard authoritarian right under Victor Orban in Hungary, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Xi Jinping in China, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Human rights are rapidly eroding, freedom is increasingly restricted, and transparency is threatened. An anti-liberal, populist, nationalist counter-revolutionary wind is blowing. Can we anticipate it reaching our shores? Or, to put it another way, is it reasonable to frame South Africa's political trajectory within contemporary global trends.

South Africa

We do know that historically South Africa has not been immune to ideas emanating from beyond our borders. American nativism in the 1920s, for example, had analogues in 'segregationist' discourse, while 'Garveyism' - a revitalising movement for Blacks led by the Jamaican Marcus Garvey - influenced domestic struggles. Nazism too had reverberations in South Africa, with radical right 'Shirtist' movements peddling global anti-Jewish fantasies and flirting with notions of 'Aryanism' and 'Nordicism'. The reach of European fascist ideology and the formative influence of Mussolini and Hitler on Afrikaner nationalism were also manifest in the *Ossewabrandwag* and *Nuwe Orde*. At that time it was the Jew who was targeted,

commonly branded as alien, unassimilable, subversive and mendacious. The grossly antisemitic 'Hoggenheimer' cartoon caricature represented Jewish monopoly capital, identified as a threat to Afrikaner advancement. Similar processes operated in other countries where exclusivist nationalism ran in tandem with religion. Such was the case in France and Poland in the interwar years and especially in Canada, where fascist groups such as Adrien Arcand's *Parti National Social Chretien* were at the forefront of scapegoating Jews. Besides highlighting the allegedly negative role of Jews in society, these extremists sought to redefine the nature of French Canada and the Jew was a useful means of bolstering a Francophone identity rooted in confession and notions of race.[2]

Even the "Fallists" involved in recent campus turmoil aped the discourse of American campuses. In an internet age where geographical distance is of no consequence and all have access to events far removed, the speed with which ideas travel is unprecedented.

Clearly intellectual and political currents migrate with relative ease, especially since populations have moved en masse and communications have improved. It is impossible for a country to isolate itself. Consider today's situation where South Africa is tied to the so-called Washington consensus with little room for manoeuvrability. Ratings agencies are monitored and their assessments taken seriously at the highest level. Even the "Fallists" involved in recent campus turmoil aped the discourse of American campuses. In an internet age where geographical distance is of no consequence and all have access to events far removed, the speed with which ideas travel is unprecedented. Relative deprivation is visible for all to see on smart phones and the lessons of violence are immediate and easily assimilable.

The surge of illiberal populism across the globe was tied in particular to the financial crisis of 2008. For its casualties, distinctions between left and right mattered less than the cleavage between elites and 'the people'. Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, Jean Luc Mélenchon, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders did their best to exploit this mood. Donald Trump is an exemplar. Basing his politics on identity and exclusion, he has defined the so-called 'real America' which he repeatedly tells his followers will be 'great again' under his leadership. Trump understands the white working class and its hatred of Washington and its experts. Like all populists he claims that he alone represents the people, and defines his political opponents as enemies.[3] Similar trends are observable in South Africa. President Jacob Zuma has become increasingly shrill, sharing in the rhetoric of the avowedly populist EFF under Julius Malema. Both Zuma and Malema punt a racial nationalism that employs identity politics and seeks scapegoats. Zuma chastises the 'clever Blacks' (just as Trump attacks the bicoastal liberal elites) while Malema holds a sword of Damocles over Whites.

The appeal of populism and racial nationalism finds fertile ground in a society with glaring racial inequality and massive poverty. Yet comparative studies show that populism is rooted not simply in anger and resentment, nor is gender or class necessarily a dividing line. Emotions also enter the debate. Sometimes those who support populism have rational reasons for doing so. They need to be confronted with facts and shown that populist promises are built on sand. The shortcomings of their arguments need to be illustrated. As the CEO Initiative (a business lobby) recently warned: 'Populist policies that focus on short-term solutions with no regard for the liabilities that we bestow on future generations will only result in the economy slipping further away from providing opportunities that benefit all who live in the country'.[4] Very seldom does one hear a leader in South Africa extrapolate on the long haul to wealth creation. Instead redistribution is presented as a simple choice.

Cartoon by Zapiro, Mail & Guardian © 2011. Reprinted with permission

African Nationalism

More disturbing than the turn to populism (although not unrelated) is a burgeoning Africanism - sometimes referred to as a racial national project. Racial nationalism builds on the politics of exclusion. To this end, in an attempt to cement cracks among the majority (insiders) and paper over class divisions, it scapegoats minorities. In South Africa the Indian, Coloured and White minorities are increasingly targeted by a desperate regime. Racial nationalism is seductive. It strikes the right chord - witness our planned withdrawal from the International Criminal Court - and resonates with our history by revealing apartheid's legacies. But racial nationalism and its mythical qualities threatens to undermine the 'Rainbow Nation' - a fragile construction built on a humane and generous forgiveness and reconciliation. Racial nationalism defines insiders and excludes outsiders. *Völkisch* nationalism in Germany was paradigmatic, built upon nineteenth century integral nationalism that culminated in fascism, a heightened nationalism combined with racism and populism.

In South Africa the Indian, Coloured and White minorities are increasingly targeted by a desperate regime. Racial nationalism is seductive.

Given our demography and the legacy of our past, the turn to racial nationalism is perhaps inevitable: the African National Congress always had strands within it that challenged what was termed 'multi-racialism'. However White and Indian intellectuals 'managed to pin the "non-racial" slogan onto this donkey,' in the

words of RW Johnson - but real commitment to 'multi-racialism', he writes, has never been more than 'skin deep'.[5] It was, however, sufficiently deep (thanks in part to the Freedom Charter) to construct the 'Rainbow Nation' in 1994. But this social contract gradually unravelled under the Thabo Mbeki administration when a shift in language and a hint of racial exclusivism began to characterise the later years.

Only recently a group in KwaZulu-Natal calling itself the Mazibuye African Forum has called for the 'liberation of KwaZulu-Natal from Indians'. Among other things the group is advocating that some 'Indian-owned land' be distributed to Africans and that Indians lose their BEE status.

Subtly - and sometimes not so subtly - an intimidatory discourse defined who was in or who was out. We saw this vividly in anti-Indian and anti-Coloured rhetoric, in xenophobic action and violence against foreigners and, more latterly, in a discourse that targets Whites. As early as 2002 the well-known playwright and composer, Mbongeni Ngema, released an anti-Indian song, *AmaiNiya*, in which he called for 'strong and brave men to confront Indians' who were accused of oppressing and dispossessing the Black population. Five years later, Fikile Mbalula, then ANC Youth League president, contended that transformation had turned the University of KwaZulu-Natal 'into nothing but Bombay' at the expense of Africans. In 2010, when he was leader of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema made references to '*amakula*' (a derogatory term for Indians) when addressing a meeting and, one year later, Mzwanele Jimmy) Manyi, at that time head of the South Africa's Government Communication and Information Services and the President of the Black Management Forum, suggested that there were too many Indians in KwaZulu-Natal,[6] contending that many of them had bought their way to the top. He also cast aspersions on Coloureds, arguing that there was an 'over-concentration' of them in the Western Cape. Trevor Manuel correctly likened his ideas to those of HF Verwoerd.[7] Only recently a group in KwaZulu-Natal calling itself the Mazibuye African Forum has called for the 'liberation of KwaZulu-Natal from Indians'. Among other things the group is advocating that some 'Indian-owned land' be distributed to Africans and that Indians lose their BEE status.[8]

This sort of language is inflammatory. Let us be absolutely clear about this. Similar allegations were levelled at Jews in Weimar Germany (who constituted less than one per cent of the total German population) and one knows where that led. Even if Whites, Coloureds and Indians are relatively better off than the Black majority in South Africa, the on-going focus on these minorities is concerning. While such rhetoric clearly serves the interests of racial nationalists, its consequences should not be underestimated. So long as labels are used and racial terminology exploited, the dream of a 'Rainbow Nation' will be deferred if not destroyed. Ideas have consequences: as Heinrich Heine put it 'Thought precedes action as thunder precedes lightning'. It is explosive to define Whites as colonialists and racist; of not atoning for the sins of the past; of having stolen land from Blacks; of having derived their wealth through exploiting Blacks; of owning and dominating the country; of thieving and being alien, and as responsible for unemployment, inequality and poverty. Rian Malan identified these characterisations as central to the demise of the 'Rainbow Nation'. If you do not consider such language sinister, warns Malan, 'replace the term Whites with "Jews" and see what they call to mind'.[9]

Conclusion

The binding rubric at present is 'white monopoly capital'- allegedly drawn up in the boardrooms of Bell Pottinger, an international reputation management agency. No one will deny that Whites have benefited hugely from colonialism, segregation and apartheid and that greater equality, less poverty and a more inclusive economy is a necessity. We should also interrogate neo-liberal economic premises; but to forge national unity around the mantra of 'white monopoly capital' is lazy thinking and especially dangerous in a fragile society with deep fault lines. It draws on the worst of populism, bringing to mind Trump and the European far right. Calling on one's supporters to 'remain vigilant of certain sections of our population who were the beneficiaries of the old order and are bent on either reversing this achievement or at best stall the progress' - as the ANC did on Freedom Day this year - is disturbing to say the least. 'Ours is to confront those elements intent on undermining the popular electoral mandate in order to reverse the gains of our hard-won democracy', continued the ANC statement.[10]

Advice of this kind should come with a cautionary warning: to define a section of the population in these terms can have disastrous consequences. Too many lives have been lost over the centuries to ignore the lessons of inter-ethnic conflict. South Africa is not immune; it never has been.

NOTES

1 This too has a parallel in the past. The American right, wrote Daniel Bell in the early 1960s, feel dispossessed. The America they had once known had been taken away from them, but they remained convinced it could be recovered. Cosmopolitan elites and intellectuals, they claimed, had corroded American culture, while treasonous plots operated at the very centre of power. See, 'The Dispossessed', in Daniel Bell (ed), The Radical Right, New York, 1963.
2 See Irving Abella, 'Antisemitism in Canada in the Interwar Years' in Moses Rischin (ed), The Jews of North America, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1987, p.244 and Pierre Anctil, 'Interlude of Hostility: Judeo-Christian Relations in Quebec in the Interwar Period, 1919-39' in Alan Davies (ed), Antisemitism in Canada. History and Interpretation, Wilfred Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, 1992, p.153.
3 See Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017.
4 See http://www.fin24.com/Economy/ceos-warn-against-populist-rhetoric-as-moodys-downgrades-sa-20170610.
5 RW Johnson, 'Our Racial Discontents', http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/our-racial-discontents
6 Today Manyi is ironically a defender of the Gupta family.
7 See 'Trevor Manuel's open letter to Jimmy Manyi', http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/trevor-manuels-open-letter-to-jimmy-manyi-1034606.
8 See Brij Maharaj, 'Anti-Indian statements are racism of the worst order': 15 November, 2015. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-11-15-anti-indian-statements-are-racism-of-the-worst-order/#.WRQefBsdDcs.
9 http://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/rian-malan-to-sisonke-msimang-yes-i-am-paranoid-20170515
10 ANC Statement on Freedom Day, 27 April, 2017. http://www.anc.org.za/content/anc-statement-freedom-day-1.

Nationalism, and Nightmare

Rafael Friedman holds a Bachelor of Arts in Law and International Relations as well as an Honours degree in International Relations. Both from the University of the Witwatersrand. His final dissertation focussed on trade protection in the steel industry and his main interests are economic development and global governance. He is currently a researcher at the Helen Suzman Foundation.

"History is a nightmare from which I am struggling to awake" - James Joyce (Ulysses)

Much of the rise of nationalist and populist politics in recent years has been premised on economic rhetoric about the enemy at the gates, usually uneven trade deals or job-stealing immigrants. But the ramifications of the "Fourth Industrial Revolution" and the vast technological changes that accompany it are less often spoken about, given their complex nature as a target. Rafael Friedman looks at these phenomena and the risks for greater polarisation that can be easily stoked to promote nationalist or populist policies.

