One of the paradoxes of the present row
over Kader Asmal's plan for the country's universities and technikons
is that the ANC, so determined to do away with the legacy of apartheid
in every other direction, has taken eight years to face up to that
legacy in higher education - the area where delay has been most
expensive and damaging. But of course the Historically Disadvantaged
Institutions, as they like to call themselves, never quite get around
to mentioning that the main historical disadvantage most of them
suffered from was being an integral part of the old "separate
development" policy with clienteles defined by tribe or race. In effect
Asmal plans to turn this page at last, merging most of the HDIs with
formerly all white institutions so that most of them disappear.
The last decade has been a terrible time for the HDIs but it began as
if they had come into their own at last. In the apartheid era they were
run by iron-clad Broederbonders which meant that by 1985 most were the
scene of more or less continuous staff and student tumult. By the late
1980s, however, the Left had won and they all passed to the management
of "progressive" black or brown academics, a moment of giddy euphoria
when their campuses seemed exciting places and managed to recruit a
number of able academics. This change preceded the far greater
political turning point of 2 February 1990 so that when the liberation
movements returned home they hailed the once reviled "bush colleges" as
bastions of the Left and models of transformation. Donors rushed to
help them, and from 1994 on the government was clearly minded to give
them preferential treatment of every kind.
Calamity ensued. The culture of student power and mass action
continued to create havoc. The new government, business and the older
established universities poached huge numbers of academic staff which
the HDIs could not afford to lose. Many of the most able among the
HDIs' student clientele deserted them for the formerly white
universities. Aids began to cut a regular and growing swathe through
the student body. Student applications fell calamitously at the same
time that institutional debts mounted. Most crucial of all, the new
post-apartheid management teams uniformly failed.
To be fair, the problems of the HDIs would have tested any management
- but typically these problems were only worsened by far by the style
of management actually imposed. For there was something in the post of
vice chancellor which frequently brought out the very worst in the
members of the new black elite. The whole notion of a campus was
peculiarly alluring: a tiny fiefdom all its own, its chieftain was by
definition endowed with great intellectual and social authority, had
the right to dress up in brightly coloured mock-medieval costumes and
bestow honorary doctorates not just on their cronies but on men and
women so famous as to imply even greater distinction in the
degree-giver himself. On such occasions the vice chancellor would give
orations which exalted the African Renaissance, black empowerment and
his or her own determination to achieve yet more and faster
transformation in the institution. Crudely, this meant getting rid of
whites, whatever their qualifications, and promoting blacks and
cronies, whatever their qualifications.
To ensure that no one could prise this fiefdom from their hands, the
vice-chancellors quickly packed the university council with their
cronies and creatures and, disregarding any notions of academic
freedom, applied brutal stick-and-carrot policies to the professoriate,
ensuring no challenge could come from there. Thus entrenched the
vice-chancellor would award him or herself a vast salary and an even
larger expense account and then set forth on interminable
peregrinations abroad where he would be said to be "fund-raising",
though typically there were no funds to show at the end of such trips.
In all too many cases, indeed, there were soon large and unexplained
holes in the accounts into which millions of Rands had unaccountably
vanished.
With the vice chancellor so frequently away, multiple smaller scams
and scandals proliferated - and, inevitably, his or her position became
increasingly contested. Even when he or she was present, the vice
chancellor's management style consisted simply of the issue of ukases,
frequently disregarding not only the institution's constitution and
procedures but also taken without much regard to practicality. Students
finding themselves on the receiving end of such brusqueness were prone
to riot, usually resulting in the sudden alteration of the dates of
teaching terms and exams - and to the buying off of key student
leaders. Foreign donors often found to their incredulity that they were
unable to give away the large sums they had allocated to the HDI
because no one could be found to construct a properly evaluated and
costed project proposal. At long last many walked away, just as many of
the academic staff and students had walked away - and, belatedly, even
Kader Asmal is now walking away.
Frequently matters were even worse than this caricature suggests. At
the end of a decade of post-apartheid leadership of the HDIs it is not
only difficult to cite a single vice chancellor or principal who was a
success, but an increasing number of these institutions have seen their
leadership collapse altogether so that they are now "under
administration" and bankrupt. Only the difficulty of grasping this
political hot potato can explain why the government has delayed this
long before intervening, for the situation has been chronic for many
years now. Probably only two HDIs ever had much chance of succeeding -
the universities of Western Cape and Durban-Westville, which were
situated in large conurbations and with original target clienteles
(Coloureds and Indians, respectively) with superior educational
traditions undamaged by Bantu Education. But not only were they fatally
weakened by the loss of those clienteles but their management was every
bit as bad as that of the other HDIs. It is, nonetheless, no small
irony that South Africa's first Indian Minister of Education should be
administering the coup de grace to UDW which not only incorporated the
outstanding educational tradition of the Indian community but which,
alone in South Africa, provided for the study of that community's
distinctive history, culture and languages.
So is Asmal's policy correct? To the extent that it shuts down
unviable institutions, yes. The only lobby to keep them open comes from
vested interests - such as the HDI vice chancellors in post. But it is
impossible to pretend that anyone, starting from scratch, would design
a tertiary system of the kind South Africa has now. The Asmal plan
seeks to make such a policy more palatable by disguising it as a policy
of merger. In some cases one can see further disasters coming: thus the
universities of the North and Venda are to be merged with Medunsa. All
three are failed institutions: a merger will merely make the failure
bigger, more unwieldy and probably irretrievable. In most other cases
the fact that the HDIs have been allowed to run down for so long will
mean that mergers are really takeovers. This could prove problematic
for there are areas of real merit, even excellence, within the HDIs -
which could be lost in a simple takeover. There is also the problem of
administrative overload. The University of Natal, for example, has
always struggled to administer two centres at Durban and
Pietermaritzburg plus a semi-independent medical school. Under the
Asmal plan it must now absorb UDW and perhaps the Umlazi campus of the
University of Zululand as well.
