Electoral Reform: Representation - a conceptual analysis

Introduction

Representation can be thought of as the act of standing in place of, or the exercise of proxy on behalf of, another, or the advocacy of a set of preferred interests. A represented interest is separate to, and distinct from, the interests of the representative – even where the two may, in fact, align. When it comes to political representation, it is this distinction which is supposed to shield representatives from being both judge and party in the issues which they determine: those being the interests of the nation, the people, the voters. Essentially, the public interest.

James Madison was wary of sinister representatives who obtain the vote only to betray the interests of the electorate. So how do we define the line between the interests of the representative and the represented? Madison lauded the “happy combination” of a federal constitution as forcing negotiation and compromise among majority and minority group interests in a republican setting[1].

The South African Constitution is one which, through principles, values, and norms, embodies, by consensus, a national interest which transcends party, faction, and individual in favour of a collective democratic framework. Within this democratic agreement, we might have certain expectations of our political representatives, but what are these expectations based on? Before we can determine how we expect our representatives to represent, it would help to engage with our understanding of the concept of representation.

Conceptions of representation

The historical primer to thinking about the nature of the political representative was to consider first whether representatives should act as delegates or trustees[2]. A delegate represents the expressed preferences of their constituents while trustees are selected for their discretion to decide on the best course of action.

Madison, who espouses the delegate view of representation, saw having a large and diverse constituency as a way of mitigating the risk of the faction described earlier[3]. Conversely, Edmund Burke’s conception of trustee representation flows from the argument that representatives, once seconded to Parliament, sit as a “deliberative assembly” to represent the national interest, and not “different and hostile interests” – to this end, discretion is integral to the exercise of decision-making of the representative in Parliament.

Hanna Pitkin[4] and Jane Mansbridge[5] have pioneered important ways of understanding and interpreting forms of representation itself. Pitkin provides the following concepts[6]:

• Formalistic representation is characterised by authorisation and accountability through sanction. Electoral replacement exists as an incentive for good performance (at least in theory) although there are no standards for assessing performance[7] – the only criteria for representation is whether the office is held legitimately. Importantly, the threat of no longer holding office is different to the question of whether someone represents/is considered a representative.
• Symbolic representation concerns itself with the meaning of the representative to the represented constituency or cause. Struggle leaders in liberation movements or Greta Thunberg as a representative of global climate change activism are examples of symbolic representatives – where the ability to represent is contingent on the acceptance of the representative (and some instances, externally imposed.)
• Descriptive representation’s central concern is the existence of common interests (usually found through the demographic grouping of the representative). The representative resembles or shares common experiences with the represented group.
• Substantive representation can be identified by the alignment between the interests of the representative and those being represented – this form of representation can take the form of special interest groups, lobbyists or even from civil society.

Mansbridge extends these categories to consider four more forms of representation:

• Promissory representation and Pitkin’s formalistic representation share commonalities in that they both emphasise consent of the constituency (electorate). The mode of accountability is prospective as representatives are evaluated based on the promises made during election campaigns[8].
• By contrast, in anticipatory representation representatives act to please future voters in order to secure a seat at the next election[9].
• Gyroscopic representation is premised on trustworthiness of the representative and implies trustee representation, The representative “looks within” to best determine how to act[10].
• And finally, surrogate representation describes the scenario where constituent interests may exceed jurisdictional boundaries – in other words, where one lacks an “electoral relationship” with the representative[11].

Conclusion

The concepts outlined in this brief indicate that there are nuanced and contested ideas of political representation. Their purpose is to encourage reflection on how and where our representatives fit into, overlap, resemble or are distinct from the various ways of conceiving of legitimate political representation.

We can then start to narrow our legitimate and enforceable expectations of our political representatives and form a clearer idea of the value and meaning of our vote.

Kimera Chetty
Legal Researcher
kimera@hsf.org.za

[1] Madison, James. [1788] 1987. “Federalist No.10.” In The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick, New York: Penguin