Introduction

Various developments in the past few years have elicited in many across the liberal, progressive world a sinking feeling that we are moving inexorably backwards. The liberal world order is seemingly in its gravest danger since its initial rise at the end of the Second World War. This is given that the relative political stability most 'Western' nations have enjoyed in recent decades has been shattered by a dramatic re-shaping of electoral politics as well as an increasing backlash towards policy orthodoxy. Consequently, this has fostered fears that the world is showing signs of reversing many important gains. The United Kingdom's vote to leave the European Union and Donald Trump's seemingly unlikely election in the United States of America are the best publicised examples of these signs. But, they are by no means the only ones. Although the "contagion" effect that many thought would lead to similar results in other Western European elections has not materialised; what *has* materialised is a general shift globally over the past few years towards governments of more nationalist character. The fear is that this will result in many societies re-adopting principles that we believed belonged to an earlier time. However, the driving causes behind this trend are often far more about the future than the past. The solutions these problems require are therefore likely to also require more attention to the future than to the past.

South Africa itself has a strong undercurrent of nationalist politics and the increasing promotion of populist economic policies from a number of political parties speaks to South Africa's place in the global shift towards populist politics. However, South Africa's history of racial division and discrimination has centred much of the focus of nationalist politics on internal divisions between racial and ethnic groups. This is not uncommon since internal divisions are a clear marker of populist sentiments throughout the world. Significantly however, South Africa's

focus has remained on this ethnic or post-colonial centred nationalism and is yet to give rise to a nationalism based around a historic conception of the state and its power. Nevertheless, as both populism and nationalism begin featuring ever more greatly in global politics, it is worth exploring what the trends that have driven this mean for the future of South African politics and society.

Trade

Throughout the world, the rise of nationalism and populism have also seen a rise in economic thinking that calls for the foregrounding of national interests over any global considerations. This is often premised on the notion of protecting local jobs and industries. A prime target of these sorts of policies is therefore the international free trade regime that has formed a crucial part of post-World War Two globalisation. According to figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the world is experiencing exceptionally weak trade growth. This is driven partly by a stark rise in protectionism that flowed from the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. Free trade deals, particularly multilateral ones, are facing increasing criticism and have become easy targets for politicians pushing a narrative that their nation's pride, prosperity and values are being sacrificed in favour of the citizens of other countries and an ideology of "globalism". This has generated the idea that jobs that should be reserved for locals are being sacrificed on the altar of free trade. This is not entirely the case; in most advanced economies, these jobs are being lost almost entirely to automation as we enter what many have called the "Fourth Industrial Revolution".

Encapsulated in the treaty that established the WTO is the phrase: "[r]ecognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand".

The 2017 National Treasury Budget review identifies being a part of the global trading system as crucial to the South African economy. Additionally, further identified in the review as an integral component of South Africa's economic development is the existence of a fair and rules-based trading system. Hence, similar anti-free trade sentiment in South Africa would likely be misplaced.

As a continent, Africa continues to maintain a stubbornly high number of trade barriers and a remarkable lack of intra-regional trade, with only 25% of exports going to other African countries. As trade barriers increase globally, a growth in trade within the continent will be vital for African countries to secure the continent's future success. But in order to avoid antipathy developing, these trading relationships will need to demonstrate clear advantages at all levels; as opposed to only amongst certain industries or in discrete segments of societies. What this requires is a trade policy that seeks to promote development rather than viewing free trade as an *automatic* driver of development. In fact, this forms part of the founding provisions of the World Trade Organisation. Encapsulated in the treaty that established the WTO is the phrase: "[r]ecognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand". This speaks to the ideals that should guide the establishment of free trade areas; regardless of the debate about whether the WTO has lived up to these ideals itself.

Automation

One of the hallmarks of what is being referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution is the increasing automation of many traditional jobs. While it has been barely mentioned in major political campaigns, it has had a profound effect on the escalation of nationalist politics in the Western World. One study in the United States of America estimated that 87% of recent manufacturing job losses have been due to the increased productivity brought about by automation. However, the concept of 'automation' is a complex political target. So, numerous politicians have instead preferred to blame these job losses on foreign countries, immigration and the global trading regime.

A particular concern for developing economies is that this is driven by de-industrialisation as automation allows foreign companies to move factories back to their home nations. The study estimates that 60% of South African jobs are at risk of computerisation.

Nonetheless, there remains a debate about whether automation will create jobs or lead to widespread job losses. Previous industrial revolutions were typified by an increase in productivity that enabled job growth, but there are fears this will not be the case this time round. Many traditional manufacturing jobs are at risk - which have long held a treasured space as reliable, well-paid and lifelong jobs.

The split regarding whether automation will create more jobs than it will destroy is reflected in a Pew Poll of tech-professionals and economists that found that 52% believed it would create jobs while 48% believed it would nullify them. But even if automation produces jobs, they are unlikely to be situated in the professions or areas where it causes job losses. Automation will probably phase-out low-skilled manufacturing jobs while creating engineering and technological jobs which require high skill-sets. This has been seen as a driving force behind much of the populist backlash in Western politics as politicians target anti-trade initiatives and similar economic policies which are directed towards the disillusioned who have lost out due to the changing nature of the global economy.

A recent study by the Oxford Martin Institute examined the risks automation poses to employment in developing markets. It holds that developing countries would be impacted negatively because they face the issue of increasingly being unable to close the gap with wealthier nations. A particular concern for developing economies is that this is driven by de-industrialisation as automation allows foreign companies to move factories back to their home nations. The study estimates that 60% of South African jobs are at risk of computerisation. This is a devastating figure given South Africa's current unemployment rate.

While jobs will be added in particular digital industries, these require a high skills base and additionally will be likely to be concentrated in South Africa's urban areas. They can also be expected to favour those with resources and access to education. If swift interventions are not undertaken, then our future economy might well severely worsen the deep divisions in South African society between those who are and those who aren't included in the formal economy. These divisions manifest typically take the form of inequality and racial exclusion, and have already become a key rallying point for populist politics in South Africa.

Therefore, progress will require finding ways to harness the possibilities presented by automation positively. This demands an emphasis on education; both to allow

the currently employed to re-skill as well as to even the playing field concerning job-access in growing industries. In addition, South Africa will have to ensure that people are able to relocate easily to take advantage of growing industries as other industries shed jobs. This requires policies aimed at enabling people to move to where jobs are emerging as well as between industries. Most importantly, a new strain of thought is needed regarding the direction of the South African economy. Some of the country's traditionally job-creating industries, such as mining and manufacturing, can be doubted to create jobs *en masse* - even if they recover from their current slump. New ideas are necessary to adapt the South African economy to the digital age if it is going to ensure that its full potentials are capitalized upon and that the economy's benefits are more widely shared.

Divisions

Around the world, globalisation and inequality have brought divisions in societies to the fore that have driven the rise of populism and nationalism. The growing divide between rural and urban communities as well as divisions based on age and education-level have shaped Western politics during current election cycles. This is politically interesting, but more crucially highlight the lessons South Africa should learn in order to avoid the upsurge of a potentially damaging strain of politics.

The roots of this politics go back far, but some of the challenges that are driving it are profoundly modern. Having entered a new age of 'the global economy', the challenges faced by traditional economic and social structures are great. The way the divisions emerging from this are navigated, and in particular the way that those who have not borne the fruit of the advances are included in their successes, will play a decisive role in defining our future.

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Populism and Nationalism: Implications for South Africa

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Leslie Dikeni takes a theoretical journey through the history of both populism and nationalism in South Africa that looks deeply at the ideological underpinnings of these political trends. Dikeni looks at the different streams of thinking on these trends and tracks their ideological development in the South African context. Finishing with a look at the modern era and the trends that are evident in our current politics.

Introduction

The purpose of this essay, is to examine two theoretical concepts that contemporarily have an impact on the South African social, political and development discourse namely populism and nationalism. In so doing, to take into account international events that have structurally influence this discourse in the country.

Of importance here, is to develop an understanding of how different social actors with power (state and non-state actors) translate and give meaning to these concepts within the South African development discourse. Thus, taking into account that concepts do influence and shape societies. In so doing provide a theoretical analyses that will provide a paradigmatic shift from the current one.

My approach, will be to connect both theory and praxis. The assumption being, that theoretical and pragmatic issues, and activities are closely interwoven so much that one cannot have one without the other.

Key to this process, is an attempt to answer the question: What are the historical and methodological basis of the existence of these concepts? In other words, to understand their origins and how they were constructed. This with the view to understanding how over the years they have shaped and reshaped societies in different ways.

My starting point, is that, both the concepts of populism and nationalism have been at the centre stage of political debates since the 1800s by various different nation states. In South Africa the discourse has been with us since the birth of the liberation movements.

It finds expression, amongst different social actors operating at different levels of society today , e.g. the local (or micro), regional (or meso), and national (or macro) level. The actors involved are: different state actors, different political parties (with different ideological perspectives e.g. left, right and centre left), advocacy groups, the media with conflicting ideological point of views and perspectives.

An important actor, amongst these actors is what I previously dubbed as the Celebrity Intellectuals (see Dikeni, 2009) who seek to gain face and not to lose face. Of importance here, is their use of political phrases in a populist and fashionable way. This they do by offering us media soundbites of the day on television and other media outlets. All their ideas are informed by ideological theory and not practice informed by reality.

Theorising Populism

From a sociological perspective (and also as defined by other social scientists) populism is generically used to cover a variety of political phenomena. There has been considerable debate of whether it is a movement or an ideology, or whether it exists at all.

Canovan (1981), identifies three forms of populism and provides many examples of leaders from different countries in the world who are proponents of a populist cult. These are:

- ***Populism of the Little Man*** describes the political orientation of small proprietors such as peasants, farmers and small businessman who support private property and cooperation between small producers, but are wary of big business and government. Typically, this populism decries "progress", whether it be urbanisation, industrialisation, or the growth of monopoly capitalism, which it sees as leading to moral decay, and calls for a return to past eras. It disrupts politicians and intellectuals and may lead people to support either direct popular democracy or strong leaders who share the populist ideology. Examples include the agrarian populism of the American Populist Party in the 1890s, the European peasant parties and the Canadian Social Credit Party of the early twentieth century, and the non-agrarian populism of the post-war Scottish National party (in its early years) and the nineteenth-century Norwegian Left.

Furthermore, populism cannot be fitted easily into the conventional frame works of political analysis. It may be either right-wing or left-wing, or neither.

- ***Authoritarian Populism*** describes charismatic leaders who bypass the political elite to appeal directly to the people, often utilising reactionary sentiments. Examples include fascists such as Hitler, and right wing leaders such as Charles de Gaulle.
- ***Revolutionary Populism*** describes the idealisation of the people and their collective traditions by intellectuals who reject elitism and progress. This leads to a rejection of existing political institutions in favour of the seizure of power by the people, or in favour of charismatic leaders who claim to represent the people. Examples include the Russian populists (Nardodniks), intellectuals who during the 1860s claimed that socialism could be achieved without first going through capitalism, by building on existing peasant communes, and the later support of fascism among certain European intellectuals. Furthermore, populism cannot be fitted easily into the conventional frameworks of political analysis. It may be either right-wing or left-wing, or neither. It is often reactionary, calling for a return to traditional virtues, but some populist leaders, such as Juan Peron in Argentina, have worked for social and economic modernization and eschewed reactionary rhetoric. Nor is it possible to identify a definite pattern of social and economic conditions under which populism occurs; particular types of populism are not systematically related to particular social classes nor to specific economic circumstances.

This theoretical and analytical frame work, by Canovan helps us to discern and identify some common features of populism. Populism is a distinctive form of political rhetoric that sees virtue and political legitimacy residing in the "people", sees dominant elites as corrupt, and asserts that political goals are best achieved by means of a direct relationship between government and the people, rather than being mediated by existing political institutions.

Understanding Nationalism: Paradigm Lost Paradigm Regained

The debate on the concept of Nationalism in South Africa and elsewhere in the world is one that we have been chewing for a long time and has since gained ground. In South Africa and within the continent at large, and especially after the liberation of the colonies (though having gained ground) it was lost for some time. This occurred after the liberation of most African Countries from colonial rule.

The debate seem to have emerged again within the 21st century and has taken different forms, having been given different meaning and interpretations by various social actors involved in the political development of the continent (e.g. different political parties, different intellectual groups and individuals and state and non-state actors).

Of relevance here, is how such a debate shaped the historical, political, social and developmental trajectory of South Africa today and in the future.

Hence, in broadly paraphrasing Thomas Kuhn (1970) on the *Structure of the Scientific Revolution*: we lose paradigms, yet we still regain them. Hence my attempt to regain the discourse and/or re-theorise the concept of nationalism with the aim of finding a better understanding of it for the contemporary South African political and social discourse.

Subsequent to these events Nationalism became closely associated with movements for self-determination against imperialism and colonisation in the Third world (where we belong).

