Summary - The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is widely seen as the last major bastion of one-party communist rule in the name of the proletariat but China itself believes it is a communist-controlled multi-party state.
The Communist Party of China (CCP), with 67 million members, rules but, according to the PRC’s yearbook, it cooperates and coexists with eight other parties (with a combined membership of less than 500 000). These are not, however, opposition parties, they participate “fully in the political life of the nation”. Founded in the 1940s, these parties are today represented in the standing committee of China’s supreme legislative institution, the National People’s Congress, but their function is to advise the government on how to improve the implementation of policy, not to oppose the policy.
China’s political system is a variant of the “people’s democracies” of the former Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe. It is not a form of multi-party liberal democracy.
Since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping came to power, China has succeeded in freeing parts of the economy from government control and interacting increasingly with the outside world. The emergence of family-based profit-seeking agricultural units at village level and the establishment of special economic zones in which market forces rather than state edicts prevail bear testimony to the extension of greater economic freedom to citizens. Freedom has not yet spread to the political sphere, however.
One rationale for preventing or minimising the seepage of freedom from the economic to the political domain is the need to proceed cautiously, an inclination reinforced by the fate of the Soviet Union, which imploded when Mikhail Gorbachev moved too quickly on too many fronts, precipitating the 1991 attempted coup that ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The second explanation for the paucity of political reform is that China’s immediate priority is economic development, not political restructuring. Currently China ranks 112th in the world for per capita income, with 100 million Chinese citizens living on less than a dollar (about R6,50) a day. The average annual per capita income is just over US$1000 (approximately R6500 a year). The target is to raise it to US$3000 a year by 2020. Another reason is that the Chinese government apparently believes it must tighten its political control to underwrite national stability and prevent pro-democracy demonstrations from diverting its attention away from economic development. The memory of the Tianamen Square massacre of 1989, which brought shame to China, is still vivid.
The repression of the Falun Gong religious movement, which, while claiming the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, eschews violence, does not augur well for the chances of a genuinely independent political party being allowed to emerge. The imprisonment in 1998 of the dissident Wu Wenli, for trying to establish an opposition party, is hardly an auspicious omen for liberal democracy in China.
Certainly China has made huge strides in improving its economy in the past 25 years and may overtake Japan as Asia’s pre-eminent power. The possibility of its booming economy collapsing spectacularly cannot be dismissed, however.
The changes introduced by Deng include, crucially, the establishment of special economic zones. Although dynamic, they account for a relatively small portion of the total economy. The suspension in these areas of rigid controls has attracted billions in investment by foreign companies, many of which are now established and export a wide range of products “made in China” all over the world, making China a serious force in the world economy.
One major problem is that portions of the economy remain under the control of a bureaucracy steeped in communist dogma, and many of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not financially viable.
Rather than surrender their control of the SOEs the CCP-controlled mandarins exercise their power over the state-controlled banking system to salvage them financially. The state is thus subsidising inefficiency with money that comes from the savings of the people of China, a situation which could cause hard-working citizens to rebel and start a major run on the banks, with grave implications.
Although many predict the collapse of President Hu Jintao’s government, an event that could usher in a period of instability that may negate many of the gains made since 1978, it is just as possible that China will transform itself into a modern multi-party democracy if it is bold and determined enough. Having made an impressive start under Deng, the time has come for further progress towards greater freedom for China’s aspirant and existing entrepreneurs, as well as the provision of space for Chinese citizens to exercise the nominal freedoms enshrined in the constitution.
While the argument for proceeding prudently to minimise the risks of inciting political instability has some merit, it needs to be set against the perils of political stasis, a situation that may be as or even more dangerous than rapid change.
Taiwan, regarded by the PRC as a province, but regarding itself as the Republic of China, has transformed itself into a modern democracy. A decisive shift towards multi-party democracy on the Chinese mainland would advance the cause of the peaceful reunification of China and Taiwan.
The oft-quoted Chinese proverb states that a journey of a thousand leagues begins with a first step. The People’s Republic is fortunate: it has taken several giant steps. It needs to resume the journey, cautiously if necessary, but with a determined commitment to reach the destination.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is widely seen as the last major bastion of one-party communist rule in the name of the proletariat, defined in China as workers and peasants. But, by is own reckoning, China is a communist-controlled multi-party state or, to adapt a term coined by South African Marxist theorists, a democracy of a special kind.
The PRC’s yearbook1 identifies the Communist Party of China (CCP) as the ruling party of China. Noting that the CCP has 67 million members, the yearbook adds that there are eight more parties with which the CCP co-operates and coexists. These parties, referred to as “democratic parties” in official publications, are not opposition parties, however. They participate “fully in the political life of the nation”. Founded in the 1940s, before the 1949 victory of Mao Zedong’s communist army over the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-Shek, these parties, having aligned themselves with Mao, are today represented in the standing committee of China’s supreme legislative institution, the National People’s Congress.
