During apartheid, evictions could take place with no regard to the risk of homelessness on the part of affected parties. Our Constitution, through section 26, ushered in a new era by guaranteeing everyone the progressive realisation of the right to have access to adequate housing. Whilst stipulating that no one may be evicted from their home or have their home demolished without an order of court.
Section 26 of the Constitution must be read with the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act of 1998 (PIE Act) and the various judgments of the Constitutional Court, which over the years provided us with a constitutional framework for determining if an eviction will be just and equitable.
There are numerous examples where municipalities have sought to argue that they are neither obliged to nor able to provide temporary alternative accommodation to occupiers facing eviction. The Constitutional Court has time and again ruled that municipalities indeed have a duty to provide temporary accommodation, even in instances where the eviction is at the insistence of a private landlord.
Through legal precedent there is legal certainty in determining the relevant circumstances that must be taken into account in determining whether, under which conditions and by which date, eviction would be just and equitable. The availability of alternative housing for occupiers is one of the circumstances.
This is all about to change if the PIE Amendment Bill of 2026 is to proceed in its current format.
PIE Amendment Bill seeks to undo years of constitutional jurisprudence
Municipalities seem to welcome and support the PIE Amendment Bill. This is no wonder as the Memorandum on the Objects of the Bill declares outright that the Bill seeks “to relieve municipalities of the huge financial burden or providing alternative accommodation”. It also declares outright that it seeks to reduce the number of orders on provision of alternative accommodation.
The Bill takes us back to pre-1994 reasoning with no regard to ubuntu (a factor the Constitutional Court ruled comes into play in eviction matters) in the protection of the poor and vulnerable against homelessness.
How does the Bill do this?
The Bill deletes references to the provision of temporary alternative accommodation, as one of the circumstances to take into account when a court makes an order to determine if an eviction will be just and equitable. The definition of “alternative accommodation" is also amended in such a way that it shifts the responsibility from the state to private landlords. And finally, it goes as far as inserting a provision which seeks to spell out to a court that it has the option of not granting an eviction order with a requirement of asking the municipality or any organ of state to provide alternative accommodation or land. This provision is akin to asking a court to grant an order undermining years of legal precedent setting out the duties of the state in the realisation of section 26 of the Constitution.
In other instances, the Bill seeks to centralise power in the hands of municipalities away from property owners and even from National Treasury. It proposes an amendment of the definition of “person in charge” that would put municipalities in a position of authority over a rightful landowner for merely exercising administrative duties in relation to the property in question. As to National Treasury, it is not clear if the consent of the Minister of Finance was sought under the PFMA, but it proposes the payment of monies seized under the Act, into municipal accounts and not the National Revenue Fund. May we be reminded that the Chairperson of Scopa told News24 on 25 May 2026 that “municipalities are f***ed!”
HSF does not agree with this attempt to absolve municipalities of their obligations as a means of addressing financial and accountability failures. In HSF’s view, the Bill signals an attempt at backtracking the freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights and secured by litigation victories.
Read HSF's submission here.
