Over the past year, as Robert Mugabe's
land seizure programme gathered momentum in Zimbabwe, South Africa's
African National Congress-led government has issued a spate of
reassuring statements. Similar dispossession of white farmers will not
take place in South Africa, ANC notables, from President Thabo Mbeki
downwards, have declared. The situation in South Africa is too
dissimilar from Zimbabwe's for a replication of Mugabe's polices to
occur in South Africa, they have insisted.
But juxtaposed with these comforting messages is a stream of
unsettling letters to daily newspapers and contributions on radio
phone-in programmes from black South Africans. They almost invariably
express support for Mugabe's policies. Cognisance must be taken of
them. The often palpably anxious exhortations of white South Africans
for the government to either speed up its land reform policy, or to
take tougher action to halt the murderous attacks on white-owned farms,
should not be left out of the equation either.
Taken collectively, the written and spoken interventions by ordinary
South Africans suggest that it would be prudent to view the assurances
of government ministers with a degree of scepticism and not to dismiss
warnings or premonitions that it could happen in South Africa further
down the line.
Mbeki has pronounced categorically, however, that "the problem in
South Africa is homelessness, not land". His statement, made in his
state of the nation speech to Parliament in February, echoes a point
made by the Minister of Housing, Sankie Mthembi-Mahanyele, after the
invasion of unoccupied (but not unowned) land at Bredell, near Kempton
Park, in July 2001.
Judging by her input during a debate on the Bredell affair organised
by the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE), Mthembi-Mahanyele
believes that comparisons with Zimbabwe are misleading. The Bredell
invasion, like earlier illegal occupations of urban land by
"squatters", has to be seen as part of the quest for homes, and land on
which to build them, by the poor people who are squeezing into every
nook and cranny of South Africa's urban areas.
She adds a corollary. The government is making progress towards its
objective of relieving the housing shortage or, at the least, of
reducing it to manageable proportions. She notes that the government
"nearly" fulfilled its target of building one million housing units in
its first five years in office, stating that in March 1999 nearly 746
000 housing units had "either been completed or were under
construction". The process of providing housing has speeded up since
then, she observes further.
In an exposition of government's land policy, published in The
Star, Land Affairs Director-General Gillingwe Mayende adopts an
even more positive posture. He declares, "We have a land reform
programme to comprehensively address and eliminate the legacy of
colonial and apartheid-inspired land dispossession (of indigenous
blacks)". The implication is that South Africa's land reform policy is
rapidly neutralising the kind of pressures that led to land seizures in
Zimbabwe. "Any talk or threat of land invasion is completely out of
line," he states, labelling those who think differently as "either
ill-informed or downright mischievous".
Mayende observes that the land reform programme consists of three
components: restitution to compensate those who were dispossessed of
their land between 1913 and 1994; redistribution to rectify the
historically deeper disparities arising from the "frontier wars" or the
"wars of dispossession" during the colonial phase of South African
history; and policies designed to underwrite security of tenure for
labour tenants on farms and for people who live in the formerly
designated "homelands".
He gives the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) a school-masterly tick
for each component.
· Of the 68 878 restitution claims received by the cut-off date of 31
December 1998, 33 510 or 48,6 per cent, have been settled, thanks, in
large measure, to a decision to speed up the process by empowering the
Minister of Land Affairs to expedite undisputed claims
administratively. Completion of the process is on schedule for the
target date of 2004.
· After a slow start, redistribution is "on an upward curve" and the
DLA is working to fulfil its target of redistributing 30 per cent of
agricultural land by 2015.
· Similar progress is being recorded in securing the tenure rights of
labour tenants and in the redistribution of state-owned agricultural
land. The system of land holding and land administration in the former
"homelands" and in development trust areas is in the process of being
"democratised". Communities there will acquire "full ownership of the
land" and will be able to administer it on their own or "in conjunction
with their traditional leaders, if they so choose".
Dismissing the threat of Zimbabwe-style land invasions in South
Africa, he states: "From the reports that we have received, the process
of forcible land acquisition in Zimbabwe is led by the state. The
government of our country is not going to lead a land-grabbing
exercise".
Having noted these government assurances, it is appropriate to
evaluate them critically and, in the process, to reflect the views of
informed people with a direct interest in, and specialised knowledge
of, land affairs who do not share the optimism evinced by government
ministers and officials.
It may well be true that the most conspicuous and vocal demand is for
land on which to build houses on, in or around South Africa's major
conurbations. But there is little comfort in that. It has led to
repeated invasions by homeless people of "empty" tracts of land. Ugly
scenes have often followed, when the "red ants" - men in red overalls
employed by security companies contracted to evict the squatters - have
moved in to demolish illegally erected shacks.
As the CDE notes in its mimeograph on Bredell, there have been at
least 50 similar invasions since 1994, ten of which occurred in the six
months before Bredell was occupied by people in search of land on which
to build their own homes.