But, explains a high-ranking foreign affairs official in the autonomous region of Ningxia in central China, the function of these parties is to advise the government on how to improve the implementation of policy, not to oppose the policy per se2. Their combined total membership is less than 500 000 or a fraction of one percent of the CCP’s 67 million members. A central deduction flows from these facts: as the registered auxiliaries of the ruling party, they provide the CCP’s virtual monopoly of power with an aura of democracy.
China’s political system is as a variant of the “people’s democracies” of the former Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe. It is not an innovationary form of multi-party liberal democracy in which independent parties compete for a mandate to govern during elections held at prescribed internals and conducted according to agreed rules. Not surprisingly China is not on the list of liberal democracies identified by the Japanese American scholar Francis Fukuyama in his illuminating study on the growth and spread of liberal democracies through the globe over the last two and a bit centuries3.
Since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping came to power after the death of Mao in 1976, China has unquestionably taken great steps in freeing parts of the economy from government control and opening itself to increasing interaction with the outside world. The emergence of family-based profit-seeking agricultural units at village level, as well as the establishment of special economic zones in which market forces rather than state edicts prevail, bear testimony to the extension of greater freedom to citizens in the economic sphere. The freedom has not yet spread to the political sphere. The CCP still looms large and seemingly omnipotent there.
A jounalist’s note of a visit to the Shanghai Three Gun textile factory by a party of African journalists illustrates the point from a different perspective. The memo reads in part:
The 20-odd journalists receive an overview of the company’s impressive performance over the past few financial years. The speaker, Zhang Song Xiang, agrees to take questions. A journalist asks whether the factory workers have the right to strike. He looks puzzled as the question is translated from English into Chinese. He answers vaguely and inconclusively. The question is repeated. Zhang, whose card identifies him as a senior economist and vice director of the company, looks up hesitatingly before replying: “If the workers want to strike, they can apply to the local police station for permission”4. The answer tells its own tale, particularly as the government holds 45 per cent of the company’s shares.
Chinese government spokespersons offer various explanations for seeking to prevent or, at least, minimise the seepage of the newly conceded freedom from the economic to the political domain. Two interconnected rationales predominate: the need to proceed cautiously in the restructuring of post-Mao China and the belief that economic development is a more urgent imperative than political reform.
The starting point of the first elucidation is China’s huge dimensions. Covering an area of 9,6 million square kilometres, China is the third largest country in the world after Russia and Canada. Populated by 1,3 billion people speaking many different languages and dialects and containing 55 ethnic minorities as well as the majority Han people, China is the world’s most populous country. The multiplier effect on any mistake is proportionately huge. Even a little error of judgement can become a disastrous miscalculation by the time it has been magnified by an array of forces operating over a vast expanse of territory and within a multitude of people, many of whom still struggle to eke out an existence on a per capita income of less than half a US dollar a day or less than R3. Conscious of the potent impact of the multiplier effect on even minute misjudgements, the Chinese government tends to opt for a “hasten slowly” strategy.
The fate of the Soviet Union reinforces the inclination to prudence when it comes to restructuring. The Chinese are only too aware that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics imploded hardly six years after Mikhail Gorbachev took over from the aging generation of communist rulers in 1985, three years after the death of the bear-like Leonard Brezhnev. With the advantage of hindsight, it seems clear that Gorbachev proceeded too quickly on too many fronts with his policies of perestroika (reconstruction) and glasnost (transparency), consequently precipitating the 1991 attempted coup by intractable communists that led to his downfall, the rise of Boris Yeltsin and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the Chinese-American journalist and author, Gordon Chang, has observed: “The apparently swift collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites dramatised the dangers of moving too quickly. (It) solidified the thinking and stiffened the resistance of the old guard (in China)”5.
The second explanation for the paucity of political reform is that China’s priority at the present juncture of history is economic development, not political restructuring. The point is emphasised repeatedly to visiting journalists. An official publication contrasts China’s world ranking when the yardstick is gross domestic product (6th) with its position in the hierarchy of nations when the gauge is per capita income (138th)6. Qi Xinaque, a vice director general in the ministry of commerce, quotes more recent figures. They show that China’s per capita world ranking has improved since then to 112th while it has dropped marginally to 7th position in terms of its total GDP7. These adjustments may point to a minor improvement in the distribution of income which, if sustained, may herald a more significant shift.