My point of departure, is that, a glimpse at the historical theoretical data (18th or 19th hundred century) in this regard shows that by the end of the 19th century in Europe (where the concept originates), after the Napoleonic period, and during the emergence of national movement which coincided with the nation states there. Furthermore, a growing number of social theorists during this period (See for example, Smith, 1971, Davis 1978 and Gellner 1983 for further reading of these theorists) assumed that nationalism would decline and would be replaced by internationalism and cosmopolitanism. Suggesting that:

- The growth of trade would undermine particularistic differences between societies;
- Conflicts would be expressed through class rather than national ideologies; and that
- The working class would develop a commitment to international socialism.

The events of the First World War thwarted or rather shattered these theoretical assumptions. In that, during the war there was very little working class opposition to a war fought on nationalist principles.

Subsequent to these events Nationalism became closely associated with movements for self- determination against imperialism and colonisation in the Third world.

There are two major dominant schools of thoughts on the theory of nationalism that have for a long time held the centre stage on the debate. Though different; they

are similar and have one thing in common. That is, their "deterministic" economic approach and "homogenisation" of different social groups in different societies to the interpretation and analytical use of the concept.

Furthermore, they seem to insist that nationalism and/or the emergence of nationalistic movements is only propelled by external forces for economic exploitation of internal groups.

In their view nationalism is a form of reactive politics against colonialism in societies where traditional modes of social organisation have collapsed as a result of social changes introduced by external colonialism. Thus, for these schools of thought nationalism is associated with political extremism and xenophobia. Of importance here, is the social homogenisation of all national groups in the colonies.

Briefly described , without having to go into detail about the different ideological stand points of these two schools of thought: They are the on the one hand, the liberal school of thought which tends to obscure the positive political merits of national movements within the Third World, which have achieved self-government and some measure of social development.

Both theoretical models of these schools of thought are tainted by deterministic linear and externalist views of the concept of nationalism.

To this school, the blame (amongst other things) is squarely laid on capitalism; which it claims, through its uneven development ,creates profound regional imbalance. With peripheral regions driven to embracing nationalist politics to secure a more equal distribution of wealth.

On the other hand, is the classical Marxist approach to nationalism that sees it as bourgeoisie ideology, because it serves the interests of the rising bourgeoisie in its opposition to other class forces in society. Also to this school, national struggle was a special form of class struggle, often referred to as 'external class struggle' that is conducted on the international rather than the national level.

In short, and as evident in both schools of thought (in my view) though holding different deterministic ideological points of view on the concept of nationalism still share some commonalities in their approach. And despite their obvious differences in ideology and theoretical trapping, these schools of thought on nationalism contain paradigmatic similarities. Both theoretical models of these schools of thought are tainted by deterministic linear and externalist views of the concept of nationalism.

As was eluded to earlier on elsewhere, in this contribution and in paraphrasing Thomas Kuhn and, that is, we lose paradigms and yet at a certain point in historical scientific thought processes we regain them.

The debate on nationalism in history also evolved and the old paradigm was replaced by a new one, leading to a new period of normal science amongst social scientists. In short, some form of consensus (free from ideology) emerged on the discourse on nationalism amongst social scientist. And that is, despite empirical complexity, nationalism has the following general features:

- It is based on the demand that governments should share the same cultural identity as the governed;
- As a result cultural nationalism, which seeks to preserve or recreate the national heritage through, for example, the revival of a language in Africa, prepares the basis for political nationalism, which seeks self-determination and political supremacy;

- The development of modern systems of mass communication facilitates the dissemination of unifying nationalist ideologies;
- Nationalist ideologies have a strong appeal to subordinate classes by providing them with some economic protection against non-nationalists, but the content of the ideology is typically developed by marginal intellectuals – black intellectuals, for instance, excluded from white educational establishments, were drawn to nationalism;
- Nationalism is, in the twentieth century, associated with de-colonization and the economic development of the Third World societies, and with the struggle for regional equality within existing capitalist societies.

Populism and Nationalism in South Africa

Implications of Nationalism

My analyses lead me, to argue that the South African theoretical discourse is composed of all three theoretical models of nationalism discussed above. And that, the current political and social events taking place in South Africa will show that we have both the Marxist school of thought and the liberal school of thought discussed earlier here. Whose theoretical models of the concept are tainted by linear and externalist views on nationalism.

There is evidence, in the various actions of some members of the alliance (partners) movement that indicates a return to old ideas of narrow nationalistic thinking, tribal thinking and narrow homogenising definitions of identity.

The Marxist school of thought

Examples of these are the South African Communist Party (SACP) and its leading alliance partner the African National Congress (ANC) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) that subscribe to a Marxist school of thought (this not excluding the splinter groups from COSATU. This school of thought has historically held this position (pre and post the advent of democracy) and arguably is still holding this world view. However, the current political events in the country indicate that a social and political shift has emerged from its historical theoretical stance today.

Without having to deal in depth with the disturbing political and social events (what others refer to as catastrophic) within the country today.

There is evidence, in the various actions of some members of the alliance movement that indicates a return to old ideas of narrow nationalistic thinking, tribal thinking and narrow homogenising definitions of identity.

These ideas find expression in the various statements they often make in the media (print and otherwise), some policy documents and sometimes in parliamentary debates. The many policy theoretical bubbling concepts (e.g. BEE, Affirmative Action and the many charters) developed to seek to deal with racial inequalities and yet at the same time having to come to grips with identity questions miss the point and often turn out to be decisive at a cultural and economic level.

The often downright critique and racial labelling of other members of the minority groups belonging to this movement when (As we have seen in the case of the late Ahmed Kathrada amongst others) critically theoretically engaging on policy and/or any other conceptual discourse affecting this movement is one other such example. Of late we have seen this tendency playing itself out between a former minister and a current minister in government.

And indeed shouting down of others who seek to advance the non-racial project (as often done in Parliament) as Un-African (when they are black) is another short coming that is narrow in theoretical and conceptual thinking.

The liberal school of thought

The liberal school of thought led by different political opposition parties within government. Dominant here, being the leading opposition party the Democratic Alliance (DA) with other smaller minority parties. Connected but distinct from this group, are far right groups like the Freedom Front, Afri-Forum and others.

As already mentioned elsewhere in this piece, this school of thought obscures the positive political merits of of national movements within the so called third world , which have achieved self –government and some measurers of social development.

The recent tweets and/or statements by the Cape Town mayor of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in the media on colonialism and racism are a good affirmation of this liberal theoretical model on nationalism.

To this school, the blame (amongst other things) is squarely laid on capitalism; which it claims, through its uneven development ,creates profound regional imbalance. With peripheral regions embracing nationalist politics to secure a more equal distribution of wealth.

The recent tweets and/or statements by the Democratic Alliance's Premier of the Western Cape on colonialism and racism are a good affirmation of this liberal theoretical model ofnationalism.

This liberal externalist and myopic view on nationalism, therefore suggests that nationalism is a form of reactive politics against colonialism in societies where traditional modes of social organisation have collapsed as a result of social changes introduced by external colonialism.

The social scientific perspective

These are contrasted by a specific group that is by character free from ideology and thus; has adopted social scientific and/or differing perspectives on the discourse. This group draws support from the different South African political parties, amongst academics and some civil society groups.

Implications of Populism

Following Canovan's description and analytical framework of analysis on the political phenomena of populism. The dominant form of populism that exists in present day South Africa is that of a revolutionary populism. And that is the idealisation of people and their collective traditions by intellectuals who reject elitism and progress. Which leads to the rejection of political institutions in favour of the seizure of power by the people, or in favour of charismatic leaders who claim to represent the people.

Examples in South Africa would include political parties and advocacy groups such as the Economic Freedom fighters (EFF), the Decolonisation Foundation, Black First Land first (BLF), Black Management Forum (BMF), Afri-Forum and other members of opposition parties. Of importance here, are some members of the ruling party (e.g. the current presidentof the Party) that seek to claim the voice of the people. Of evidence to their myopic rhetoric are the various populist theoretical bubbles that they feed the citizen. Of importance here is that, these concepts have

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no theoretical and methodological basis of existence and hence they are theoretical bubbles. These theoretical bubbles are fed to the citizen via the media (with various ideological interests) for the public to consume. To illustrate my point, the statement by the current minister of Water Affairs who was quoted as saying "when the rand falls we will pick it up…" is one such glaring example. Furthermore, concepts like Radical Economic Transformation, White Monopoly Capital and sometimes a very generic interpretation of decolonisation that clearly are used by these populists for their own interests and not for the advancement of society.

Indeed, and that is, we are at a very critical turning point in South Africa where old orthodox ideas must give way to new ideas on the conceptualisation of the South African development trajectory. Populist theoretical ideological bubbles are very far from helping in this regard.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in this essay I have tried to pull together the various theoretical and conceptual models of the concepts of nationalism and populism, and discuss their implications for South Africa. An attempt here, was to try and develop an understanding of the historical and methodological existence of these concepts. In so doing, I call into question the euphoria of new populist theoretical strategies for its political social development trajectory.

And, finally, I stress the need for the development of sensitizing concepts, more flexible, more flexible frameworks of analysis and more treatment of the voices and practices of social and political civil society actors that include the ongoing transformation and interpenetration of external models and experience.

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Political myth-busting: what does it mean to be proudly South African?

Pride is a ubiquitous political phenomenon.

Despite the British Writer Samuel Johnson's great assertion that "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel" one of the hallmarks of the current global trend towards nationalism has been demonstrations of nationalistic patriotism that glorifies the respective state. In this piece Cecelia Kok and Dr Jason Werbeloff aim to dispel many of the myths around patriotism with South Africa as the focal point. This piece looks at the rationality of basing patriotism on economic, geographic, political, personal and cultural loyalty in an increasingly globalised world.

Introduction

Donald Trump's US presidential election victory was in part driven by his campaign to 'make America great again'. In essence, this slogan appeals to the notion of American pride. Brexit can also be seen through the prism of pride: pride in 'standing together' and belonging to the European Union on the one hand, or, on the other, pride in the independence and self-sufficiency of Britain. Given that shame is the converse of pride, the former notion also plays a significant part in Brexit: anti-Brexiteers believe pro-Brexiteers ought to be ashamed of their isolationism and xenophobia. Pro-Brexiteers, by contrast, believe shame is the appropriate response for anti-Brexiteers who display a condemnable lack of patriotism.

Pride may be understood to be at the heart of war. After Germany's humiliating defeat in World War One, Hitler's appeal to Germans was substantially based on his avowal to restore the country's pride. In addition to war between nations, pride can fuel internal ostracism, violence, or even genocide against designated groups perceived to be a stain on a nation's pride, such as Jews in Germany, the Bosniaks in Serbia or the Tutsi in Rwanda. Pride in one's ethnicity was a central feature in the creation of such strong in- and out-groups that, in the end, led to murder on a mass-scale in each of these countries.[1]

Contemporary racial identity politics in South Africa are also deeply rooted in pride and shame. In her widely cited paper, WITS academic Samantha Vice writes that

> …while the emotions of guilt, regret and shame are appropriate emotions for white South Africans to feel, shame better captures the identity and phenomenology of the white South African self than the others. Given the present inescapability of white privilege (barring enormous structural and psychological change), and given the peculiarities of the South African situation, it is unlikely that a white South African will be in a situation in which shame is not called for.[2]

Pride has, through patriotism and nationalism, spurred countless social and political movements. But what exactly does it mean to be proud of your country? What does it mean to be proudly South African?

'Whiteness' theory claims that 'whiteness' is one of the greatest obstacles to black advancement and thus being 'proudly white' would be preposterous. However, blacks, according to such theorists, may quite justifiably be 'proudly black'.

Pride and its converse, shame, are powerful emotions. Pride is at the heart of patriotism (a fervent sense of pride in one's country) and nationalism (an even more extreme sense of pride, often coupled with a sense of superiority to other countries). Pride has, through patriotism and nationalism, spurred countless social and political movements. But what exactly does it mean to be proud of your country? What does it mean to be proudly South African?

When someone says they're proudly South African, it seems they might feel an allegiance to their country in one or more of the following ways:

- Geographic fondness (e.g. 'I love South Africa because it is beautiful.')
- Economic loyalty (e.g. 'I prefer buying South African products to support our economy.')
- Cultural affinity (e.g. 'I love the culture that we South Africans share.')
- Political affinity (e.g. 'I treasure our Constitutional dispensation and the values informing our society, such as non-racialism, inclusion and tolerance.)
- Fondness for South African people (e.g. 'South Africans are open, friendly people with whom I identify.')