One of the most spectacular of the recent invasions concerns the
plight of Braam Duvenage, whose farm in the Benoni municipal area near
Daveyton on the East Rand has been occupied by an estimated 6 000
families or 40 000 people. His recent appeals for help to the police
have so far failed. Prison officials have reportedly told him the
police cannot arrest the squatters because the local prison is already
overcrowded. A court injunction by the Witwatersrand High Court
ordering the squatters to vacate his farm has not helped either. The
Sheriff of the Court has informed him that he will have to pay the
R1,8-million that it will cost her to appoint a private contractor to
carry out the court order.
A desperate Duvenage applied to the Pretoria High Court for an order
to compel the President, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs,
the Minister of Housing, the Minister of Safety and Security, and the
National Police Commissioner to comply with their respective
responsibilities in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act. These include protection of the sanctity of private
ownership of land and upholding the Rule of Law by ensuring that the
original order of court is effectively enforced. All government
institutions cited in the application - which was served before the
Court at the end of October - have opposed Duvenage's application. They
contend that the matter amounts to an ordinary civil action between
private litigants (Duvenage and the squatters) in which government has
no duty to interfere.
Agri SA, the most important voice of commercial farmers, intervened in
the proceedings as a "friend of the court" and on behalf of its 65 000
members supported Duvenage's cause. It regards his case as one of vital
importance to the future of organised agriculture.
In his judgement, delivered as Focus was going to press, Justice
William de Villiers, chastises the government for neglecting to protect
Duvenage's property rights and accuses it of failing to uphold the
"democratic political order" and the constitution that underpins it. He
has given the government until February 28, 2003, to present a
comprehensive plan to the court on how its proposes to fulfil its duty
to protect Duvenage's property rights, as well as those of indigent,
landless South Africans to shelter from the elements.
His judgement reinforces scepticism about the efficacy of government
land reform and its effectiveness as a bulwark against land invasions.
It provides a useful legal precedent however, that commercial farmers
can use to protect their property from invasion, provided they act
swiftly and decisively. If they do not take action within six months of
an invasion, the invaders acquire legal rights that make it difficult
to dislodge them.
Unless vastly more money is spent on the provision of urban housing,
invasions comparable to those suffered by Duvenage and the landowners
at Bredell are likely to continue inexorably for the foreseeable
future. They are symptoms of a deeper crisis: the poverty of the rural
areas and the desperate plight of the majority of people who live in
them. As Thembela Kepe and Ben Cousins, of the Programme for Land and
Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape, note:
"Over 70 per cent of the country's poorest people reside in rural areas
and over 70 per cent of all rural people are poor". Many rural families
experience "food insecurity at household level" and under-nutrition is
"widespread", they add.
The reflections of a long-gone squatter leader provide a historical
perspective to the problem. "The government is beaten. (It cannot) stop
the people from squatting. The government is like a man who has a
cornfield that is invaded by birds. He chases the birds from one part
of the field and they alight in another part of the field. We squatters
are the birds". The speaker is Oriel Monogoaha, a squatter leader in
Pimville more than 50 years ago. His words are as apposite today under
the ANC government as they were in the last years of the United Party
government of JC Smuts.
Director-General Mayende is understandably proud of the accelerated
process of restitution. But the total number of claims, under 69 000,
is small when compared with the 3,5 million people estimated by the
Surplus People's Project to have been displaced during the forced
removals of the apartheid era. It conjures up a vista of disgruntled
victims of dispossession who for one reason or another (illiteracy,
isolation or deficiencies in the DLA's dissemination of information)
did not know about the restitution programme.
The Chief Land Claims Commissioner, Wallace Mgoqi, offers an
explanation: in the rural areas each claim represents not one person
but an average of 297 people and, consequently, 4 million people,
claimants and their dependents, stand to benefit. Even if that is so,
problems remain. Most of the claimants, nearly 60 per cent according to
Edward Lahiff, of PLAAS, have been compensated financially for the loss
of their land. That raises the possibility that the compensation offers
a temporary respite only against destitution, particularly as,
according Mgoqi's figures, the money has to be shared between so many
people.
There are likely to be budgetary problems, too, according to Kepe and
Cousins. They state in their policy brief on land reform and rural
development that a six-fold increase in the restitution budget will be
required to realise Mbeki's hope of completing the restitution process
by December 2004. Whether the necessary funds are made available will
serve as a litmus test of the depth of government's commitment to
restitution and, indirectly, of the reliability of its verbal
assurances that Zimbabwe-style invasions will not be part of South
Africa's future.
The government has long since abandoned its brave (or reckless)
Reconstruction and Development Programme target of redistributing 30
per cent of South Africa's agricultural land between 1994 and 1999. For
that reason Kepe and Cousins describe the progress in the
redistribution of land as "very slow indeed". The goal posts have been
shifted. The deadline is now 2015. Kepe and Cousins foresee further
problems, however. To meet the revised timeline target, the DLA will
have to transfer 1,72 million hectares of land per year, seven times
more than the largest amount it has transferred in any one year so far.
Average annual expenditure on land acquistion will, moreover, have to
be three times as much as the amount the DLA budgeted for land
acquisition in the financial year 2003-2004.
