It is difficult to explain South
Africa’s position towards Zimbabwe along either realist or idealist
modes of foreign policy analysis. The realist view holds that states
seek to maximise their key interests, but there is no evidence that
either quiet diplomacy or tacit support for the Zimbabwe government has
done this. The idealist interpretation offers no clearer insight.
According to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, our foreign policy is aimed at
promoting ‘democracy, good governance, people-centred development,
peace, stability and security…’ But it is impossible to reconcile those
goals with our stance towards the humanitarian crisis unfolding in
Zimbabwe. Our quiet diplomacy approach has no clear objectives, no time
frame, and is non-verifiable. It is also inconsistent with our efforts
to mediate conflicts elsewhere. Southern Africa has lost an estimated
US$36 billion in potential investment as a direct result of the
Zimbabwe crisis. Our parastatals have also paid a heavy price, with
Zimbabwe defaulting on its debts to both Eskom and Sasol. Moreover,
there are now approximately two million Zimbabwean refugees in South
Africa. This has increased pressure on jobs and housing, and has also
spawned criminal activity. Other costs include a substantial reduction
in tourism and a looming environmental crisis as a result of poor
animal husbandry in expropriated farms. The rand’s precipitous drop in
2001 was in part influenced by negative market sentiment regarding the
contagion effect of Zimbabwe. South Africa’s international prestige has
also suffered. What alternative policies could South Africa consider?
This country has considerable economic leverage over Zimbabwe.
Approximately a third of Zimbabwe’s fuel is railed through South
Africa, and we supply 20 per cent of its electricity. Zimbabwe is also
deeply in debt to South Africa. Therefore, sanctions are a potentially
powerful tool. These could be targeted against specific individuals and
organisations associated with the regime, and could include the
freezing of bank accounts, restrictions on travel and seizure of
property. Credit from South African parastatals should also be
curtailed. At the same time, civil society in Zimbabwe should be
offered material support. Clearly, there would have to be an exit
strategy for president Mugabe, including possibly an amnesty. Potential
difficulties include the problem of limiting the harm done to the
Zimbabwean populace, Mr Mugabe’s evident unconcern about damage to the
economy, the length of time needed for sanctions to bite, and the
likelihood that Zanu-PF would control and use humanitarian aid for its
own advantage. Despite these risks, however, it is time for South
Africa to abandon quiet diplomacy and consider sanctions.
“South Africa must be the only country without vital interests” a
senior Pretoria-based diplomat remarked recently. The diplomat
concerned was maligning South Africa’s contrasting diplomatic positions
of “positive engagement” with Iraq and that of “quiet diplomacy” with
Zimbabwe.
It is difficult to explain South Africa’s position towards Zimbabwe
along either realist/traditionalist or idealist modes of foreign policy
analysis. The former holds that states behave in a “rational actor”
basis and constantly seek to maximise their key, core, or vital
interests, however defined. There is no convincing evidence to
demonstrate that either quiet diplomacy or tacit support of the
Zimbabwe government have advanced any of South Africa’s vital
interests.
If South Africa’s position towards Zimbabwe cannot be explained in
realist or traditionalist terms, the idealist interpretation offers no
clearer insight. Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma reminded
Parliament in May 2001: “Our foreign policy... is not only anchored in
our domestic policy, but on (the) responsibility... that South Africa
offers hope for all humanity... (We) have to contribute to the ongoing
struggle for a better world... Internationally, we continue to struggle
for a world with the following values... democracy, good governance,
people-centred development, peace, stability and security, promotion of
co-operation, partnership and good neighbourliness”.
Given the acute and deepening humanitarian crisis unfolding in
Zimbabwe, it is impossible to square South Africa’s stance towards its
most important northern neighbour with that of its avowed commitment to
a human rights-orientated foreign policy.
South Africa’s quiet diplomacy approach to Zimbabwe hardly qualifies
as policy. It is non-verifiable, non-specific, has no clear or given
objectives or deliverables and does not permit either the local or
international community to understand the substance of the positions
adopted. No time frame or framework for engagement has ever been
published or agreed to, except the announcement in October 2002 that
South Africa and Zimbabwe would hold bi-annual talks. That response to
a national and regional catastrophe is inadequate and
disproportionate.
The approach of quiet diplomacy is, moreover, conceptually flawed as
it makes the fundamental assumption that engagement with a political
leader, who has abrogated the most basic tenets of democracy and the
rule of law, will be amenable to a quiet diplomatic approach to change.
The South African government has failed to place the superordinate
principles of humanity, human rights, and good governance above
fraternal links and domestic political concerns. Thus there is an acute
dissonance between Pretoria’s avowed approach to foreign policy and its
practice.