The problem, however, is that when we investigate these five forms of pride, they disintegrate in surprising ways. What seems obvious or clear on the surface quickly becomes difficult to defend when considered carefully.

To 1: Geographic beauty

'I am a proud South African because my country is beautiful.'

While South Africa has many beautiful landscapes, it seems odd to be proud

of or patriotic because of these features. After all, there are other countries that display majestic beauty too. If one is proud of South Africa because it contains Table Mountain, should one not be equally proud (or perhaps more proud) of Nepal because it is home to Mount Everest?

There is a further problem here. Suppose South Africa were to become ugly. some would say it already has in certain areas. Would this mean that one ought no longer to be proudly South African? It seems that proud South Africans would advocate pride no matter what happened to our verdant landscapes.

Thus, a country's beauty is neither sufficient nor necessary for pride in that country.

To 2: Economic loyalty

'I buy local products to support my country.'

The company 'Proudly SA' owns various logos based on the South African national flag as well as the trademarked phrase, 'Proudly South African'. 'Proudly SA' charges businesses up to R100 000 a year in membership fees.[3] On its website, Proudly SA claims that by buying local, one is making 'personal and organisational contributions to economic growth and prosperity in South Africa, thereby increasing employment opportunities and reinforcing national pride.'[4] Whilst this may hold intuitive appeal for many, it is widely accepted that open economies eager to trade, such as the Netherlands, are more successful at poverty reduction and job creation than closed economies, such as North Korea.[5] Buying local encourages a closed economy.

In conclusion, economic pride ironically seems to bring about negative consequences for one's country, and so does not seem to be the sort of stance one should adopt.

Controversially, in his electoral campaign Trump stated that he wanted car manufacturers to manufacture for Americans in America - as opposed to in Mexico - and threatened sizeable taxation for companies manufacturing outside the United States. Such measures were meant to boost the US economy. However, experts argue that relocating manufacturers to America would in fact harm the local economy. Rather, opening the US economy to trade with other countries would lead to more local job creation in the vehicle manufacturing sector.[6]

In conclusion, economic pride ironically seems to bring about negative consequences for one's country, and so does not seem to be the sort of stance one should adopt.

To 3: Cultural identity

'When I'm with friends of all races at a braai enjoying pap and wors, drinking a castle and watching the Springboks beat the All Blacks, that's when I am a proud South African.'

Many South Africans feel that when they take part in what are considered to be prototypically South African cultural activities, they experience a sense of pride in doing so. However, what exactly are these distinctive South African cultural activities?

South Africa is home to a plethora of cultures and subcultures from which flow diverse activities and practices – Cape Malay culture is quite different from Zulu culture which is again different from Hindu, Buddhist and Jewish culture. Thus, can one make sense of being proud of 'South African culture'? Enjoying a braai and

watching rugby may be one group's prototypical cultural practice, but it seems many other groups may not identify strongly with this at all.

Given that it is impossible to find a cultural practice around which all South Africans can unite, it seems strange to hold that South African pride is based upon central and discernibly 'South African' cultural practices.

To 4: Political pride

'I am proud of South Africa for overcoming its fraught Apartheid past and for the Constitutional values it espouses as a nation.'

Our Constitution's founding provisions declare that South Africa is founded, at least partly, on the values of 'non-racialism and non-sexism'.[7] But does the nation of South Africa embrace these values?

The following three examples illustrate South Africa's vibrant racialism:

(i) President Jacob Zuma, the 'first' citizen of the country who is elected by the African National Congress, the party that enjoys the biggest share of South African votes, frequently dismisses his critics as 'racists' and blames 'White Monopoly Capital' for South Africa's ills – a catchy buzzword to distract from his failures and shift blame to a particular racial group.

(ii) Whether one is filling out an insurance claim or applying for a job, South Africans are continually confronted with the request to identify their race, even though there is no biological marker necessary or sufficient for race.[8]

We are therefore far from the ideal of judging individuals 'on the content of their character' as opposed to 'the colour of their skin' (Martin Luther King Jr), and thus still far from a non-racial society.

Given that Apartheid is considered repugnant for its racial classification of citizens and our Constitution explicitly espouses non-racialism, it seems strange indeed to continue this practice. Do we use the pencil test? Do we self-classify? Can we be 'incorrect' about our self-classification? Is one's race 'societally determined'? What does this mean? Whatever dubious methods are used, South Africa's omnipresent racial classification is inconsistent with non-racialism as espoused by our Constitution.

(iii) Through calls for the fundamentally racially-driven agenda of 'decolonisation' or the silencing of whites in virtue of their 'white privilege', South Africans are drifting further and further from our non-racial Constitution.

When well-founded criticism is dismissed on the basis of race by a country's first citizen, when race is a crucial element in applying for a job, and when social movements demand that learning material be selected on the basis of an author's race, it is quite clear that this country has not embraced the value of non-racialism. We are therefore far from the ideal of judging individuals 'on the content of their character' as opposed to 'the colour of their skin' (Martin Luther King Jr), and thus still far from a non-racial society.

Beyond our nation's ignorance of our non-racial Constitution, there are many other examples of widespread and gravely unconstitutional behavior, much of it displayed by the very individuals tasked with protecting our supreme law. Threats to free speech, property rights, freedom of information, and separation of powers enshrined in our Constitution emanate from the executive in the form of,

respectively, the Hate Speech bill, the Investment bill, the Expropriation bill (or calls for 'radical economic transformation') and undue ministerial interference in crucial independent organisations such as the police oversight body (the Independent Police Investigative Directorate) and the corruption-fighting unit of the Hawks. If the very people entrusted to safeguard our Constitution, democratically elected into power, are often those attempting to undermine it, can one confidently claim that South Africa is a Constitution-loving nation? The answer would appear to be: no.

Finally, even if it were the case that South Africa was a well-functioning democracy which had broadly embraced the values enshrined in its Constitution, is this something in virtue of which individuals could or ought to be proudly *South African*? One might rejoice in our constitutionalism (and what it means for oneself and for others lucky enough to live in such a country) and one might be politically active so as to uphold and defend such a dispensation, but a sense of pride seems odd. A liberal constitutional democracy, after all, is not exclusive to South Africa – there are various well-consolidated democracies that espouse positive values. Thus, like geographic beauty, this seems an odd feature in virtue of which to be specifically proudly *South African*.

Not only have foreigners been greeted with hostility by South Africans, they are subject to notoriously difficult immigration procedures, leaving many individuals – in particular refugees from other African nations – vulnerable and open to exploitation.

To 5: South African personality traits

'I am proudly South African because South Africans are friendly, open, warm and tolerant people.'

South Africa has infamously high crime rates with roughly 50 people killed and 150 sexual offences committed daily (unreported offences are likely to increase the latter number).[9] It is also a country which has made world headlines for its horrific xenophobic violence. The murder of Mozambican national, Ernesto Nhamuave, who was stoned and subsequently burned alive, became emblematic of South Africa's brutal xenophobia.

In light of the above, it seems odd to claim that South Africa is a warm, open, friendly and tolerant country. Paradoxically, it should be noted that those perpetrating gruesome xenophobic acts may well be doing so in the name of national pride!

Not only have foreigners been greeted with hostility by South Africans, they are subject to notoriously difficult immigration procedures, leaving many individuals – in particular refugees from other African nations – vulnerable and open to exploitation.[10] South Africa's unwelcoming stance is even reflected in the letter of the law in light of, for example, the new visa regulations.[11]

And again, even if it were the case that South Africans were, on the whole, open, tolerant and friendly, is this something in virtue of which to be proudly *South African*, since there are other countries whose populations also exhibit such characteristics?

Two proud objections

We have argued that some of the features of which South Africans are proud (geographic beauty, constitutionalism, and friendliness) are not exclusively South African features – other countries possess them too. Given this, it seems odd to use those features to ground pride in *South Africa* specifically.

The proud South African, however, may object. She may argue that individuals often feel pride, legitimately so, about some feature or accomplishment even if other individuals possess that feature or have achieved that accomplishment too. For example, a student may be proud of the A+ she received in her business management course even though others received the same mark. The proud South African might argue that, analogously, even if there are other countries that exhibit the same positive features that South Africa possesses, we can still be proud that South Africa possesses them.

*Now, consider the case of the proud South African. She has no discernible **control** over whether the country is beautiful, constitutional, or friendly. It seems inappropriate, therefore, for her to feel pride in respect of her entire country because of such features.*

Consider, however, exactly what is involved in achieving an A+ on the business management course. The proud student has bought textbooks, and spent time attending lectures, studying and clarifying examination material. She has earned her mark. That is, she has exercised *control* over factors that caused her success.

Now, consider the case of the proud South African. She has no discernible control over whether the country is beautiful, constitutional, or friendly. It seems inappropriate, therefore, for her to feel pride in respect of her entire country because of such features.

The proud South African may exclaim that this is untrue. She planted a vegetable patch and picked up litter, she voted to support a democratic state, and she fed victims of xenophobic violence. In so doing, she may proudly argue that she has contributed to, and thus in some sense controlled, the country's positive features; in light of this she claims she is proudly South African.

Yet her contribution, although evidently positive, seems miniscule at best when considering the scope of the entire country. It seems legitimate for our proud South African to be proud of the *specific* vegetable patch she tends, the particular vote she casts, and the specific xenophobic shelter to which she contributes her time. However, pride beyond this, of the entire country in virtue of its beauty, constitutionalism and friendliness, seems misplaced. Her lone vegetable patch does not hold a candle to the magnificence of the Outeniqua mountains. Her vote does not sway the result of the election any more than anyone else's vote. She has played a minimal role (if any at all) in these features, and so, is entitled only to minimal pride. Certainly not the sort of pride required for patriotism and nationalism.

The proud South African may attempt a final objection. She may argue that the correct analogy for pride in one's country is not personal pride, but rather pride in *another*, *related person's* achievement. For example, a parent may be legitimately proud of her daughter's high mark on the business management course, even if other students on the course also achieved an A+. Perhaps the proud South African feels towards the achievements of South Africa the way a parent feels towards the achievements of her child.

The problem with this model of pride, however, is that while the parent's legitimate pride is rooted in (significant) causal influence over her child's accomplishments, the ordinary citizen does not exercise such comparable influence. The parent raised, fed, educated and supported her child in ways that ultimately provided her with the capacity to perform well in her business management course. The ordinary citizen, however, has exercised no such causal influence over her country.

Perhaps the correct model for the proud South African is a parent who has had little to no contact with her child, but feels proud of her accomplishments nonetheless. For example, the parent who gave away her child at birth, and then proudly collects newspaper clipping of her child's success decades later. However, we might ask whether such a parent is justified in feeling proud of her child? If the parent is proud, it seems the only reason for being so is because she donated half of her child's DNA, and that DNA is somehow causally responsible for the child's success. Yet we think such a link between success and genetics is tenuous at best, and perhaps not even present in the analogous case of the proud South African – the citizen is not the source of the country's 'genetic makeup'. The average South African born today has done little to contribute to the fabric of her society as it has evolved through the generations before her. How then can she be proud of her country at all?

Conclusion

On closer examination, none of the above five ways in which people commonly consider themselves 'proudly South African' seems like a good reason to be proud of South Africa. Thus, none of the above five reasons seems like a good reason to be patriotic or nationalistic.

This piece does not intend to single out South Africa as uniquely worthy of shame (in our view, shame in respect of a country – given that it is the converse of pride, is also inappropriate). It merely probes some common reasons cited for national pride, using South Africa as its example. We argue that that there is a mismatch between the reasons cited for pride, and facts about South Africa. Furthermore, even if the facts changed, an individual's pride in an entire country on the basis of certain positive features would still seem unfitting. Thus, we submit that our arguments can be modified to show why pride or shame in any country is misplaced.

If pride isn't grounded in geographical beauty, economic loyalty, cultural affinity, political affinity, or the personality traits of its citizens, then what exactly is pride in one's country? What grounds this pride, and why should we think it is a rational attitude to adopt?

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Campus of Storms: Freedom of Expression versus post-colonial cringe at UCT

Graham Dominy is a former Archivist of South Africa who retired in March 2014 after winning a protracted labour dispute with Minister and Department of Arts and Culture. He has worked in and managed a variety of, archival, cultural and heritage institutions since the 1970s. He has studied extensively in South Africa and internationally: obtaining his graduate and professional qualifications in South Africa (University of Natal and Pretoria), his MA in Ireland (University College Cork) and his PhD in the United Kingdom (at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London).

