THE CONVENTIONAL approach to the
problem of non-payment of rents, rates and service charges is to ask
"how do we reverse the culture of non-payment bred by resistance to the
apartheid regime now that the democratic new South Africa has arrived?"
This is a partial and misleading approach, for even if apartheid and
the resistance to it had never existed, there would doubtless have been
a crisis over non-payment. As it is, the tradition of successful and
long-lasting rates and rent boycotts merely lends an extra and
troublesome dimension to the problem, for it created a political and
moral rationale for non-payment that continues to be invoked in a
radically changed situation.
The non-payment phenomenon in South Africa’s cities and towns should
be viewed as part of a wider social crisis. The dimensions of this
crisis are customarily wrapped up in phrases about "transition" or
"transformation", but it is best to be blunt about some of the key
processes through which the country is passing at a great rate.
Had apartheid not existed urbanisation would doubtless have been a
gradual and continuous process but for years this process was
artificially restrained. The abolition of the pass laws in 1985
continues to have a huge impact, much like that of a piece of elastic
snapping back rapidly, having been stretched in the opposite direction.
In the mid-1980s the rule of thumb was that roughly one third of
Africans lived in the "homelands", another third in the cities and
towns and the remaining third in the rural areas outside the homelands.
This has changed at enormous speed in recent years not only because the
legal barriers to urbanisation were removed but because of the large
shake-out of farm labour and the ending of the homeland system - with
its large subsidies to homeland development.
The result, almost everywhere, has been the run-down of the old
homeland "capitals" such as Thohoyandou or Phuthadithaba and a dramatic
decline in employment opportunities there. In addition, trade union
insistence on standardised national pay rates saw the old border
industries shut up shop and move to the cities once the subsidy
incentives to stay there were removed. All of these factors hastened
the flow to the cities. By 1999 it was estimated that 50 per cent of
the African population lived in the towns but that this figure was
increasing steadily and would reach 55 per cent by 2005. There is no
reason to believe that this influx will not continue for a long period
after that.
This accelerated process of urbanisation is changing the entire face
of South Africa. In the first place, the physical structure of
townships built in the 1950s and 1960s is creaking under the tremendous
strain of this increased population. Such townships are being pressed
by informal settlements on all sides — and often within their own
streets as well. Whereas in the apartheid era urban Africans by
definition all had jobs (if not they were shunted out of town),
unemployment is increasingly becoming the norm among these large
African communities.
Attempts to provide housing and other services for this mushrooming
population have inevitably fallen far behind demand so that
increasingly urban settlements are informal, uncontrolled and
unregulated. The more the authorities do manage to supply housing and
services, the more these urban settlements attract other rural dwellers
(for whom no one provides houses) and immigrants from the surrounding
countries who are unlikely to make the payment of rents, rates or
service charges a high priority. The net result of these pressures is
that an enormously greater demand is placed on the urban infrastructure
and services at the same time as the ability to pay is
diminishing.
South Africa is also going through the same process of
de-industrialisation witnessed in many other countries, with a run down
in manufacturing, mining and agriculture and growth limited to the
service sector. This has had an extremely depressive effect on the
formal sector job market, for the unemployed masses being disgorged
onto it usually lack the skills required in the growth areas of the
service sector — information technology, software, financial services
etc. There is a general fall in per capita incomes and an increasing
number of people at the bottom of the system who are suffering rapid
immiseration not just in relative but in absolute terms. But relative
inequality within groups has also grown. The number of poor whites is
increasing, too, and it must be expected that more and more of them
will react as have the whites of Carletonville by becoming non-payers
themselves on a very significant scale. The phenomenon of non-payment,
predominantly an African one to date, is likely to spread into other
racial groups.
The black population is still growing quite rapidly, though the
depredations of Aids mean that the rate of growth of will be slower
than expected. Aids is bound to affect the problem of the non-payment
of rates, rents, service charges and taxes for multiple reasons. One is
simply that many of the economically active, who are most able to make
such payments, will become sick or die. Another serious question is how
far those who know they are HIV positive are likely to bother to pay
rates or service charges. The temptation to spend whatever they have on
themselves is understandable and likely to be overwhelming in such a
situation.
The fact that neighbours and family members are becoming sick and
dying all around is bound to produce a tremendous malaise, indeed the
demoralisation of many communities. In such an atmosphere it is
difficult to see how community spirit can be built up and how such
relatively prosaic questions as the payment of rates can achieve either
the salience or priority that local councils might wish.
This social and economic context provides a framework for thinking
about the phenomenon of non-payment which is realistic but undoubtedly
gloomy. On present trends it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to imagine that the problem can be fully solved in the immediate
future, if by solved we mean the attainment of a close to 100 per cent
payment rate in the large majority of townships and informal
settlements.
In effect, by refusing to pay rates and service charges non-payers are
pushing the buck back to the government. It therefore faces a situation
in which all the major public utilities are likely to incur large and
possibly unsustainable losses due to non-payment. Either it will be
forced to support these utilities by subsidies or, at best, it will
have to accept lower returns from them than would otherwise have been
the case and delay their possible privatisation. Equally the government
will inevitably be reluctant to surrender management control over these
utilities to anyone else, for there can be little doubt that if they
were run on lines of economic efficiency alone they would be forced to
retreat from certain areas of provision, effectively "red lining"
significant parts of the community. Such a solution is not acceptable
to the government or to voters.
Non-payers are also, in effect, voting to weaken local government and
to force the tax burden upwards onto central government alone so that
local authorities are supported only by central government subsidy,
which in turn depends on centrally levied taxes. The government will no
doubt wish to resist having this burden laid upon it and will wish to
see payment levels improved to the maximum degree possible. Our study
suggests several ways forward.