Furthermore, South Africa’s approach to Zimbabwe is inconsistent with
its tried and trusted practice of seeking to mediate conflicts
elsewhere in Africa and further afield by providing a platform for
constructive dialogue between political opponents, whether in Burundi,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo or even in the Middle East through
the Spier initiative.
Recent reports of high-level kite flying by senior Zanu-PF figures,
however, suggest that events may be overtaking the ruling
septuagenarian, but likewise may also be overtaking South Africa’s
position of quiet diplomacy.
What cost South African policy
towards Zimbabwe?
In December 2001, Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin noted in
Harare: “We all know that a rising tide lifts all ships and a strong
regional economy is essential for the success of any one nation... In a
short period in Zimbabwe the industrial capacity has been destroyed.
What is happening to ordinary people and workers is absolutely
devastating”. The cost of South Africa’s position is impossible to
measure in financial terms but the downward trajectory of trade between
the two countries is easier to plot and is demonstrated in Table
One.
Foreign direct investment (FDI), the key driver of growth in any
developing economy, has been hit hard by concerns over Zimbabwe and its
potentially destabilising effect on South Africa. In 1997 portfolio
investment in Zimbabwe stood at around US$32 million (about R272
million). The pattern has however changed with the country registering
net outflows in the US$10-$15 million (about R85-R127 million) range
over the past two years.
The International Crisis Group has estimated that the loss of
potential investment to Southern Africa as a direct result of the
Zimbabwe crisis is some US$36 billion (about R306,5 billion, i.e.
R306,5 thousand million, or ‘milliard’). In addition South Africa’s
parastatals have paid a heavy price. Zimbabwe has defaulted on its debt
to both Eskom and Sasol. As the ICG notes, “SA utilities are thus
carrying Zimbabwe with longer and longer credit lines for electricity
and fuel”.
The American Chamber of Commerce has estimated that for the year to
mid-2001 South Africa had lost US$ 3 billion (about R25,5 billion) in
potential investment as a result of the Zimbabwean crisis. BusinessMap
echoes that sentiment. During the period of the Zimbabwean crisis South
Africa’s own investment risk rating has declined slightly, making it a
less attractive destination for scarce capital.
The South African business community has steadily increased its
criticism of South Africa’s position on Zimbabwe. Chairman of Sasol
Paul Kruger stated in his 2002 annual address to shareholders: “(Quiet)
diplomacy pursued by the South African government has had no material
effect on the appalling occurrences in Zimbabwe”. Kruger went on to
warn of the impact of Zimbabwe on the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (Nepad). “The despotic conduct of that country’s leadership
and the anarchy and abuse of human rights appear to go unabated,
thereby tarnishing the image of the whole continent.”
On the reverse side of the social and economic spectrum, ANC alliance
partner Cosatu has been far more vocal than the government in its
condemnation of Zanu-PF policies, in particular as they pertain to the
curtailment of worker rights and freedoms. The fraternal relationship
between Cosatu and elements of the MDC are, however, a cause of
friction between the government and the labour federation. Indeed South
Africa’s official stance on Zimbabwe can to some degree be explained in
terms of domestic imperatives of the government attempting to curb the
ascendancy of both populist and workerist tendencies within the
alliance.
The Zimbabwe crisis has also propelled an unwanted refugee phenomenon
across the border particularly through Messina. It is estimated that
two million Zimbabweans have sought refuge in South Africa. That has
the deleterious effect of placing increased stress on the South African
job market and scarce housing, besides causing a drainage of skills and
people from Zimbabwe. Most of these immigrants are “illegal” and have
given rise to a network of criminal activity in border towns. Some
1,200 illegal immigrants are repatriated to Zimbabwe every week. The
government has put in place emergency measures to accommodate a feared
mass exodus of immigrants.
There are additional material costs to South Africa of the Zimbabwean
meltdown. They include a substantial reduction in tourist numbers
between the two countries as well as a looming environmental crisis
being driven by poor animal husbandry practices in newly expropriated
farms, as well as a foot and mouth crisis that is rapidly growing out
of control.
The precipitous drop in the value of the rand during 2001, the
subsequent importation of inflation and the corrective hiking of
domestic interest rates, were in part influenced by negative market
sentiment regarding Zimbabwe through the contagion effect. Rand-linked
regional currencies, particularly the Namibian dollar, were affected as
well as the rand.