Student protest movements have risen up across South African campuses focussing on issues of transformation, as well as issues of funding, in the higher education sector. One of the more controversial moments in the movement's history was the burning of paintings during a protest at UCT in early 2016. Graeme Dominy looks at the challenges this poses to freedom of expression and the South African art world against the backdrop of rising nationalist sentiments.

Introduction

Let us begin in Gauteng. On Wednesday, 26 July 2017, former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his former deputy, Mcebesi Jonas, were heckled vociferously during a debate on state capture and radical economic transformation held at the University of Johannesburg. Strangely enough, students dressed in EFF regalia (backed by students in ANC colours), led the heckling and even chanted, "Gordhan tell us what Zuma has done" (As if their Commander-in-Chief, Julius Malema, would not be able to enlighten them). Putting aside a nasty suspicion that the hecklers may have been part of a rent-a-crowd, dressed up for nefarious purposes, this type of engagement between prominent public figures and citizens is the very essence of democracy and the students were exercising their rights of Freedom of Expression. Media accounts indicate that Pravin Gordhan gave as good as he got. What a difference between the University of Johannesburg this week and the University of Cape Town last year.

Since the burning of works of art by students in 2016, controversy over Freedom of Expression issues at UCT has bubbled on. The university has been shaken by student protests since 2015. Beginning with the *#RhodesMustFall* movement; which had the removal of the excrement-daubed statue of Cecil John Rhodes from its prominent pedestal on the Jameson Steps at UCT, being the most immediate symbolic objective. The movement later evolved to focus on higher education costs as the *#FeesMustFall* movement spread across the country from Gauteng and was, in its initial stages, widely supported by academics and the public. However the battle-lines are drawn, not only around Rhodes and the legacy of colonialism, but at what the UCT vice chancellor, Professor Max Price, has termed the "elusive, but extremely powerful creature of institutional racism".

In an article published by *News24* on 16 July 2017, entitled "A subtle kind of racism", Price writes of the multiplicity of institutional practices that are seen to perpetuate racial stereotypes of inferiority and superiority. Price claims that UCT has "entrenched and normalised" the values and culture of English-speaking white

South Africans and this underpins the institutional racism of the institution. If this is the "new normal" at UCT, where does, what was regarded as a fundamental "value", namely the concept of "academic freedom", fit now? Is it just a relative value, a South African "English" cultural value, as important, perhaps, as another revered English institutional value, teatime? Price is silent on the issue, although university spokespeople still stress the importance of academic freedom.

One of the areas in which institutional racism is allegedly prevalent, relates to the university's art collections. In February 2017, a university Arts Works Task Team, set up in the wake of the burning of works of art on the campus, demanded that seventy-five works of art removed from display in 2016, apparently because of the offence they gave to certain students, should be kept from display indefinitely.

However, artists and academics associated with UCT are challenging the university and are strongly alleging that the management is censoring works of art in violation of the principles of academic freedom and the constitutionally enshrined right to Freedom of Expression. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, specifies that the right to Freedom of Expression includes freedom of artistic activity and freedom of scientific research. The art collections of UCT have now become a site of contest over conflicting constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression versus the right to human dignity. What is the background?

"We regret that Mr Goldblatt could not be persuaded out of his view that freedom of expression, artistic freedom and rights of artists were no longer protected at UCT. We respect and understand his decision".

During the 2016 protests at UCT works of art perceived by some students as being colonial or demeaning to black people were burned or otherwise vandalised. That the students were over-emotional and ill-informed in their selection is obvious. Works by progressive artists and photographers, several of them black South Africans, depicting the inhumanities of apartheid, as well as staid portraits of the great and the good in UCT's history and sculptures depicting nudity or human sexual organs have all been targeted. An angry student leader condemned the art as denigrating blacks and glorifying whites. The context of the times when the works were created seems to have escaped the protesters.

Earlier this year the University of Cape Town acknowledged that photographic artist David Goldblatt is withdrawing his unique and historical photographic collection from UCT and transferring it to Yale University in the USA. The official UCT statement reads: "We regret that Mr Goldblatt could not be persuaded out of his view that freedom of expression, artistic freedom and rights of artists were no longer protected at UCT. We respect and understand his decision". The rest of the statement is a bromide reaffirming UCT's belief in academic freedom, intellectual honesty, the creation of spaces for the contestation of ideas and its intention to continue developing artistic collections.

David Goldblatt is one of the foremost photographers of the apartheid era. His collection represents a unique artistic and historical record for a period of over sixty years. It has been used for study and exhibition purposes at UCT and will now presumably be used for similar purposes at Yale for the benefit of American students and those international scholars privileged enough to study at, or visit, this world-renowned institution, the *alma mater* of President George W. Bush and of his father President George H.W. Bush. The departure of the collection means

that UCT students are deprived of a key resource for imagining and understanding the human and historical context of apartheid oppression and aspiring artists are deprived of a source of inspiration for their work. There are also rumours that other concerned artists are considering withdrawing their collections from UCT.

The relocation of this collection also raises a number of questions: cultural, personal, legal and political. Culturally, Denis Goldblatt created a unique set of images that not only reflect South Africa's history, but now form part of its heritage. Personally, the images are the representation of Goldblatt's particular vision and understanding of our society. Legally, the collection is Goldblatt's own intellectual property, but politically the move to Yale represents a collective failure of South African patriotism, willpower and foresight.

In the event that the Heritage is held in private hands, which in the case below it appears to be, while Government cannot stop the movement of the Heritage objects it can and does apply the requirement that a SAHRA permit for removal must be obtained.

There is a long history of American universities pouncing on collections of South African cultural heritage and an equally long history of a weak and uncoordinated government response (to be fair, South Africa is not the only country targeted in this way). Many of the previous cases occurred when a personal collection came up for sale and bidders, often British or American, were about to take it out of the country. Anything to do with Nelson Mandela might as well have had a big fat target painted on it, but state financial processes are too cumbersome for the Department of Arts and Culture to react swiftly to threats of the expatriation and sale of heritage collections.

The Chief Director of Communication and Marketing at the National Department of Arts and Culture, Mrs Zimasa Velaphi, has commented:

> The Department of Arts and Culture notes and appreciates the benefits and positive impact in making South African collections popular worldwide. However, The Department does not support the permanent removal of Heritage objects from the country, as it denudes the National Estate. In the event that the Heritage is held in private hands, which in the case below it appears to be, while Government cannot stop the movement of the Heritage objects it can and does apply the requirement that a SAHRA permit for removal must be obtained. SAHRA would then apply its own guidelines in the permitting process to allow the legal removal of Heritage objects across borders.
>
> The Government, as a signatory to the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, can also intervene if persons wanting to move these artworks and/or heritage objects out of the country were involved in the illicit trafficking of the same. In this case it would be expected that, in the execution of his decision to move his collection from the University of Cape Town to Yale University in the United States, Mr David Goldblatt will respect the legislative process.

SAHRA, the South African Heritage Resources Agency (the re-glossed version of the old National Monuments Council), is empowered to authorise or refuse the export of cultural material forming part of the National Estate, but whether

the Goldblatt collection has been so formally categorised is another matter. The critical fact is that this collection is David Goldblatt's own work, so it will be difficult for SAHRA to refuse a permit.

However, the Goldblatt Collection case stands out from other instances of cultural fire-fighting. One would have assumed that because his collection was already in the custody of a university that its fate would have been settled. The UCT statement claims that the collection has been 'housed' at UCT since 2009. There is no mention of the conditions in terms of which it was placed at the university, but these may have been enthusiastically rather than legally drafted. Mr Goldblatt's circumstances may have changed since 2009 and his financial needs may now be greater, so perhaps Yale has now made him an offer that he felt he could not refuse.

However, it seems that there were other factors at play as well. David Goldblatt has unequivocally told UCT that he believes that it no longer respects the rights of freedom of expression, artistic expression and the rights of artists. The university has categorically denied this, although events at UCT over the past two years certainly demonstrate that it is a campus in crisis and management is struggling to contain the situation through shaping compromises, some of them rather questionable.

While Professor Price correctly stated that the right to Freedom of Expression is not an absolute right in the constitution, not allowing the annual academic freedom lecture to proceed was a humiliation for the university. There is a clear link between this decision and David Goldblatt's decision to remove his collection from UCT.

One of the questionable decisions was the cancellation of the 2016 TB Davie Academic Freedom Lecture which was to have been presented by the controversial Danish journalist Flemming Rose. The justification of the UCT authorities for these actions was that the university was in a crisis situation and a lecture by the person who published the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed would inflame the situation even further. One of the apparent errors made by the UCT authorities was that the local Muslim community was only belatedly consulted. Many South African Muslims expressed their ardent desire to engage Mr Rose in debate. UCT's pusillanimous actions deprived South Africans of hearing such an exchange. While Professor Price correctly stated that the right to Freedom of Expression is not an absolute right in the constitution, not allowing the annual academic freedom lecture to proceed was a humiliation for the university. There is a clear link between this decision and David Goldblatt's decision to remove his collection from UCT.

The recent decision not allow the display of some seventy previously displayed works of art is adding fuel to the debate over Freedom of Expression. The University is within its rights to decide which of its works of art should be displayed at any given time, every art gallery and museum routinely takes such decisions. It is also within its rights to align its public displays to its main public policy thrusts, such as transformation. While a hall full of portraits of pale male vice chancellors has historical value serving as a valuable reminder of how far the country has come, it can only be appropriate to keep them *in situ* if they are contextualised and lead into a space where there is a vision of the university's future direction.

Many South African institutions have faced similar dilemmas. The grand Victorian red-brick city hall in Pietermaritzburg was full of colonial art and pompous portraits of various mayors (largely male and up to the 1990s, all white).



Cartoon by Zapiro, The Times © 2016. Reprinted with permission

During the transition years, The last Town Clerk of the city, noted that certain mayoral portraits had been defaced and he consulted with the museums and art galleries in the city and found homes for the old art works and various relics. These included the British Union Jack that used to flutter defiantly over the City Hall on ceremonial occasions after Hendrik Verwoerd had proclaimed a republic in 1961. You cannot get more colonial than that.

Radical rhetoric and student anger go together as closely as toast and butter. Also, students are an important constituency for the EFF and student mobilisation is critical for Julius Malema's anti-Zuma government agenda.

I have a degree of sympathy for university administrators and vice chancellors; in 2015 and 2016 universities were clearly surrogate targets for students angry with government incompetence and broken promises. Radical rhetoric and student anger go together as closely as toast and butter. Also, students are an important constituency for the EFF and student mobilisation is critical for Julius Malema's anti-Zuma government agenda. Higher Education Minister, Dr Blade Nzimande's giggling reference to "#Students Must Fall" was not a helpful intervention.

The UCT Vice Chancellor, Professor Max Price, is obviously well aware of these factors in the student body politic, plus, there is the localised issue of a significant Muslim student constituency and a smaller Jewish constituency on his campus. But keeping mortar boards below the parapet does not do much more than keep discontent just off the boil. Nevertheless, if the university is backing off the constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of expression then it is failing in its duty.

Putting the technicalities around the export of cultural property, highlighted by the Department of Arts and Culture, aside, the real question to be asked is as follows: Is UCT's inability to channel student anger into vigorous discussion and constructive debate, a localised and specific problem, or is it a symptom of a growing national malaise? Are South Africans losing their hard won human and constitutional rights? Is the debate an abstraction? If a student is forced to stay in a shack and survive on perhaps one meal per day, then that student is not going to be an engaged participant in debates on the reinterpretation of colonial art. However, following the hash-tags of whatever must fall can lead us down a road to future Marikanas where a failure on the part of business, political and police leadership to engage in any meaningful discussions with the striking miners led to the worst human tragedy and failure of government since 1994. This was a failure of leadership infinitely greater and more tragic than whatever failures of leadership there may be at UCT.

However, the concerns raised by David Goldblatt are not abstractions, they raise fundamental issues and recent American experiences show that constitutional rights still have to be fought for if they are to retain their meaning, even in a "mature" democracy. Who knows, the Goldblatt collection may yet become a site of struggle on the leafy Yale campus?

However, even if this is partly true it does not explain South Africa's willingness to name and shame Israel for human rights abuses. So what this implies is that South Africa has a consistent policy of non-interference with human rights abusers, but there can be exceptions.