The most central problem clearly lies in the complex of issues
surrounding "the entitlement culture" and even the "culture of
non-payment". The latter certainly exists in Gauteng and has some roots
elsewhere. The strength of the Masakhane campaign is that it attempts
to tackle these cultural phenomena head on and to install a strong
sense of community in its place. Undoubtedly a strong, confident
community consciousness is the best antidote to these dependent and
self-defeating attitudes. Our study also suggests at many points that
this is also the key to the achievement of higher payment levels.
Nonetheless, whatever the local successes achieved by the Masakhane
campaign, it would be a mistake to see that response as a complete
answer to the problem. The government must also consider carefully how
far it wishes to risk its credibility in such campaigns, which cannot
possibly succeed overall. It may be that Masakhane campaigns should be
launched only in those communities where payment levels are already at
40 per cent and can reasonably by expected to rise to, say, 75 per
cent. In such cases something real and probably lasting would have been
achieved and a consequent strengthening of community solidarity and
consciousness would be likely to take place. But to campaign to raise
payment levels from, say, 10 per cent to 30 per cent is a waste of
time, for non-payment will then remain the norm and the 30 per cent
level will not be maintained over time.
Secondly, government is going to have to accept that it will not be
able entirely to solve the problem of non-payment in the foreseeable
future and that the result will force transfers of resources from
central government to the major utilities and to local government.
These transfers are going on already and are bound to continue. For
government the questions are how far it should openly acknowledge this
inevitability, how it should extend subsidies and transfer resources to
achieve the maximum impact, and how to promote higher payment levels
wherever possible.
Thirdly, our study suggests several ways in which these transfers
could be most usefully made. Our survey shows that expenditure on roads
(including road cleaning and road lighting) should receive priority, as
should a more generalised attack on crime in township and informal
settlement areas. A concerted drive against crime in these communities
is necessary not merely to restore law and order to these often lawless
settlements but in order to give a reasonable chance to the process of
community building. This could in turn provide the basis for the
stronger community cohesion necessary to the achievement of higher
payment levels as a second stage.
In a climate of zero-tolerance of crime there would be a far better
chance of persuading residents that the non-payment of rates and
service charges was a serious matter — and that making illegal
connections to water, telephone and electricity supplies was more
serious still. In any case only a crackdown on crime will enable the
government to dispose of the criminal syndicates who are often
responsible for these illegal reconnections.
In Durban, we were told how Telkom would train young engineers who
would then leave six months later because they could make more by
selling their skills in townships to make illegal phone connections. In
some cases there was only a two-week gap between the original phone
installation and illegal reconnection, as syndicates of illegal
reconnectors swept in right behind Telkom. Eskom and the water boards
can face similar problems as trained staff defect to make more money
this way.
A concerted attack on such practices will be all the more effective if
it is part of a wider anti-crime campaign. At least residents will then
feel that they are gaining a more peaceful community out of the process
and not merely losing the opportunity of acquiring cheap and illegal
water/electricity supplies.
Fourthly, the government should reward communities that are clearly
successful in increasing payment levels so that it strengthens the
perception that higher payment levels lead to better delivery and more
development. One objection is that this could well produce a pattern of
rewarding the better-off communities. However, as our study shows,
communities as poor as Keimoes and Kuruman in the Northern Cape and
Ivory Park in Gauteng were all among those that might be in the queue
for such rewards. Even if better-off communities were in fact rewarded,
this could still be worthwhile if it produced permanently higher
payment levels in those communities.
Finally, the government will have to consider taking stronger action
to guarantee the integrity of existing townships and their
infrastructure. It simply cannot allow townships that work to be
deluged with squatters and migrants to such a degree that they cease to
function as communities. This is a real danger. There clearly also
needs to be a far more detailed and determined attempt to plan urban
development and not to allow "wild cat" squatting initiatives to
determine the pattern of development.
Currently plans are going ahead to merge municipalities around the
country into a far smaller number of much bigger units. It may well be
that the government will hope thereby to solve some of the problems of
non-payment, effectively forcing redistributive transfers from
wealthier sections of the community to subsidise non-payers. But the
scope for such transfers is by no means unlimited, especially with the
haemorrhage of tax-paying skilled and professional labour abroad. The
attempt to force such transfers will cause companies and personnel to
move away from the affected areas.
In the end there will have to be some scheme of rebates for the very
poorest whereby their inability to pay is recognised and they are at
least brought within the law. The cost of such rebates should be met
out of central government funds, though the same point should be made
about the effect on a slender and possibly diminishing tax base. If
people feel they are being taxed unfairly heavily, studies the world
over show that they find ways of not paying more, even if it means
moving away.
The government must also reconsider its policy towards the rural
areas, including the former homeland areas. Although the old homelands
policy is rightly completely discredited, simply to have scrapped it
does not answer the needs of these areas — and threatens to turn the
flow of urbanising migrants into an irresistible and destabilising
flood. The recent suggestion of the minister for welfare, population
and development, Zola Skweyiya, for an unemployment benefit for the
poorest of the poor — which in practice would largely mean the rural
jobless — would undoubtedly be a start.
But the most effective way to reduce the speed of urbanisation to more
manageable levels would be to create more employment opportunities in
rural areas and small and medium-sized country towns in the hope that
their inhabitants will be less inclined to migrate to the metropolitan
centres. In part, this may be dealt with through the development
corridor process which the government has launched in a number of
areas, but there needs to be a wholesale review of policy, including
the possibility of differential wage rates, lower company taxes and
other incentives for enterprises to locate themselves outside the major
metropolitan areas.