Whether this really represents a strengthening of the merged
institution which ultimately eventuates is a moot point. Management
talent is, as we have seen, in short supply and spreading it ever
thinner may hurt rather than help. One should not forget the analogy of
the over-loaded lifeboat. At some point one more swimmer clambering
aboard will sink the boat and drown the whole crew.
Unfortunately, the battle over closing or merging HDIs is laden with
symbolism and has been fought with tenacity by HDI vice chancellors
who, though they may be discredited in the educational world, have
strong political connections. In fact this battle is as irrelevant to
the real needs of the tertiary sector as Asmal's disgraceful threat to
apply racial quotas.
Two issues are paramount. Earlier this year the Financial Mail drew
attention to the fact that over half the universities' scientific
research output (as measured by publications) was now produced by those
aged over 50 - a dramatic change from the position a decade ago. In
fact much the same would doubtless be true in the arts and social
sciences, for what the data was really telling one was that tertiary
education is now dangerously over-dependent on an older (and largely
white) age cohort which will exit the sector in the next five or ten
years - lured out of the way, in many cases, by early retirement
schemes crazily aimed at hurrying this talented older group on its way.
It is now extremely difficult to see how the whole tertiary sector can
avoid a precipitous drop in quality and standards. For although
replacing this older group with a similarly talented younger cohort was
one of the most urgent tasks facing the education ministry in the last
decade, Asmal has yet to acknowledge that the problem exists. The
reason, of course, is that this would be to question the holy mantra of
transformation.
The second, connected issue is that of merit. When Edwin Cameron,
chairman of the Wits Council, announced that it was highly probable
that Colin Bundy's successor as vice chancellor would "either be black
or a woman", he was merely expressing openly the doctrine that merit
alone was no longer the basis of appointment even to the most important
jobs in the tertiary system. Quite clearly, white males need not apply.
A greater betrayal of the academic enterprise than this insistence on
sexual and racial criteria is hard to imagine. When the Nazis ruled
that German universities would no longer employ Jewish academics,
severe damage was inflicted on that country's tertiary system even
though Jews had not made up a majority of German academics. But white
males have historically provided the majority of South Africa's
academics - which means that our version of the Nuremberg Laws will do
far more harm.
The sensible (as well as the humane) response to the Nuremberg Laws
was that of the British and American universities which grabbed all the
German Jewish academics they could. They were quite unbothered that
such folk were non-Aryan white males: they were simply the best. It is,
of course, desirable that South Africa's intelligentsia should include
as many shades of black and brown and as many women as possible - but
anyone with the slightest historical understanding knows that the
formation of an intelligentsia is not something which works according
to the ukases and timetables of lawyers or politicians. There is no
prospect whatsoever of Kader Asmal or anyone else conjuring into
existence a black or brown intelligentsia of sufficient size to replace
the white academics who will leave the tertiary sector in the next few
years.
It is, of course, true that a similar demographic crisis faces most of
the professions over the next few years but of these the crisis
afflicting our educators (schoolteachers are also badly affected) is
the most severe. In the case of accountants, actuaries, doctors and so
on, much higher salaries will create market forces to help fill the
gap; this is not true of academics or teachers. Second, educators are
the fundamental profession: they produce the members of all the other
professions.
Above all South Africa has to be deeply conscious of the fact that the
coming to power of African nationalism led, right round the continent,
to the decline and virtual destruction of many fine universities
bequeathed by the colonial order. This was long ago identified by the
World Bank as a major cause of Africa's crisis, "robbing such countries
of the possibility of institutional renewal". But the brutal truth is
that Uganda could survive the decline of Makerere if the coffee and
cotton grew, just as Ghana could weather the decline of Accra
University if the cocoa crop came in. But South Africa is not like
that: its far more sophisticated economy and infrastructure depend
utterly on a continuing supply of well-educated graduates, which in
turn depends on the core tertiary institutions remaining in a healthy
state. But this core - of which the HDIs have never been part - is in
trouble. Unisa is already in a critical state and the University of
Natal could soon follow. To date all Asmal has done for these core
institutions is reduce their autonomy and academic freedom and threaten
them with racial quotas.
One of the saddest signs of the time, indeed, has been the failure of
universities to protest against a new regime which seeks to turn them
into mere parastatals, annihiliating their long and sturdy defence of
the autonomy and freedom they once fought for. Thus Asmal's recent
ukase threatening racial quotas was actually greeting with applause
from universities which mounted furious protests when the apartheid
government first insisted on such racial criteria in 1957.
Meanwhile underpaid academics leave in droves for other shores and
other jobs and many of the brightest graduates either leave the country
or are told that an academic career is not for them because they are
the wrong colour. It is a clear warning signal when the vice
chancellors first of UCT, then of Wits and then of Natal all emigrate
to jobs abroad. The apartheid era was bad for universities but even
under apartheid nothing like that ever happened. In a very limited
sense the decision to close or merge the HDIs constitutes a victory for
merit - at least future resources will be devoted to institutions more
able to do the job. But to save the core requires nothing less than a
public admission that tertiary education can only thrive and survive if
intellectual merit is its first and last criterion.