Dark clouds cast a gloomy shadow

Summary - What kind of government will we have after the next elections? How will economic confidence and political stability be affected? Will our much-lauded democracy have the capacity to ensure an orderly resolution of policy conflict?

South Africa has become unused to this kind of uncertainty. It seemed that the leadership of the ANC was in absolute political command. But this was a huge myth. The central power machine was in fact steadily unhinging itself by promising to be all things to all people and trying to do everything at once. Meanwhile the coherence and capacity of the bureaucracy has been weakened by transformation and managerial inexperience.

No power elite can survive protracted failure unless it is well nigh totalitarian in its methods. The current administration promised far more than it could deliver and Mbeki is the fall guy. What does this mean for the next administration?

The best outcome for democracy would be if the ANC split, with large parts of Cosatu, the SACP and other “progressives” forming a new socialist or labour party to contest the 2009 elections, thus reducing the dominance of a single party, but it is highly unlikely.

The more feasible scenarios, therefore, seem to be the following:

Popular “socialism”. The next president, first of the ANC and then of the country, will be captive and accountable to a very mixed stakeholder group which will include principled socialists, labour formations hostile to business and disaffected would-be yuppies – a lurch leftwards. With luck the principled socialists, who at least understand the need for expanded production and employment, will be influential. But nothing will curb the pressure for populist reform that will frighten many middle-class taxpayers into emigrating, and puncture economic and investor confidence.

More of the same. The current political establishment might succeed in muscling in a candidate who will be seen as an Mbeki clone. A slight majority of rank-and-file ANC voters will back the new leader, but there will be ongoing opposition from the dissident factions in the alliance. The new leader will have to continue to promise more than can be delivered. The dispute at the heart of the ANC will remain unresolved, with an escalating potential for instability.

Tough choices. The country needs a leader who will realise that some things, like education and training, labour-intensive employment strategies and the quality of public sector management, must be fixed before the government undertakes any large new initiatives. This person will need to have enough confidence and communication skills to explain these priorities to the electorate and the authority to get the cabinet and the bureaucracy to respond coherently.

For the sake of the economy and longer-run prosperity for all South Africans, the third option is obviously the one to back. But even it will face serious populist dissent.

A captive and self-defeating democracy?

The second uncertainty is the quality of our multi-party democracy.

A multi-party democracy must perform two core functions: it must reward or punish leaders for their performance and it must offer an orderly and constructive way of resolving national disputes about ideological and policy choices. Currently our party system does neither particularly well.

The current dispute about economic, welfare and development policy in the ANC is not something that only the factions themselves have to resolve. Voters in a democracy are supposed to consider the options and deliver their judgment. South Africa’s voters are being sidelined because those in favour of Mbeki’s programme and those opposed to it both vote for the same party. In the end this situation will force voters to take to the streets, which is what has happened and what democracy is supposed to avoid. It is turning our democracy into a farce.

The most desirable future scenario, therefore, is the one that seems least likely. The SACP and the socialists in Cosatu should do the honourable thing, and get out of the ANC to form a new party. At least it will help to rescue what was once a very promising new democracy.

“… the future is not what it used to be” (Paul Valéry)

Quite suddenly, South Africa’s medium term future is looking rather different than it did a year or even a few months ago, and some of the uncertainties of our transition have jumped to the fore once again. Two in particular are serious. One concerns the shape of government in the medium term future and the other is about the quality of our celebrated constitutional democracy.

The shape of future government

It is clear that the current controversy within the African National Congress (ANC) lies very much deeper than the trial of Jacob Zuma. This messy event has coincided with the discontent reflected in some 40 to 50 public protests over service delivery in poor townships1, increasingly insistent criticisms of fiscal and welfare policy by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) and a host of other specific disagreements between the Cabinet and factions in the ruling alliance.

Tension within the ANC is old news, and so is discontent among the poor, but the Zuma issue has clearly been a catalyst in galvanising the participants to act. We read that Cosatu-SACP formations are not only dancing and singing with the youth at Zuma speeches, but in Johannesburg at least they are nominating their own candidates for the local government elections in opposition to the existing political establishment. By the time that Zuma’s trial ends, the outcome will quite possibly be overshadowed by crystallised ideological conflict and a burgeoning palace revolt.

Hence the re-emergence of uncertainties last debated just before and after 1994. What kind of government will we have after the next elections? How will economic confidence and political stability be affected? The most important question of all, however, is whether our much-lauded democracy will have the capacity to ensure an orderly resolution of policy conflict.

South Africa has become unused to this kind of uncertainty. The ANC has seemed so large and powerful that the country appeared to be on an undeviating course. The top leadership of the ANC appeared to be in absolute political command.

