Summary - With close to 3 000 troops on peacekeeping duty, South Africa is now a fair-sized contributor of troops to peace missions. Its willingness to participate lends the country diplomatic prestige, gives impetus to its campaign for a seat on an expanded United Nations Security Council and provides valuable experience for the defence force. In addition, the argument put forward by government that Africa’s stability and prosperity are linked to South Africa’s is a compelling one.
South Africa is a newcomer to international peacekeeping, although since 1999 the defence force has seen over 14 300 tours of duty on peace-bolstering missions. Though mainly concentrated in the DRC and Burundi, there are a small number of military observers in the security zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea and about 250 recently-dispatched monitors to the Darfur region of the Sudan.
After the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa displayed an initial reluctance to become involved in peacekeeping operations. But that focus changed unexpectedly in September 1998 with an ill-prepared intervention in Lesotho, made to restore order after a disputed election. While the operation was later given the veneer of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) operation when 130 troops from Botswana joined South African troops, it was initiated by South Africa.
About a month after the Lesotho intervention the cabinet approved a government White Paper whose overriding message was that the foreign affairs department should spearhead processes leading to peace missions and that all responsible government institutions needed to be involved.
However, the emerging peace and security system has centred on the African Union (AU). Early warning systems, a powerful AU Peace and Security Council, and plans for an African Standby Force, as well as an SADC defence pact, create a substantially changed environment for peacekeeping and intervention.
The signs are that the defence force would have difficulty in deploying much above the present 3 000 on peace missions, although it has a total strength of 76 000. With a growing intake of new recruits, South Africa’s ability to perform this role will gradually improve.
The most severe constraint is that about 22 per cent of the defence force is HIV-positive and therefore ineligible, under South African rules, to be sent for duty outside the country.
The 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review did not anticipate that South Africa would play as great a role as it has in peacekeeping and the result has been a posture heavily oriented to defence-against-aggression.
The signs are that in the “review of the review”, due to be released by the end of the year, there will be an attempt to better align budgeting, training, and equipment with the growing peacekeeping role.
On the basis of the 1998 Defence Review, the government made the decision to invest heavily in new weapons for the navy and air force with what has become a highly controversial arms package. It is not impossible, but unlikely that these acquisitions will be involved in a peacekeeping operation. The purchase of state-of-the-art weapons may have been delayed, and different decisions may have been made, had peacekeeping been foreseen as the major long-term activity of South Africa’s armed forces.
South Africa should have invested more heavily in military transport. Most equipment used in operations in Burundi and the DRC has had to be flown in, some of it by foreign air transport companies.
Training is another area where there may well be inadequacies. Absent from the peacekeeping curriculum is a course on negotiation for all who enter into a peacekeeping arena. In peacekeeping operations, it is the corporal or sergeant rather than the colonel or the general who is more likely to be in need of negotiation skills.
South Africa is likely to be actively involved in regional peacekeeping over the very long term. According to the UN, about half of the states that emerge from war lapse back into conflict within five years. Furthermore, new missions arise with unexpected frequency. Peacekeeping, and the potential crises that could demand the presence of South African peacekeepers, must be given a far higher profile in budgeting, equipment acquisitions, training, logistics, and overall defence planning.
In a new get-tough policy, the United Nations (UN) mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC, recently ordered militia in the east of the country to disarm by the end of March. To enforce the order, South African, Bangladeshi, Moroccan, Pakistani, and Nepalese troops clashed with a militia group while conducting a cordon-and-search operation in early April.
It was the second time within the space of a month that South African troops had seen action in the eastern Congo. In March South African troops were flown by helicopter to support Pakistani and Indian troops in a six-hour fire-fight against a militia group.
South African forces have been involved in earlier clashes in Burundi as well as in the Congo, but the difference is that the recent shoot-outs in the Congo could be the start of a long-drawn-out campaign.
The far more aggressive posture of the UN brings closer the chance of casualties among South African peacekeepers and the possibility of it raising public concern about what our troops are doing so far from home. The question of how many deaths in combat the South African public might accept so far from home in the name of regional security has yet to be tested. So far there have been no deaths in combat, but about 25 South Africans have been either killed in vehicle accidents, drowned or, on one occasion, murdered, while on peace missions in Burundi and Congo.
With close to 3 000 troops on peacekeeping duty, South Africa is now a fair- sized contributor of troops to peace missions, although on a smaller scale than countries like Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan. The budgetary burden, at less than four per cent of the defence budget, is not large, and much is reimbursed, albeit after some delay, by the UN or the African Union (AU), which receives funds for these missions from the European Union.
South Africa’s willingness to participate in peace missions lends the country diplomatic prestige, gives impetus to its campaign for a seat on an expanded UN Security Council and provides valuable experience for the defence force. In addition, the argument put forward by government that Africa’s stability and prosperity are linked to South Africa’s is a compelling one and there appears to be a broad consensus that the country should play a large role in peacekeeping.