Certainly, the events at UCT had national ramifications, both in the sense that disturbances spread across many campuses, but, more importantly, in the sense that the right of Freedom of Expression has been threatened in a place where it was upheld during all the dark years of apartheid. The challenge is not just that students were raucous and violent, student riots have a long history. In Paris, at the Sorbonne and other universities, in May 1968, university buildings were occupied and there were violent clashes with the police. I was told, by a distinguished German colleague in the museum world, who was a participant at that time in the French *mêlée*, that sex was one of the grievances: students were furious that male students could not stay over in female accommodation and *vice versa*. History has rather underplayed this aspect of the revolutionary story.

Another question to be asked: was there a hidden hand behind the disturbances? During the 2016 protests around university acomodation, students brought in a prefabricated squatter shack, the makings of which are sold commercially in Khayelitsha. This had to be transported to the campus in a large truck, which had to be hired, as was a Portaloo (presumably required as a source of ammunition). This required planning and logistical preparation and, above all, the expenditure of many thousands of rands for materials, transport and equipment. How could a student collective that was dependant on food handouts from sympathisers during sit-ins the previous year, suddenly find the funds to undertake a logistical exercise of such magnitude? Rumours swirl that Black Land First (BLF) organised this with the support of Gupta funding. If these are true then it is just another indication of the depth of state capture. Nefarious forces in the shadows manipulating events to distract attention from the cancer eating away in the state.

If I can prescribe some required reading and viewing for student radicals and university administrators alike, I would recommend Sir Kenneth Clark's

magisterial series "Civilisation" and the Marxist and pro-feminist riposte by John Berger, "Ways of Seeing" (Both commissioned and produced by the BBC in the late 1960s and early 1970s). Clark's lush evocation of the glories of Western Civilisation was magnificent, indeed opulent. Berger counter-attacked with an incisive "deconstruction" of Western art including the famous line, "The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled". For John Berger, *looking* was a political act and examining the art and statuary on the UCT campus should be a profoundly enriching, unsettling series of political acts that should not need to take place within a bland "policy framework", or by resorting to art-burning. But, as I said earlier, campus authorities are convenient surrogate targets for radical students betrayed by empty and ill-thought out government promises and "policy frameworks" decreeing the "massification" of the higher education sector. Whereas troops and riot police can defend ministers in Parliament, pictures and statues on campuses cannot defend themselves.

In conclusion: Max Price's actions can be contrasted with those of Alfred O'Rahilly, President of University College Cork. UCC was established in 1846 as one of the three Queen's Colleges in Ireland. When, after the establishment of the Irish Free State in the 1920s, militant Republican students defaced the crest above the entrance to the quad, O'Rahilly wrote to the *Cork Examiner* apologising to the citizens of the city for the obvious deficiencies in classical teaching on the campus: the students should have known that VR did not stand for *Victoria Regina*, but for *Vivat Respublica*! Would that the situation at UCT simmers down to the extent that Professor Price can defuse the tensions with a similar gentle and humorous public chiding.

Acknowledgements: My thanks are due to several academics and former academics from the University of Cape Town, the University of KwaZulu-Natal and the University of South Africa. They proffered much helpful advice and inside knowledge. Under the circumstances, it is best that they are not publicly named.

The Crisis of African Nationalism

Charles Simkins is a distinguished Economist. He was Vice President and Professor of Economics at St Augustine College and formerly held the Helen Suzman Chair of Political Economy at Wits University. He is a former Rhodes Scholar and is a recipient of the Helen Suzman Chevening Fellowship, a UK Foreign Office award. He is currently Head of Research at the Helen Suzman Foundation'.

"Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, a universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself." – Shakespeare: Troilus and Cressida

"Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto you – Kwame Nkrumah"

With nationalist politics often underpinned by a shift towards populist economic policies, the ramifications of how this may manifest itself require exploration. Professor Charles Simkins explores the intersection between the ideological underpinnings of African Nationalism and the potential impacts of a shift towards populist economic policies in South Africa. Including a particular focus on current South African economic trends and challenges.

Introduction

Haruspication – the attempt to understand or foretell in obscure circumstances by means of signs – has been an enduring practice in human history. No Roman regiment would go into battle until an animal had been sacrificed and its entrails examined for good or evil omens. Russia watchers have long been reliant on Kremlinology, a style of analysis which, in the absence of reliable general information about the political system, seeks to make inferences from tiny and indirect, but visible, events. Such as positions in the reviewing stand for parades in Red Square. The financial community pores over the significance of small changes in successive central bank communications for future changes in the interest rate.

In our difficult and obscure circumstances, home grown haruspication takes the form of obsessive interest in the presidential succession, firstly within the African National Congress and then within the state. One can confidently predict an increasingly frantic reading of the entrails as the year wears on. In the end, of course, scheming, inducements and brawling will determine the outcomes. Before then, there will be no inside story to discover because the insiders will know no more about the final result than anyone else. Quite probably less. Recall the delusions of Mbeki supporters in 2007.

There have been calls by ANC elders for higher ethical standards, tinged by nostalgia for the 1990s, when it was possible simultaneously to claim the moral high ground, enjoy international approbation and pursue one's interests. But that happy combination was a product of specific circumstances which will not occur again. Ethical behaviour on its own demands a level of austerity which few are ready to

accept. And the elders have also to reckon with the possibility that the next wave of indignant mobilization will be against the ANC, rather than for it. Just look around.

The sanest response to fevered speculation is a shrug – *que sera, sera* – and a brief thanksgiving that one is not oneself in the hell's kitchen of internal ANC politics. A more productive investigation will be to consider the reasons for the current crisis in African nationalism – present ever since its accession to power - with which any leadership will have to struggle. These reasons are tightly interlocking, but for the purposes of exposition they will be grouped under five headings:

- Political inclusion and exclusion
- Accountability
- Institutions
- Distributive issues
- Economic growth
- Political inclusion and exclusion

Symbol and gesture, as rhetorical devices, are always important in politics. They are particularly important in nationalist politics, as it struggles to define and realise an 'imagined community'. While there was a conscious effort at the symbolic level to make the 'imagined community' inclusive in the early post-apartheid years, the scope of the 'imagined community' has become narrower, and increasingly policed by violence. It was no accident, for instance, that the Afriforum students (predominantly Afrikaners) at the abortive National Education Crisis Forum Convention in March saw quickly that they were neither wanted nor safe. Nor is it coincidental that some refer to a possible change in government, a consequence of democratic rule, as 'regime change', a change in the political system. That view is incompatible with the acceptance of loyal opposition, hence charges of manipulation by sinister forces such as 'white monopoly capitalism', restoration of apartheid or the neo-colonial machinations of foreign powers. Ironically, some South African discourse echoes the worst aspects of American identity politics: the strength of an argument becomes less important than the identity of a person advancing it.

It is the mark of populist strategies to divide citizens into the 'real people' and their enemies – the 'foreign', the fifth column, the manipulative special interests and so forth …

It is the mark of populist strategies to divide citizens into the 'real people' and their enemies – the 'foreign', the fifth column, the manipulative special interests and so forth – and then to mobilise against the enemies while claiming an organic relationship between political leaders and the real people, based on lived experience and a common suffering at the hands of these enemies. What need, then, for constitutions and laws, for checks and balances? The organic link confers legitimacy in a way that no legally based system can, and leaders should be free to act in terms of it in any way they can.

Are there not populist straws in the South African wind? "Democracy was good in the past, but it is flawed and it no longer works',[1] 'If you give me just six months to be a dictator, things will be in order',[2] 'The time for talking is past'.[3] It is quite possible – and, in fact, usual - to have simultaneously populist mobilisation and a narrowly defined dominant elite held together by patronage, an elite prone to suffer from democracy fatigue.

Moreover, many of the old nationalist tropes have become antiquated and worn out with use. 'We led you out of Egypt' no longer works as well as it did,[4] and 'a good story to tell about service delivery less plausible at a time of declining living standards. The way to deal boredom with political speech is the way in which producers of a tired TV soap prolong its life. You have to spice it up, often outrageously. The effect is usually temporary; the more gothic a TV soap becomes, the nearer it is to the end. But entertainment is one thing, politics another. The way of prolonging the stimulus of outrageous political speech is to take outrageous action, for which an authoritarian political environment is needed.

Accountability

The Constitution embeds the principle of accountability firmly, the words 'accountable' and 'accountability' occurring more than fifteen times in the Constitution.[5] Yet it is weakly represented in South African practice. It can be enforced legally, but the law takes a long time and it is expensive. Normative acceptance is needed,[6] along with better institutional design.

Additionally, cadre deployment, when applied to administrative rather than political appointments, is toxic. It fatally undermines lines of accountability, blurring the lines between state and party.

The weaknesses are found at several levels. The first is the relationship of Parliament to the people. Section 46(1) embodies the principle of proportional representation, but the form which we have effectively makes parliamentarians accountable to party leaders rather than constituents. It is not impossible legally to change the balance[7], but it is very difficult to change it politically. The second is the accountability of the executive to the legislature. It is not politically unacceptable that Ministers do not regard their appearance before parliamentary committees as taking priority over all other business. Equally, strong conventions about the neutrality of the Speaker are lacking and insufficient efforts are made to prevent walkouts, even in the face of provocative behaviour by the EFF.

Administrative accountability is also weak, partly for reasons discussed in the next section, and partly because of arrogance and cover-ups of incompetence, irrationality and corruption.[8] Additionally, cadre deployment, when applied to administrative rather than political appointments, is toxic. It fatally undermines lines of accountability, blurring the lines between state and party.

Institutions

One clear theme arising from the renewed interest in growth theory in recent decades is the importance of institutional development for economic development. The corollary is that institutional decay damages development, the thesis of Francis Fukuyama's *Political order and political decay*, published in 2014.[9] How do things stand with us?

Certainly, and predominantly in the early post-apartheid years, there was institutional development in the fields of co-operative governance and public finance, and the formation of specialist agencies to perform new functions. But there have also been developments – severe of late – leading to institutional decay, caused by the following interlocking factors:

- *Churn*. There is a remarkably rapid turnover of directors-general and chief executive officers of state owned enterprises.[10] This is a consequence of unresolved conflict between political and administrative heads, resulting in

intrigue, breakdown of relationships and early terminations of contracts, usually accompanied by substantial pay out settlements.

- *Loss of institutional memory.* This is partly a consequence of churn, and partly a consequence of strong affirmative action in the public sector at senior administrative levels.
- *The piggy bank effect.* In February 2016, the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan warned that the Treasury was not a piggy bank for state entities to dip into. 'What you have is the phenomenon of state capture where basic control mechanisms are lost,' he said.[11]
- *The consequences of strong men.* Apologists for authoritarian systems like to emphasise that they are efficient in ways that democracy cannot match. The reality is often quite different, with a chaotic competition between institutions and elites for strong man approval, while the strong man himself disrupts institutions which stand in the way of his interests.

One casualty of institutional disarray, sometimes overlooked, is political party coherence.

The best forms of redistribution we have seen is the delivery of housing and associated services and the social grants system, reaching many beneficiaries. Two aspects of the distributive struggle have been more problematic: wrangles about the racial pattern of ownership and employment equity.

Distribution

Distributive issues are at the heart of politics everywhere. The particular form taken by conflict over distribution takes depends on history and current configuration of the social system. One possible outcome is revolution, though that depends on collapse of will and coercive capacity of the *ancien regime*. Another is social democracy, in which the costs of a revolutionary strategy are apparent, particularly in the form of a sharp dip in national output lying between existing circumstances and benefits accruing to the winners.[12]

The best forms of redistribution we have seen is the delivery of housing and associated services and the social grants system, reaching many beneficiaries. Two aspects of the distributive struggle have been more problematic: wrangles about the racial pattern of ownership and employment equity. It is difficult enough to estimate total wealth – Credit Suisse puts it at one trillion US dollars in 2016[13] - and practically impossible to determine its distribution by race. Ultimate beneficial ownership is filtered through ownership of shares in public companies, members' interest in long term contractual savings schemes, such as retirement annuities, and trusts and the like. These create veils that are impenetrable. The Land Audit – quite apart from the fact that it could not find records of ownership of large parcels of land – was frustrated in its attempt to determine the racial distribution of ownership because much land is owned by trusts and companies, to which it was impossible to ascribe racial identities. What the promised pre-colonial land audit will come up with is anyone's guess,[14] though the intention is to amend the constitution to permit land restitution without compensation following its findings.[15]

In any event, at the end of the day, assets end up in the hands of those willing to hold them, as companies with employee share ownership programmes know. Many allocated shares will be sold to reduce debt or augment consumption, and more will be sold for portfolio diversification reasons. It is this fact which has engendered the

current stand-off about the 'once empowered, always empowered' principle in the mining industry, the resolution of which will have a major impact on its future.

