Summary - Our political system is a hybrid arrangement composed of three distinct and competing political traditions: those of consensual politics, co-optive politics and adversarial politics. An example of consensual politics is the government of national unity, which has been partially continued with the inclusion of IFP members in government. Proportional representation, which benefits small parties, is another manifestation. Adversarial politics, which tend to widen racial divisions in heterogeneous societies, characterise relations between the ANC and the DA. The co-operative governance pact between the ANC and the NNP is an example of co-optive politics in which the ANC has co-opted the NNP, despite the fact that the two parties punt it as a form of consensual politics. It also seems that both parties were motivated to enter into the pact by self-interest rather than by common goals and concerns. The NNP, with 7 per cent of the vote in the 1999 election, is simply too small to serve as a catalyst for the expansion of genuine consensual politics. The DA, which could win as much as 15 per cent of the vote in the April election, is in a stronger position to do so. Its coalition for change with the IFP, moreover, is a genuine product of consensual politics in that the two parties developed a common agenda of problems that they believed required united action. If the ANC, DA and IFP take stock rationally after the election, there may be a move away from adversarial toward consensual politics. The differences between them are more about means than ends as they all agree that South Africa must become a more equitable society. The dispute is over how to address the injustices inflicted on blacks in the past without discriminating against a new generation of whites. If the three parties can find a way to empower the poor of all races, blacks would still be the main beneficiaries but racial tensions would be defused.
A composed look at South Africa's evolving political system leads, even amidst the cacophony of electioneering, to the conclusion that it is a hybrid arrangement, in which there are three distinct and competing political traditions: those of consensual politics, co-optive politics and adversarial politics.
Consensual politics finds concrete expression in post-apartheid South Africa in the government of national unity that was prescribed in the interim constitution of 1993. It has been partially continued, on a voluntary basis, by president Thabo Mbeki, who in 1999 appointed members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to serve in the ANC-led government. Additional manifestations of consensual politics still dot the political landscape. One is the system of proportional representation which bolsters the survival chances of smaller political parties though it has been undermined by floor-crossing arrangement.
Adversarial politics tends to characterise relations between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), in part because of apparently acrimonious personal relationship between Mbeki and his DA counterpart, Tony Leon. Adversarial politics is usually associated with the first-past-the-post, winner-take-all system that the old South Africa established in emulation of Britain's Westminster model. Whatever its merits in relatively homogenous societies, adversarial politics is calculated to widen rather than bridge racial divisions in heterogeneous societies.
The New National Party (NNP) and the ANC tend to punt their co-operative governance pact as a form of consensual politics. But it is better classified as a form of co-optive politics, in which the NNP has been co-opted by the ANC.
The decline of the NNP has been too precipitous for it to be more than an acolyte to the ANC. Its motives in signing the pact are suspect. Its sudden discovery of the virtues of co-operative governance seem to have been prompted by the self-serving desire of its leaders to prolong their political careers after the 2001 fallout with Leon. The ANC seems to have been motivated by self-interest as well: it saw the NNP's weakness as an opportunity to secure control of the Western Cape, and, in the longer run, of KwaZulu-Natal. It is a matter of time before the ANC either swallows the NNP or spits it out.
The NNP is simply too small to serve as a catalyst for the expansion of genuine consensual politics. It is, of course, possible that the NNP will astound the pundits and attain a larger share of the vote than its minuscule share of 7 per cent in the 1999 election and thereby muster enough power to generate a more authentic model of consensual politics. But that is unlikely.
The DA, which is poised to win at least 10 per cent of the vote in the pending election, and possibly as much as 15 per cent, is in a stronger position to advance consensual politics than the NNP. The coalition for change that it forged with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) may be a bonus, if it proves to be stronger than the sum of its parts after the election. The coalition is, furthermore, a product of consensual politics, as the two parties developed a common agenda by identifying the problems - unemployment, poverty, HIV/Aids and crime - on which they concurred that there is a need for united action.
If the three strongest parties, the ANC, the DA and the IFP, take stock rationally after the election, there might be movement away from adversarial toward consensual politics. Most of the differences between them are about means, not ends. There is agreement on the need to transform South Africa into a more equitable society. The dispute is about how to achieve that objective and, in particular, about how to address the injustices inflicted on black citizens in the past without discriminating against a new generation of their white compatriots, many of whom were in primary school or even pre-primary school when Nelson Mandela was released from prison.
Resolution of the dispute should not be beyond the ingenuity of political leaders who contributed to the peace settlement of 1994 that won plaudits across the globe. The need to do so is apparent from a resolution at a recent UN conference on racism in New Zealand, which warned that affirmative action aggravates racial tensions when it is based explicitly on race. If agreement can be forged to empower the poor of all races, blacks would be the main, but not the only, beneficiaries, and - as important - race would be de-emphasised.