While South African troops have gained some experience when supporting the police at home in conducting road blocks and cordon-and-search operations, South Africa is a new-comer to international peacekeeping, having been actively involved only since 1999. Over the past six years, the defence force has seen over 14 300 tours of duty on peace-bolstering missions. Though mainly concentrated in the DRC and Burundi, there are a small number of military observers in the security zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea and about 250 recently-dispatched monitors to the Darfur region of the Sudan.
In the Congo, South African forces have been mainly involved in specialist roles like cargo-handling and fire-fighting at airports, but recently an increased number have been placed in a frontline position to act as a rapid reaction force for the UN force commander in the volatile Ituri province.
In Burundi, South African forces were first sent in under an African Union mandate to help guarantee the political settlement by providing protection to high-level politicians. Later their task was extended to overseeing the disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration of the Hutu fighters. The expanded programme of the South African Special Forces includes running camps, securing convoys and protecting Bujumbura airport. Today, in Burundi, South African forces are involved in protecting the UN presence, high-visibility patrolling in the greater Bujumbura area as a confidence-building measure, and limited humanitarian assistance.
In Burundi and the Congo, South Africa operates under a UN Chapter VII mandate, which gives scope for enforcement action, including civilian protection, rather than the Chapter VI mandate, which allows only for monitoring and observation, as is the case along the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In Darfur, the AU mandate remains one of monitoring and observation and is a subject of considerable debate as the AU does not have the means to halt atrocities.
The mission in Burundi has helped stabilise a volatile environment and reinforced diplomatic efforts at conflict resolution, but the role and effectiveness of MONUC has been debatable, largely due to its weak mandate.
After the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa displayed an initial reluctance to become involved in peacekeeping operations. The ANC government did not want to be viewed as bullying neighbours, the defence force was heavily focused on integrating “non-statutory forces” with those of the former homeland armies and the old South African Defence Force, and the civilians in the defence ministry were finding ways of asserting their new-found control.
But that focus changed unexpectedly in September 1998 with an ill-prepared intervention in Lesotho. The intervention was made to restore order after a disputed election and what Pretoria called “a creeping coup d’etat”.
South African troops in the initial wave were without ammunition and maps, the president and deputy president were out of South Africa at the time, and the South African foreign affairs department was not given any notice.1 While the operation was later given the veneer of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) operation when 130 troops from Botswana joined South African troops, it was initiated by South Africa. Ultimately order was restored and the introduction of a new electoral system avoided the trauma of a fiercely contested election outcome.
The Lesotho operation, in which eight South African troops and a number of Basotho soldiers were killed, highlighted the absence of an effective national security management system, and poor communication between government departments, intelligence, and combat preparedness.
About a month after the Lesotho intervention the cabinet approved a government White Paper on South African participation in peace missions. Its overriding message was that the foreign affairs department should spearhead the processes leading to peace missions and that all responsible government institutions needed to be involved.
However, the emerging peace and security system centred on the African Union. Early warning systems, a powerful AU Peace and Security Council, and plans for five regional brigades to make up an African Standby Force for rapid intervention, as well as an SADC defence pact, create a substantially changed environment for peacekeeping and intervention. The degree to which the evolving peace and security framework will be more effective than that of the Organisation of African Unity, which it replaced, will depend on political will, the budgetary contributions of the participating countries, and heavily on the extent of donor country funding.
“Africa eats infantry,” says one senior South African general. For success, African peace missions are particularly reliant on large numbers of infantry because accessibility by road is often highly limited and there is a need to control vast swathes of territory.
The signs are that the defence force would have difficulty in deploying much above the present 3000 on peace missions, although it has a total strength of 76 000. With a growing intake of new recruits, South Africa’s ability to perform this role will gradually improve, but not to any large extent for about three to five years.
A general rule is that for every troop in the field, at least one is undergoing training to replace the one in the field, and another has returned and is either recovering or undergoing further training. South African troops are on missions for six months and military observers spend a year on duty.
The demands on the manpower of the defence force, together with the on-going internal deployment of the defence force in support of the police (which will only be phased out in 2009), account for one set of constraints.
But the most severe constraint is that about 22 per cent of the defence force is HIV-positive and therefore ineligible, under South African rules, to be sent for duty outside the country. The UN does not have such a rule and only requires troops to be combat fit. But the health problems from HIV/Aids and aging personnel as well as the absence of large-scale recruiting until three years ago creates a low level of combat effectiveness.
This year the defence force says it will take about 4 400 new recruits, but it would like to raise the number to 7 000. One of the entry requirements is an HIV-negative status, which would, in time, also allow many more troops to be sent out of the country. The next steps in the force’s rejuvenation include the massive funding of an exit package to make way for recruits, a reduction of the amounts that are spent on salaries and increased resources for operations and training.