But the absolute political control was a huge myth. The central power machine was in fact steadily unhinging itself by promising to be all things to all people and trying to do everything at once. There has been an unabated rush of new legislation with new and more ambitious mandates, while simultaneously the coherence and capacity of the bureaucracy was weakened by transformation and managerial inexperience. Government has been sublimely unconscious of the most important principle of all in running any system — when to leave well alone.

No power elite in a party, no matter how dominant, can survive protracted failure unless it is well nigh totalitarian in its methods. The current administration promised far more than it could deliver and Mbeki is the fall guy. The knives are out and the left-leaning, aspirant youth factions and the disaffected “intelligentsia” are grabbing the initiative. What does this all mean for the next administration?

One oft-entertained scenario is that the ANC will split, with large parts of Cosatu, the SACP and other “progressives” forming a new socialist or labour party to contest the 2009 elections. This would be the best outcome for democracy because it will reduce the dominance of a single party, but it is highly unlikely. The disaffected factions within the alliance know full well what massive material resources, patronage, status, organisational strength and sentimental loyalty to a historic party they would sacrifice.

The more feasible scenarios, therefore, seem to be the following:

Popular “socialism”. The next president, first of the ANC and then of the country (possibly but not necessarily Zuma) will be captive of and accountable to, a very mixed stakeholder group. It will include principled socialists; labour formations hostile to business and all manner of disaffected would-be yuppies with intense feelings of deprivation. In other words there will be a lurch leftwards. If South Africa is lucky the principled socialists, who at least understand the need for expanded production and employment, will be influential. But nothing will curb the immense pressure for populist reform that will soon frighten many middle class taxpayers into emigrating, and puncture economic and investor confidence.

More of the same. The current political establishment might succeed in muscling in a candidate who will be seen as an Mbeki clone — possibly an existing minister, a party apparatchik or an insider businessman who has maintained close links to the current presidency. A slight majority of rank-and-file ANC voters will back the new leader, but there will be fractious ongoing opposition from the newly invigorated dissident factions in the alliance. Whoever the new leader is, he or she will have to continue to promise more than can be delivered to pacify the party. The dispute at the heart of the ANC will remain unresolved, with an escalating potential for instability.

Tough choices. The country needs a leader who will realise that some things, like education and training, labour-intensive employment strategies and the quality of public sector management have to be fixed before the government undertakes any large new initiatives. This person will need to have enough confidence and communication skills to explain these priorities to the electorate and the authority to get the cabinet and the bureaucracy to respond coherently. Without mentioning names one suspects that there is a person or persons on the fringes of the ANC with popularity among the party rank and file and the talent and previous experience to begin the long haul.

For the sake of the economy and the longer-run prosperity for all South Africa’s people, the third option is obviously the one to back. The other two outcomes will put paid to our hopeful contemplation of GDP growth of 6 per cent in the next decade. But even the third scenario will face serious populist dissent. Only a clear message from a majority of voters could resolve the tension.

This brings one to the second uncertainty, the quality of our multi-party democracy.

A captive and self-defeating democracy?

In the turmoil of current events our electoral democracy is becoming something of an appendage. A multi-party democracy has many roles in society but among them it has to perform two core functions. First it has to reward or punish leaders for their performance and second it has to offer an orderly and constructive way of resolving national disputes about ideological and policy choices. Our party system does neither particularly well at the moment.

In table one the results are presented of two exactly comparable national surveys, one just before the last elections in 2004, and one completed in August of this year. If a multi-party system was functioning as it should, one would expect problems such as those just mentioned to be visible in the support patterns.

The results show that the ANC and the SACP combined got 73,7 per cent of the choices in 2004 and this increased to 76,5 per cent three months ago. Hence, amidst all the dissent and controversy, the governing alliance actually strengthened its position.

Perhaps political communication in South Africa is so puffed up with sweet words of hope and reassurance of “delivery” that voters see their task as one of rewarding good intentions rather than performance. Or perhaps they understand so little of our complex policy statements that they respond to something else altogether — the publicity that a party gets, good or bad.

But the more serious problem is that the current dispute about economic, welfare and development policy in the ANC is not something that only the factions themselves have to resolve. Voters in a democracy are supposed to consider the options and deliver their judgment. South Africa’s voters are being completely sidelined because those in favour of Mbeki’s programme and those opposed to his supposedly neo-liberal policies both vote for the same party. In the end this situation will force voters to take to the streets, which is exactly what has happened and exactly what democracy is supposed to avoid. It is turning our democracy into a farce.

The most desirable future scenario, therefore, is the one that seems least likely. The SACP and the socialists in Cosatu should do the honourable thing, and get out of the ANC to form a new party. At least it will help to rescue what was once a very promising new democracy.

Endnotes
1 Fast Facts No 8, August 2005, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.