Even so, Xinaque states, 100 million Chinese citizens still live on less than a dollar (about R6,50) a day. The average annual per capita income is just over US$1000 (approximately R6500 a year). The target is to raise it to US$3000 a year by 2020, assistant foreign minister Lv Guozeng states. In the rural areas there are still 27 million people living in poverty, about 20 million of whom exist below the poverty line, he adds. China still has a long journey to travel to meet its development targets, he expatiates.8
Another less articulated reason for prudence on the political front is the Tianamen Square massacre of 4 June 1989, when the Chinese government sent in tanks to crush a sustained pro-democracy demonstration by students in and around the square. The number of people who were killed is still a matter of dispute. The estimated number of fatalities during the four days of killing, in which heavy calibre machine guns and semi-automatic rifles were reportedly used9, varies widely. The upper range is between 2000 and 300010. Chinese officials are reluctant to talk about the massacre. They want to put it behind them, understandably in view of its negative impact on China’s world image and the resulting imposition of sanctions for a short while. The Chinese government seems to have concluded that it needs to tighten its political control to underwrite national stability and prevent similar pro-democracy demonstrations from diverting its attention away from economic development in the years ahead.
The Falun Gong religious movement is an apparent casualty of the Chinese government’s determination — or what its detractors see as its obsession — to maintain tight control. Falun Gong combines aspects of Buddhist and Taoist thought with prescribed physical exercises devised to raise the spiritual awareness of adherents. Falun Gong is, however, a prohibited movement in China today, notwithstanding the earlier granting of awards to its leader, Li Hongshi, by the government11. The government condemns it as an “evil cult” that is dabbling in political matters and spreading superstition. There are allegations, however, that the “real” reason for the government’s hostility is the ability of Falun Gong devotees to gather in large numbers at short notice, as they did outside the CCP’s national headquarters in Beijing in June 199912. The government has blocked information on the internet about Falun Gong and, in scenes reminiscent of medieval Europe, books and articles explaining its doctrines have reportedly been burned13.
The government’s repression of Falun Gong — which, while claiming the rights to freedom of expression and assembly to peacefully propagate its views, eschews violence — does not augur well for the chances of a genuinely independent political party being allowed to emerge further down the line when the government’s economic development plans are closer to fruition. The imprisonment in 1998 of the dissident Wu Wenli, for trying to establish an opposition party, is hardly an auspicious omen for the fate of liberal democracy in China14.
Whatever the disappointments about deferred political reform and the hopes for the introduction of liberal democracy in the future, China has indubitably made huge strides in improving the economy in the past 25 years. An editorial in the influential British publication The Economist, reflecting on the rise of China and the relative decline of Japan, observes: “… China surely is the real star of Asia, destined to out-sprint the sluggish, over-rigid Japanese economy and eventually to dominate the region’s politics as well as its economy”15. The Economist appends a qualification, however. Though the “Chinese hare” impresses and worries its Asian neighbours, Japan has “showed itself to be a steady, prosperous and reliable tortoise” and, in Japanese fables, “tortoises do win races (and) are symbols of potency”16.
These propositions are not as contradictory as they seem on first sight. China has the propensity to overtake Japan as Asia’s pre-eminent power and to establish its hegemony in the region. The possibility of its booming economy collapsing spectacularly cannot be dismissed, however: without diligent and prudent management boom is often the prelude to bust.
The changes introduced by the diminutive but brave-hearted Deng include, crucially, the establishment of special economic zones. The suspension in these areas of the rigid controls imposed by the communist-controlled state has attracted billions of rands of investment by foreign companies. Many are now firmly established in China and export a wide range of products “made in China” to the far-flung corners of the globe. South Africa is no exception: South African shops stock a plethora of Chinese-made merchandise from high-quality electronic items to clothing sufficiently elegant and diverse to satisfy the most snobbish parvenu as well as the truly sophisticated consumer. The China-based export industry has raised China’s profile from an austere communist country sheltering behind the “bamboo curtain” to a major force in the world economy. It has helped China identify itself as a country bursting with entrepreneurial energy.
The testimony of Jeffrey Sachs, the distinguished American economist who has served as economic advisor to a wide range of countries, including China, is worth quoting. “Since 1978, China has been the world’s most successful economy, growing at an average per capita rate of almost 8 per cent per year. At that rate the average income per person has doubled every nine years and thus increased almost eightfold by 2003 compared with 1978”17. It is a magnificent achievement, of which China is justifiably proud.
There is a major problem, however. Large portions of the economy remain under the firm control of a bureaucracy still steeped in communist dogma. Compared with those portions of the economy in which state-owned industries are dominant, and where the hand of state apparatchiks rests heavily, the special economic zones, concentrated largely on China’s eastern seaboard, form a relatively small portion of the total economy.