If disputes over ownership threaten to destabilise the economy, the approach to employment equity sets itself up for perpetual disappointment. The reason is that it uses the national race and gender composition of the economically active population as a standard to assess the actual race and gender composition of top management, senior management, and professional and technical employees. But that is not the appropriate standard. What matters is the composition of qualified people who present themselves at the factory gate, and the composition of people within the organization by qualification and experience. Both are likely to be sharply different from the EAP standard. Doubtless, this is, in substantial measure, a result of inequality of opportunity in earlier stages of formation, but inequality needs to be tackled where it occurs. Loading it all on to employment equity is both inefficient and unjust. One consequence has been the demobilisation of human capital held by minority groups – capital which, by its nature, cannot be redistributed.

Matters are not helped by a stubbornly high Gini coefficient before taxation and expenditure, though a redistributive fiscal configuration means that the coefficient after taxation and expenditure is considerably lower.[16] A lower market-based Gini coefficient requires reduction in unemployment and reduction of increased dispersion in the upper half of the wage distribution,[17] for which a more plentiful supply of skilled labour is a necessary condition.

South Africa has not been short of advice about how to improve its growth performance. But almost none of this advice has been taken. Why?

Growth

The material backdrop to all the rest is lacklustre growth. Based on an index of 100 in 1994, IMF estimates and projections put the output of emerging market and developing economies in constant US dollars at 508 in 2021. The corresponding projection for South Africa is 143. And we are currently in the middle of a particularly dismal period. Real per capita GDP has been declining since 2013 and it is not expected to reach the 2013 level by 2021.

While growth is not a sufficient condition for the reduction of poverty and shared prosperity, it is surely a necessary one over the longer term. South Africa has not been short of advice about how to improve its growth performance. But almost none of this advice has been taken. Why?

For two related reasons. The first is a nationalist intuition that, despite a highly redistributive fiscal system and despite black economic empowerment, there are still resources to be gained by sufficient pressure and that investing in this pressure will produce larger gains in a shorter time than growth. The intuition was given a powerful boost by the fact that a few people grew rich as Croesus in the immediate post-apartheid years by just these means. Where's our cut? goes up the cry. One can see it among university students. The money's there! What we have to do is apply the pressure necessary to pop it out. The result ranges from increasingly inefficient policies, such as preferential procurement, to brazen corruption, all of which raise costs in the private and public sector alike.

Secondly, as both the World Bank and Ricardo Hausman, the chair of the International Panel on the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative that advised

the South African government between 2004 and 2008, have pointed out, South African growth is critically dependent on export growth. This means competition in global markets, not compatible with a high domestic cost structure from which rents are continuously being extracted. A counter-impulse of economic introversion develops. Keep the money here – circulating within South Africa, and within preferred communities. The downside is the failure to exploit the gains of trade, including the ability to break out of narrow domestic markets.

While efficient small business development is highly desirable and finds support in the private and public sector, differential treatment of business by perceived racial identity is not. Michael Spicer, in *FOCUS 78*,[18] has set out the history of the dysfunctional relationship between government and business, in substantial measure a consequence of the salience of race, sapping the will and ability to build a unified future.

General education (Grades R to 9) is a swamp where the effects of poverty are exacerbated by one of the most widespread forms of rent extraction: teacher consumption of leisure on the job, and associated school disorganization. In this, African nationalism contrasts strikingly with Afrikaner nationalism where community pressure on the school system worked.

Growth studies have found that economies can bounce back after large scale destruction of financial and material capital, but that destruction, or absence, of human capital has more severe consequences.[19] And, in fact, despite the conclusion in the 2016 Employment Equity Report that transformation is moving very slowly, the report finds that Black/African professionals now outnumber their White counterparts. Of the four categories, change is most rapid among this group and it shows that higher education, with all its problems, has been producing results, Until now. More resources allocated to the sector will only help when disruption comes to an end, and the longer it goes on, the more extensive will be the haemorrhage of human capital from the universities, and the drop in community support.

At the same time, technical and vocational education and training colleges are struggling to cope with the rapid rise in enrolments in recent years, with consequent very high student to staff ratios. This sector is more poorly organised than the universities. Greater attention is being paid to getting learners through senior secondary school, though the jury is out on net value added to skills.[20] General education (Grades R to 9) is a swamp where the effects of poverty are exacerbated by one of the most widespread forms of rent extraction: teacher consumption of leisure on the job, and associated school disorganization. In this, African nationalism contrasts strikingly with Afrikaner nationalism where community pressure on the school system worked.

Another feature of our system is the difficulty the political system has in dealing with low growth. The reason is best expressed by Woody Allen:

> A relationship, I think, is like a shark, you know, it has to constantly move forward or it dies, and I think what we got on our hands is a dead shark. - Annie Hall

The patrimonial shark has to keep moving. It becomes particularly aggressive when new food is scarce.

Conclusion and prospects

The sixth round of the Afrobarometer survey, administered in South Africa, in

2016 found that 64% of respondents held that democracy was preferable to any other form of government, with 15% saying that they were indifferent and 17% saying that in some circumstances non-democratic government can be preferable. However, in response to the question: If a non-elected government or leader could impose law and order, and deliver house and jobs, how willing would you be to give up regular elections and live under such a government? 32% replied they would be very willing and a further 30% said that they would be willing. This points to an ambiguity in popular support for the Constitution: was it simply a means for removing white hegemony, or is it widespread commitment to the democracy for which it is the framework? Certainly, there are voices saying that the Constitution was an acceptable compromise in the mid-1990s, but that it has now served its purpose. On this view, the Constitution is regarded as needing radical revision, or even suspension.

The African nationalist project is more unstable now that at any time in the past twenty years, and it may well lurch into the direction of a populist adventure, especially in the context of stalled globalization and rising authoritarianism round the world. If it does, the experience of Latin America is that it could result in a lost decade, and the experience of Africa indicates that the damage could last longer still. Hugo Chavez's populist experiment in Venezuela was underwritten by high oil prices. Once they collapsed, it was in trouble. We don't have that cushion: prices for our commodity exports may improve modestly over the coming years. More than that we cannot rely on. So populism would lead to further and immediate economic decline. Significant elites can see this, but to foresee is not necessarily to be in a position to forestall.

There is an alternative. Struggling to emerge in a dominant party democracy is a multi-party configuration, based on interest rather than symbol, struggling to emerge. Multiple parties are normally promoted by proportional representation, in which interests compete for popular support in elections and then negotiate coalitions in parliament. There are risks: democracies have failed because of the inability to compromise and adjust. But a multi-party system would ventilate issues more thoroughly among the public and in parliament, reviving a partially moribund institution. It would contain more checks and balances. A necessary condition for its emergence is a change in the pattern of electoral support.

One thing is for certain: we cannot continue as we are.

NOTES
1 Hlaudi Motsoeneng
2 President Jacob Zuma
3 Fees Must Fall
4 We remember the fish, which we did eat in Egypt freely; the cucumbers, and the melons, and the leeks, and the onions, and the garlick: but now our soul is dried away: there is nothing at all, beside this manna, before our eyes. Numbers 11: 5-6
5 Sections 1, 41, 55, 70, 92, 93, 116, 133, 152, 181, 195, 196, 215, Schedule 6: Annexures B and C
6 'Write all these thy laws in our hearts, we beseech thee'. Response to the reading of the Ten Commandments, Book of Common Prayer 1662
7 See 'In defence of proportional representation', HSF Brief, 20 September 2016
8 We have moved too little from the apartheid days when letters to a Minister could receive the reply: 'The Honourable the Minister directs me to tell you that he is not interested in the least in your opinions.'
9 Francis Fukuyama, Political order and political decay: from the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014.
10 On this see Millions spent on out of work DGs, Mail and Guardian, 20 September 2014.
11 As reported in Gordhan asks public to help keep SOEs in line, Business Report, 26 February 2016
12 See Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and social democracy, Cambridge University Press, 1985
13 Credit Suisse, Global Wealth Report 2016
14 On this, see Aninka Claasens, Pledge of precolonial audit is a way to distract from fruits of patronage, Business Day, 9 March 2017
15 SA News, Government to conduct per-colonial land audit, 15 February 2017
16 On this see, Ingrid Woolard, Rebecca Metz, Gabriela Inchauste, Nora Lustig, Mashekwa Maboshe and Catriona Purfield, How much is inequality reduced by progressive taxation and government spending?, Econ 3x3, 2015.
17 See Martin Wittenberg, Analysis of employment, real wage, and productivity trends in South Africa since 1994, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 45, International Labour Organisation, 2014
18 The business-government relationship: what has gone wrong?
19 See Daron Acemoglu, Introduction to modern economic growth, Princeton University Press, 2009
20 When the number of learners progressed from Grade 11 (i.e allowed to enter Grade 12 without passing) able to achieve Bachelors passes in the National Senior Certificate in the next year is substantial, some questions must be asked about the reliability of assessment.

BOOK REVIEW

Martin Plaut, *Promise and Despair. The First Struggle for a Non-Racial South Africa*

Milton Shain is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Historical Studies and a former director of the Isaac and Jessie Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies at the University of Cape Town. He has written and edited several books on South African Jewish history, South African politics, and the history of antisemitism. His latest book, *A Perfect Storm. Antisemitism in South Africa, 1930-1948, published in 2015 by Jonathan Ball, won the Recht Malan Prize (Media 24) for English and Afrikaans Non-Fiction for 2016.*



PROMISE AND DESPAIR. THE FIRST STRUGGLE FOR A NON-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA by Martin Plaut
PUBLISHER: Jacana, Cape Town, 2016
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Despite prevailing orthodoxy of the roots of South Africa's deep racial inequalities dating back to the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck in 1652, Martin Plaut's book* Promise and Despair. The First Struggle for a Non-Racial South Africa *looks at more recent events with a particular focus on the negotiations around the creation of the Union of South Africa. Professor Milton Shain reviews this work and looks at the failings that led to increased oppression and racial segregation that would last for decades.

'Jan van Riebeeck's arrival in Cape Town', claimed President Jacob Zuma in early 2015, 'was the beginning of all South Africa's problems'. Herein lies our original sin. Martin Plaut, a former African editor of the BBC World Service, would disagree. For him it was the South Africa Act of 1909 - ratified by the Imperial power - rather than van Riebeeck that ensured South Africa's racial order for most of the twentieth century. After all, Plaut reminds us, the old Cape Colony and Natal had a colour-blind franchise from 1853 and 1856 respectively, in fundamental opposition to the northern Boer Republics where race defined all. And despite limited implications for 'non-whites' in the Cape Colony and especially Natal, race did not inevitably have to define South Africa's polity.

While acknowledging the erosion of African, Coloured and Indian representation as the nineteenth century progressed (supported by English- and Afrikaans-speakers), Plaut insists the blame lies with those who negotiated the Union's constitution and - perhaps most importantly – with the Colonial Office and British House of Commons and Lords that ratified the Act. For Plaut, therefore, this was the original sin.

The signs that Britain would kowtow to Boer interests were already apparent at the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902 when the ambiguous Clause 9 of the Vereeniging Peace Treaty left the door open for the black franchise to be considered only once responsible government had been returned to the Boer Republics. But the Boers had no intention of reconsidering that ambiguous clause. For them an extension of the Cape qualified franchise would exclude many previous Boer voters. This was unacceptable. They wished a return of the white franchise as had been the case antebellum.

Yet all was not lost for the black population, many of whom had participated in the colonial war effort. Whitehall had periodically spoken of ameliorating the exploitative conditions under which they lived and they had good reason to believe they would be rewarded for their loyalty to Britain. As one commentator put it 'the

British Government, led by their known and proverbial sense of justice and equality, would, in the act of general settlement, have the position of the black races upon the land fully considered, and at the conclusion of the war the whole land would revert to the British Nation, when it would be a timely moment, they thought, for the English to show an act of sympathy towards those who had been despoiled of their land and liberties (p.46).

Alas, this did not happen. Instead the Colonial Office empathised with Boer fears and black concerns were side-lined. Political divisions within the black population did not help matters. Abdullah Abdurahman, a Glasgow-trained medical doctor and leader of the African People's Organisation (APO), for example, wished to extend the Cape franchise to the north for 'coloured subjects', but showed a willingness to exclude 'aboriginal natives' (p. 63).