Assuming, however, that the government allocates enough money to
realise its 2015 target and that the DLA musters the necessary capacity
for the vast administrative task ahead, there is no guarantee that it
will excise the explosive potential building up in the rural areas. A
survey commissioned by the DLA refers to continuing levels of poverty
among the beneficiaries, ongoing expressions of dissatisfaction and
persisting under-utilisation of land. The survey reports, "Many
projects do not yet show any signs of economic potential". The findings
challenge the euphoria of success that Mayende exudes.
Mayende, however, has a point when he notes that the Mugabe government
initiated Zimbabwe's land seizures from above and that there is no
evidence that the present South African government plans to do so. But
that does not mean that a future ANC government will not adopt a more
populist land programme if the ANC's appeal as a liberation movement
begins to fade. No movement, however popular, can assume that its power
base will not be eroded by time. Rising food prices, growing
unemployment and emergence of popular protest movements, of which the
Landless People's Movement may be a forerunner, are potentially
corrosive forces even now.
The South African government's failure to unequivocally condemn
Mugabe's land seizure policy is hardly reassuring. Neither is the
imprimatur of approval that the ANC gave Mugabe's use of violence and
chicanery to ensure victory in the Zimbabwean presidential election in
March.
Another factor has to be considered in any reflection on whether the
South African government might adopt a similar policy trajectory to
that taken by its Zimbabwean counterpart. The origins of the
state-sanctioned seizure of land from white farmers in Zimbabwe lie in
two developments: street protests in Harare by war veterans against
their lot and Mugabe's capitulation to their demands for gratuities and
pensions and deflection of their anger onto white landowners. It is an
open secret that many Umkhonto we Sizwe guerrillas in post-apartheid
South Africa are disgruntled. The arrest of nearly 100 angry former
combatants planning to present their grievances to parliament is but
one sign of the ire fomenting in their ranks. If their numbers grow and
their inclination for more direct action expands proportionately, a
future South African government may similarly make absentee or foreign
or white landowners scapegoats for its own failures.
As it is, farmers already find themselves under attack on an almost
daily basis. After declining in 2001 - when there were 389 attacks on
farms and smallholdings, resulting in the killing of 62 people - the
tempo of these attacks is on the increase again. Official figures
leaked to the Afrikaans newspaper Rapport show that between
January and July 2002 there were 690 attacks and 80 killings. They
appear to foreshadow a return to the high level of attacks and murders
in 2000 and 1999 (905 attacks and 144 murders in 2000 and 813 attacks
and 144 murders in 1999).
The orthodox view, backed by empirical research, is that the
assailants are most frequently common law criminals and their motive is
usually robbery and, concomitantly, that there is no orchestrated
political conspiracy to drive white farmers off the land. But two
qualifying riders need to be added to that explanation.
The first is that, whatever the motives of the attackers, the
apparently incessant assault on the property and lives of farming folk
makes it difficult for farmers to remain on the land. They experience
the attacks, viscerally if not cerebrally, as an attempt to drive them
off their farms. The second is that South Africa still has a
politically charged atmosphere and that it is impossible to totally
exclude political motivation even where the assailant's motive is
prima facie criminal.
Speeches by politicians that portray white farmers as alien usurpers
and colonial robbers offer a justification to the assailants for the
attacks, even when they are carried out for criminal motives. A speech
made by the former ANC parliamentary chief whip, Tony Yengeni,
illustrates the point: "Everything whites own, they stole from the
blacks," is a not so subtle justification for "robbing the robbers".
Costa Gazi, of the Pan Africanist Congress, minces no words in
attributing farm attacks to deep-rooted political causes. He identifies
them as "massive hunger for land among rural farm workers", "massive
poverty in the homelands", and the slow - "very slow" - redistribution
of land.
More recently the Landless People's Movement has distributed pamphlets
that proclaim: "Landlessness = racism. Give us our land now". The
unmistakable implication is that black landlessness is the product of
white theft. Though now officially disapproved of by the ANC, the
slogans "Kill the Boer, kill the farmer" and "One settler, one bullet"
still echo in the minds of many South Africans. They have entered the
collective psyche of the citizenry, particularly those who are black
and poor and who might be tempted to adopt - or be driven to - crime as
a survival strategy.
While the reassurances of ANC leaders are welcome, they do not offer
an absolute guarantee against a repetition in South Africa of events in
Zimbabwe. There are too many variables in the deeply rooted and highly
charged land question for categorical assertions of any kind. The sense
of dispossession - for which there is some historical justification -
runs deep in the black community. David Maughan Brown highlights the
depth of feeling about lost land with an apt quote in his illuminating
book on the Mau-Mau rebellion in Kenya, Land, Freedom and
Fiction. "When someone steals your land, one can never forget. It
is a bitter presence". Whether that bitterness can be contained in
South Africa will depend on how the land reform programme progresses in
the next few years.
Anyone appraising the efficacy of land reform in South Africa should
heed the counsel of the African nationalist leader, Amilcar Cabral,
"Claim no easy victories," he advised.