The ramifications of the problem run deep and spread wide. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) constitute a major portion of the economy, but — worse still — many are not viable financially. Rather than surrender their control of the SOEs by subjecting them to the competition of the market, the CCP-controlled mandarins exercise their power over the state-controlled banking system to salvage them financially. The state is thus subsidising inefficiency with money that, in the final analysis, comes from the savings of the people of China18. Though the money is theoretically advanced as loans to the SOEs, the loans are not infrequently written off as bad debts. The ever-present danger in the situation is that the hard-working citizens of China may rebel and demand their money from the banks rather than allow it to be used to keep malfunctioning SOEs afloat. It would result in a major run on the banks, with grave implications for China and its hopes of regaining its status of a millennium ago when it was a major world power accounting for an estimated quarter of the world’s GDP.
The editor of the China Economic Quarterly, Joe Studwell, writes: “… the state in China, like its banking system, finds it all too easy to part with money; neither is it subject to effective outside supervision, whether from the media, electors or shareholders”19. He quotes China’s finance minister, Xiang Huaicheng as describing the situation as yangu, meaning grim. He reckons that the government’s “total contingent debt” is not less than an astounding 80 per cent of China’s GDP20.
There is no shortage of doomsday chroniclers who predict the collapse of President Hu Jintao’s government, an event that could usher in a period of grave instability that may negate many of the gains made since 1978. Those who foresee a potentially calamitous collapse in the making include Gordon Chang, the author of The Coming Collapse of China and Robert Harvey, author of Comrades, The Rise and Fall of World Communism. Harvey writes of China: “The alliance of party bosses and military figures that succeeded Deng (Xiaoping)… could last a few more years. But fall it will, as assuredly as the regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe before it”.
The outcome is not written in stone, however. The regime — to use the pejorative label favoured by Harvey — is not destined to collapse or implode. It can transform itself into a modern multi-party democracy if it is bold and determined enough. Having made an impressive start under Deng, the time has come for further progress towards greater freedom for China’s aspirant and existing entrepreneurs, as well as the provision of space for Chinese citizens to exercise the nominal freedoms, including those of free speech, assembly and association, enshrined in the constitution. These freedoms logically imply — or should imply if conventional meanings are attached to the inscribed words — the freedom to form political parties and oppose the ruling CCP.
While the argument for proceeding prudently in the march towards the future to minimise the risks of inciting political stability is not without merit, it needs to be set against the perils of political stasis, a situation that may be as or even more dangerous than rapid change. As Chang remarks, gradualism taken to extremes can become the acceptable face of denial that there is a need for change21.
The People’s Republic of China regards Taiwan as one of its provinces, though Taiwan labels itself the Republic of China (RoC) and sees itself as the guardian of the republic established by Sun Yet-sen in 1911, as distinct from the one established by Mao Zedong on mainland China in 1949. Since then Taiwan has transformed itself from a dictatorship under martial law to a modern democracy in which there are constitutionally prescribed elections. It has fulfilled the criterion that many political theorists regard as the most vital test of the viability of democracy: the defeat of the incumbent government in an election followed by the peaceful transfer of power to the victorious opposition party. In Taiwan’s case that has happened twice: first in 2000 when Chen Shun-bai of the Democratic Progressive Party was elected as president and again in 2004 when Chen was re-elected in a presidential election.
A decisive shift towards multi-party democracy on the Chinese mainland would advance the cause of peaceful reunification between China and Taiwan. It has been repeatedly emphasised as a necessary condition, though not necessarily a sufficient condition, for reintegration of the two polities by the leaders of the main parties in Taiwan, Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party.
Establishment of a liberal democracy on the mainland would be a far more difficult task, however, given the geographical size and huge population of the PRC. The oft-quoted Chinese proverb states that a journey of a thousand leagues begins with a first step. The People’s Republic is fortunate: thanks to the wisdom and courage of Deng, it has already taken several giant steps on the proverbial thousand-league journey. It needs to resume the journey, cautiously if necessary but with determined commitment to reaching the destination.
The near unanimous decision to award China the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games may be regarded as a gesture of international goodwill to fortify it for the long journey ahead. The recent launching of China’s second manned space mission shows that it has the ability to reach for the sky.
Endnotes
1 China 2004. New Star Publishers. Beijing.
2 Discussion with Chen Zhigang, deputy foreign affairs director
general in Ningxia.
3 The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin, 1992.
4 The writer was present on the tour.
5 The Coming Collapse of China, Gordon C Chang. Random House,
2001.
6 China in Diagrams, State Council Information Office, 2003.
7 Briefing session in Beijing.
8 Ibid.
9 The China Dream, Joe Studwell, Profile Books, 2005. Joe Stud
2005.
10 Oxford Dictory of Contemporary World History, Oxford, 2003.
11 Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia
(www.en.wikipedia.org.wiki).
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Collins World Encyclopedia, 2005.
15 The Economist, 8th October 2005.
16 Ibid.
17 The End of Poverty, Jeffrey Sachs. Penguin 2005.
18 The China Dream, op cit, provides an excellent account.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. Page 301.
21 Gordon Chang, op cit.