At the level of international prestige and standing, South Africa’s
position on Zimbabwe has had a profound impact on particularly western
countries’ perceptions of President Mbeki’s political leadership and
his brainchild, Nepad. One diplomat argued that, after the holding of
the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Australia in 2002,
during which Zimbabwe was a key issue, Nepad became a programme that
needed more than support. It had to be defended as well. Even more
pessimistically, a senior Africanist scholar has remarked that,
“Nepad’s headstone will no doubt have Zimbabwe inscribed on it”.
Policy alternatives
If quiet diplomacy has been the abject failure it is broadly held to
be, given the parlous state of the Zimbabwean economy and its deepening
humanitarian crisis, what are the alternative policy responses that may
be considered by South Africa?
South Africa enjoys considerable economic leverage over its northern
neighbour should it choose to exercise it. Zimbabwe is currently
dependent on South Africa for the transiting of a high percentage of
its US$40 million (about R3,4 billion) monthly fuel supplies (see Table
Two); and for providing 20 per cent (300MW) of its electricity (another
20 per cent comes from Cahora Bassa in Mozambique).
Zimbabwe currently imports around 3,5 to 4 million litres of fuel per
day. Before the current economic decline, daily consumption was 5,2
million litres, with seasonal peaks driven by the agricultural sector.
Approximately one-third of its needs are railed up from South Africa.
The Beira-Harare pipeline has a daily capacity of 3 million litres,
though it is operating currently at around 70 per cent of its
potential. BBR Railways — a joint venture with Spoornet — moves 600,000
tons of liquid fuels from Beitbridge to Bulawayo. An estimated 2
million litres of fuel are being used per week in the Congo. It is
important to note that there has already been a considerable decline in
rail transport flows (see Table Two).
South Africa is a significant debtor state of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is
deeply in debt to South Africa. The debt includes a R60 million Telkom
credit line to the Zimbabwean Posts and Telecommunications Department,
the (R75 million maximum) overdraft extended by the South African
Reserve Bank to its Zimbabwean counterpart, export credit reinsurance
provided by the South African government to the Zimbabwean iron and
steel parastatal Zisco, and around R80 million in Eskom electricity
payments.
Sanctions are a serious but potentially powerful tool and, in the
light of the failure of measures hitherto adopted, now require serious
consideration. The impact of sanctions on the regime must be
distinguished from that on the population. A list of specific
individuals and organisations associated with the regime could be
identified, and sanctions targeted as precisely as possible against
these. Simultaneously, civil society forces in Zimbabwe could and
should be materially supported.
If applied, sanctions against Zimbabwe could be calibrated in the
following manner:
- ‘Smart’ sanctions against individuals associated with the regime, including the freezing of bank accounts, restrictions on travel, and seizure of property.
- Curtailing credit from South African parastatals Sasol, Eskom, Telkom and Transnet on their sales to Zimbabwe of oil, electricity and telecommunication and transport services.
These measures would need to be sequenced, according to the Zimbabwean
government response.
Further measures could be imposed, but their threatened imposition
could be used prior to it. These would take the form of
multilaterally-mandated sanctions (UN, SADC, EU, AU, Commonwealth), and
could, in an extreme case, include a border blockade on both imports
and exports, and the suspension/removal of Zimbabwe from leadership and
representative functions in international bodies.
Importantly, these measures have to be wielded in conjunction with the
formulation and application of an exit strategy for President Robert
Mugabe, including possibly a leadership amnesty.
There are a number of difficulties in applying sanctions, which should
be acknowledged, however:
- There is a need to limit the damage done to the Zimbabwean people and target the Zimbabwean regime.
- To a great extent, Mr Mugabe has already self-imposed financial and travel restrictions on himself and his country, and is evidently unmoved by damage to the economy.
- Most inter-governmental initiatives, with the notable exception of a physical blockade, would take time to bite.
- Any immediate-term impact of sanctions would, to a degree, be offset by the flow of humanitarian aid, which is likely to be controlled by Zanu-PF and used to its political advantage.
- The uneven application of measures by different states would, to some extent, undermine their efficacy.
- Sanctions would have to be carefully sequenced, and involve a number of key states (such as Mozambique if fuel supplies were to be withheld).
Despite the risks and dangers inherent in a shift of policy, it is
time for South Africa to formally abandon its failed position of “quiet
diplomacy” towards the Zimbabwe regime and to consider sharper options.
For the sake of national self-interest and ultimately that of ordinary
Zimbabweans, it is time for South Africa to seriously consider
sanctions.
Table One: Imports to and exports
from Zimbabwe in thousands of Zimbabwean dollars (which have
depreciated alarmingly since the crisis started gathering momentum in
2000). (Figures for 2002 are currently not available).
SA Total Regional Traffic 4,883,148 1,587,670 4,640,233 1,720,296