Not as severe a constraint, but nevertheless a sign that peacekeeping is a subsidiary activity, is the absence of a detailed and specific management policy for peacekeeping missions, particularly as peacekeeping missions now account for the bulk of defence force operations. The 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review did not anticipate that South Africa would play as great a role as it has in peacekeeping and the result has been a posture heavily oriented to defence-against-aggression.
The signs are that in the “review of the review”, due to be released by the end of the year, there will be an attempt to better align budgeting, training, and equipment with the growing peacekeeping role.
On the basis of the 1998 Defence Review, the government made the decision to invest heavily in new weapons for the navy and air force with what has become a highly controversial arms package, due to alleged payoffs as well as questions about its relevance to the country’s needs. It is not impossible, but highly unlikely that these acquisitions will be involved in a peacekeeping operation. The destruction by the French of the Ivory Coast’s air force last year after an attack on peacekeepers illustrates a potential role for the Gripen fighter aircraft. Another conceivable use, although an unlikely one in African peacekeeping, is to enforce no-fly zones.
There is a varying degree to which a peacekeeping role can develop with relative ease from South Africa’s dominant posture of defence-against-aggression. But the purchase of state-of-the-art weapons may have been delayed, and different decisions may have been made, had peacekeeping been foreseen as the major long-term activity of South Africa’s armed forces. South Africa should have invested more heavily in military transport. Peacekeeping operations have been a severe test of the defence force’s ability to operate effectively at long distances. Most equipment used in operations in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo has had to be flown to these countries. Due to the defence force’s shortage of airlift capacity and its inability to transport outsize cargo, it has had to hire Ukrainian air transport companies to fly in such essentials as Casspir mine-protected troop carriers. Many requirements are supplied by a weekly logistics flight on one of the two aging Boeing 707s in the air force’s transport fleet.
South Africa has a fleet of nine C-130 transport aircraft, but earlier this year seven were grounded on the recommendations of the manufacturer because of problems with aging wing spares. The likelihood of the continuing demands of peacekeeping, combined with the diminishing transport capacity of the current fleet of planes, are sound arguments for the acquisition of a new transport fleet.
Late last year the government announced that it had agreed to buy between eight and 12 of Airbus’s latest military transporters, the A400M, on which production for delivery between 2010 and 2012 has since started. But it is unlikely that increased air transport alone can solve the defence force’s problems with logistics and inventory management, which have been noted in a number of qualified opinions by the auditor general.
The defence force admits there have been problems in supplying spares for vehicles and a range of other supplies for the troops in Burundi and the Congo. But it says vehicle fleet management is made all the more difficult by servicing a widely-dispersed fleet operating in rougher and wetter conditions and at far longer distances from depots than in its recent experience.
Vehicle availability has been adversely affected by the high accident rate. South African forces drive right-hand drive vehicles in countries where the rule of the road is keep right, which makes it difficult to see traffic. To remedy the situation, the defence force has stipulated that there has to be a co-driver in the passenger seat at all times. That raises the question of whether a more durable solution to the problem might not be to use left-hand drive vehicles.
Training is another area where there may well be inadequacies. Peacekeeping operations are dealt with in pre-deployment training, but there is no in-depth preparation. What is absent from the peacekeeping curriculum is a course on negotiation for all who enter into a peacekeeping arena. The recent award to a British Royal Marines reservist colonel for his negotiating with warring factions during an attack on Bukavu last year highlights the role of such skills in peacekeeping. In peacekeeping operations, it is the corporal or sergeant rather than the colonel or the general who is more likely to be in need of negotiation skills.
While the defence force says the occurrence of ill-discipline is not exceptionally high, a number of incidents have done its reputation harm. They include alleged involvement in sexual misconduct of four senior South African officers in the Congo, including a battalion commander.2
South Africa is likely to be actively involved in regional peacekeeping over the very long term. Despite the move to elections in Burundi and the Congo, these countries and the wider Great Lakes region remain tense.
According to the UN, about half of the states that emerge from war lapse back into conflict within five years. Furthermore, new missions arise with unexpected frequency, as was the case with Darfur and could be the case, through the African Union, in Somalia.
In both the Congo and Burundi there has been a gradual expansion of the mission of South African peacekeepers which can be viewed either as “mission creep” or a matter of flexibility, but what it shows is that it will be difficult to exit any time soon.
It is unclear what lessons the government actually learned from the Lesotho disaster or what reforms it made to the national security management system. But peacekeeping, and the potential crises that could demand the presence of South African peacekeepers, must be given a far higher profile in budgeting, equipment acquisitions, training, logistics, and overall defence planning.
Endnotes
1 Garth Shelton, The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and
President Mbeki’s Peace and Security Agenda: New Roles and Missions,
Institute for Global Dialogue, IGD.
2 SAPA, SANDF Commander on CONGO Sex Charges, 15 March, 2005.
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