When the South African National Convention deliberated from October 1908 to May 1909 black concerns were effectively ignored: at issue was a compromise between the English and Afrikaners. In the final South Africa Act of 1909, the Union constitution, steered under the chairmanship of Sir Henry de Villiers, blacks were excluded from the franchise other than in the Cape, and 'non-Europeans' excluded from membership of Parliament. Convention leaders it would seem were confident that Britain would ratify their plans. Whitehall was certainly delighted to see old division between the Boers and English relegated to the past.

This was apparent when a South African Native and Coloured People's Delegation travelled to London in an attempt to thwart the efforts of the South African National Convention. Setting sail from Cape Town in the winter of 1909, the delegates had one objective: to persuade the British parliament not to ratify the constitution.

This was apparent when a South African Native and Coloured People's Delegation travelled to London in an attempt to thwart the efforts of the South African National Convention. Setting sail from Cape Town in the winter of 1909, the delegates had one objective: to persuade the British parliament not to ratify the constitution. Former prime minister of the Cape Colony, William (W P) Schreiner, was joined by John Dube, Matt Fredericks, Dr Abdullah Abdurahman, Dr Walter Rubusana, John Tengo Jabavu, Thomas Mapikela, Joseph Gerrans, Daniel Dwanya and D.J. Lenders. All were highly motivated, distinguished and competent leaders with Schreiner providing direction to the mission.

The one time prime minister of the Cape Colony - a liberal with important contacts in the 'mother country' and a steely determination to ensure a future without racial exclusion - left no stone unturned. Working tirelessly, Schreiner met with a range of progressive individuals, among them the MP Sir Charles Dilke, Keir Hardie, and Ramsay MacDonald, as well as influential lobby groups such as the Aborigines' Protection Society. It was an uphill task. As Plaut explains, the 'deputation was up against well-co-ordinated and well-resourced opposition: the combined weight of the political leadership of white South Africa and the British government' (p. 87).

In essence, however, Whitehall had made up its mind. Secret minutes detailing formal negotiations with the official South African delegation on 20 July, 1909, make it abundantly clear that the British government supported the new constitution: 'It is the fixed conviction of His Majesty's Government that these matters must be settled in South Africa itself. It was of no use to express academic options, and His Majesty's Government feel that circumstances have not made it possible to adopt a

different course than that adopted' (p.100). Indeed, Whitehall was relieved that the Boers and English-speakers had come together, only eight years after the Anglo-Boer War. Wary of a looming confrontation with Germany - ratcheted up from the time of the Jameson Raid in 1895 and the Kaiser's cosying up to Paul Kruger - Whitehall anticipated the help of Union in its future geo-political plans.

Plaut traces the passage of the South Africa Act through the House of Lords and Commons. Although many spoke up for South Africa's majority black population, and although many Liberals and Labourites willingly engaged with Schreiner and his team, in the end all efforts failed. Even Schreiner's warning that confidence in the two-third safeguard against removing blacks from the Cape Franchise was misconceived - as was the belief that the king would be able to prevent constitutional change - could not prevent the Act's approval.

Yet despite all the efforts to establish a non-racial order, white supremacy entrenched itself and the racial order was solidified. Sadly little vision was demonstrated in the ensuing decades.

Afrikaner fears had to be assuaged and a new beginning for white South Africans ensured. Henceforth South African whites would fashion their own future. As Jan Smuts told the Manchester Guardian, two issues had been confronted by the South African National Convention: relations between English and Afrikaners and relations between black and white. 'After weeks of discussion of this latter problem we came to the conclusion that it was impossible to solve both problems at the same time. We solved the one and left the other to the larger and wiser South Africa of the future which could deal with the question much better than we could even hope to do at the Convention' (p133).

Yet opponents of the Act had not wasted their time. Contacts were established and those British organisations that had supported the delegation were greatly appreciated. 'A small but influential group of British men and women had come over to their side', writes Plaut. 'Many who had been the backbone of the "pro-Boer" movement during the Anglo-Boer conflict had revised their ideas about the Afrikaners. While Smuts managed to maintain his personal links with some of his Pro-Boer friends (and women in particular), a more sceptical attitude towards South African whites was emerging among the British left and a section of the intelligentsia' (p.154).

While detailing in the main the delegation's efforts in London, Plaut also pursues the parallel efforts of Mohandas Gandhi in the metropole on behalf of Transvaal Indians and in South Africa where he wrestled with the wily Smuts. Refreshing insights are drawn from the papers of Betty Molteno and Emily Hobhouse, while divisions within the Coloured and African communities are explored. Plaut also traces the tireless work of black elites, leading to the emergence of the South African Native National Congress in 1912, later renamed the African National Congress, is traced.

Yet despite all the efforts to establish a non-racial order, white supremacy entrenched itself and the racial order was solidified. Sadly little vision was demonstrated in the ensuing decades. Notwithstanding Dube, Pixley Seme, Solomon Plaatje and others doing their best to illustrate the dead-end of race based politics, much water had to flow under the bridge before the white minority came to its senses and negotiated a future in which all would participate.

BOOK REVIEW

Judge Dennis Davis was educated at Herzlia School, Universities of Cape town (UCT) and Cambridge. He began teaching at UCT in 1977 and was appointed to a personal chair of Commercial Law, in 1989. Between 1991 and 1997 he was Director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand. He held joint appointment at Wits and UCT 1995 - 1997. He was appointed a Judge of the High Court in 1998 and as President of the Competition Appeal Court in 2000. Since his appointment to the Bench, he has continued to teach constitutional law and tax law at UCT where he is an Hon. Professor of law. Dennis is a member of the Commission of Enquiry into Tax Structure of South Africa and was a Technical Advisor to the Constitutional Assembly where the negotiations for South Africa's interim and final constitutions were formulated and concluded. He hosted a TV programme, *Future Imperfect* which was an award winning current affairs programme between 1993-1998. He has been a visiting lecturer/professor at the Universities of Cambridge, Florida, Toronto and Harvard.

My Own Liberator: a Memoir: Dikgang Moseneke

Having recently finished a highly distinguished term as Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Dikgang Moseneke has released the first installment of his autobiography, My Own Liberator. Acclaimed High Court Justice Dennis Davis reviews this book and looks at the remarkable story of Moseneke's life taking in; his upbringing, the brutality of imprisonment of Robben Island and the inspiration behind and beginnings of one of South Africa's most influential legal careers. In this, Davis finds crucial lessons about democracy, activism and justice for contemporary South Africa.

It is difficult to read a book without taking account of the context within which it is read. Reading Dikgang Moseneke's memoir in South Africa 2017 is a truly uplifting experience. We live with the continuation of structural racism, daily reports of corruption which erode the ability of this country to use its public resources for the reconstruction of the society after apartheid, and a concomitant retreat into a form of identity politics which is not politics at all. A general erosion of confidence that an egalitarian society as prefigured in the Constitution can be attained within the foreseeable future is a central characteristic of the daily lives of 55 million South Africans.

Within this gloom, this book, which read holistically, makes out a compelling case for a process of liberation from a ghastly past which is less dependent upon public authority, constitutional institutions and far more on the ability of individual South Africans to lift themselves out of the present mire and into a future where the abhorrent characteristics of our apartheid past are finally put to bed.

Consider the life of Justice Moseneke for a moment as is so graphically documented in this book: He is born before the National Party came into power, introducing policies which are even more racist than those which had been implemented by previous white administrations. The education that he receives as a young boy takes place within the context of separate educational institutions, in which black South Africans received an insignificant percentage of the total resources devoted to education. Education is for white people and is not there to unlock the innate potential of the majority of the South African population! That lies at the heart of our racist past. Nonetheless, Moseneke receives an enlightened education from dedicated teachers. He obtains six distinctions in standard 6 which affords him an opportunity to attend a secondary school of considerable quality. Government intervention closes down the school. He returns to a school closer to home. But the



MY OWN LIBERATOR: A MEMOIR: DIKGANG MOSENEKE
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political clouds are darkening even more than they did at the time of his birth. The Sharpeville massacre takes place in 1960. By 1963 young men like Justice Moseneke are attracted to the politics of Robert Sobukwe who has broken away from the ANC to start the PAC.

For a second time Moseneke's secondary education is interrupted, this time for a lengthy period. Together with a group of young men he is charged with sabotage, having joined the PAC in its plans for sustained resistance against the racist government which were to commence on 21 March 1963. His trial is presided over by the personification of an apartheid judge whom the National Party appointed to do their worst bidding: Peet Cillie. His reward was to become Judge President of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the then Supreme Court in 1969. Initially Moseneke and his co accused were represented by legendary lawyers, attorney Godfrey Pitje instructing Sydney Kentridge and Ivor Schwartzman. Notwithstanding that this was as good a legal team as anyone could possibly have hoped for, Judge Cillie had other ideas. When Kentridge asked for a postponement of a few weeks in order that he could consult all of the accused and develop a proper defence, Cillie offered a desultory couple of days. Understandably, Kentridge and the legal team withdrew as did Jack Unterhalter who was appointed thereafter.

Moseneke recalls how he was fascinated by law even as he was facing a lengthy term of imprisonment and, given that he was now left to defend himself. Perhaps the greatest triumph of it all was this, if any readers still recall the actions of Judge Cillie. Little was he to know that he was trying somebody who would become one of the great jurists of a democratic South Africa.

The reader will find a fascinating account of life on the island for a young 15 year old which combines the grimness of imprisonment with the manner in which prisoners such as Moseneke were almost able, to make light of the dreadful carceral system that was imposed upon them.

An equally significant part of the description of the trial turns on Moseneke's narrative of Mrs Hain, mother of Peter Hain later become an important anti-apartheid activist, Labour Minister and then Labour Peer. Mrs Hain provided young Moseneke with a meal each day and showed him a level of kindness which he records endearingly in his book. Cillie sentenced Moseneke to ten years of imprisonment on Robben Island.

The reader will find a fascinating account of life on the island for a young 15 year old which combines the grimness of imprisonment with the manner in which prisoners such as Moseneke were almost able, to make light of the dreadful carceral system that was imposed upon them. There are enthusiastic accounts of football matches, including praise for Jacob Zuma's football skills and their mutual organisation of the league. Sadly, this shared experience with Zuma did not prevent the latter from ensuring that Moseneke would not be elevated to Chief Justice many years later.

The account then documents how Moseneke obtained his matric and engaged in university studies while on the island. When he was finally released from prison he was in a position to become a lawyer. But remember South Africa was saturated with the racist filth of apartheid and it was not easy for a young black man, either to get articles of clerkship to become an attorney or to be admitted as an attorney. In 1976 he was able to become an article clerk at Klagbruns where Steven Klagbrun was his principal. Unlike other firms which Moseneke had approached for articles, Klagbrun was not at all phased by the fact that he had a clerk who had been

convicted of sabotage. Then Moseneke had to be admitted. Yet again he faced an obstacle. As he documents, the Law Society opposed his application. Significantly the Law Society was represented by Frank Kirk-Cohen and Meyer Joffe, both who became judges and were later joined on the Bench by Moseneke. Significantly, as is typical of the book, there is not a scintilla of expression of ill will to any of these people which make the narrative all the more powerful.

Moseneke describes how he, George Malauleke and Willie Seriti practised together as attorneys for five years. When Moseneke decided to be called to the Bar again the application raised controversy which finally ended with the Pretoria Bar abolishing its 'whites only' rule. The book ends with Moseneke having been elevated to the Constitutional Court in 2002 and ultimately to Deputy Chief Justice in 2005.

The narrative of his judicial career is left for another volume. Perhaps that is correct for the theme of this book, as I have indicated, is about how a young boy whose secondary education is cut short by a repressive regime transcends all of these obstacles so that 42 years later he becomes the Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa and more than that, the leading intellectual figure on the Constitutional Court.

When Justice Moseneke writes that he is his own liberator he could not have summarised his life story better. He also makes an important political point as befits a person who has a most keen understanding of the relationship between politics and law and the implications of the one for the other. Moseneke, in his closing chapter, notes that while courts can be the custodians of democracy and that other institutions of government can promote the democratic enterprise, the ultimate guardians of democracy are, 'we the people'. On his analysis, 'we' need to liberate ourselves. In other words, the theme of the book is that even within the context of a gloomy picture of failed governance, there is profound hope which is to be located in the irrepressible human spirit of the individual to rise way above the limitations imposed upon him or her.

Conclusion

In this, the book holds lessons for all, whether it be lawyers and judges seeking to continue Moseneke's work of crafting a legal system which can promote an inclusive society for 55 million people, activists demanding a vindication of constitutional rights, students and educators at universities faced with demands for a transformation of these institutions. One can only hope that Justice Moseneke will publish a second volume.

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